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ABSTRACT  
   
The concept of recognition developed through the 20th century as a form of 
political legitimation has served a central if problematic role in understanding 
international politics. On the one hand, recognition aims toward establishing essential 
collective identities that must be conceived as relatively stable in order to then gain 
respect, receive political protection, and occupy both physical and discursive space. On 
the other hand, recognition tacitly accepts a social constructivist view of the subject who 
can only become whole unto itself – and in turn exercise positive liberty, freedom, or 
agency – through the implied assent or explicit consent of another. There is an inherent 
tension between these two understandings of recognition. The attempt to reconcile this 
tension often manifests itself in forms of symbolic and systemic violence that can turn to 
corporeal harm. In order to enter into the concept, history, politics and performativity of 
recognition, I focus on what is often viewed as an exceptionally complex and uniquely 
controversial case: the Israel-Palestine conflict. Undergoing a discourse analysis of three 
epistemic communities (i.e., the State/diplomatic network, the Academic/intellectual 
network, the Military-Security network) and their unique modes of veridiction, I show 
how each works to construct the notion of ethno-nationalism as a necessary political logic 
that holds the promise of everything put in its right place: Us here, Them there. All three 
epistemic communities are read as knowledge/power networks that have substantial 
effect on political subjects and subjectivities. Influenced by the philosophy of Hegel and 
Levinas, and supported by the works of Michel Foucault, Wendy Brown, Alphonso 
Lingis, Jacques Derrida, Patchen Markell, and others, I show the ways in which our 
current politics of recognition is best read as violence. By tracing three discursive 
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networks of knowledge/power implicated in our modern politics of recognition, I 
demonstrate forms of symbolic violence waged against the entire complex of the Israel-
Palestine conflict in ways that preclude a just resolution based on mutual empathy, 
acknowledgment, and (re)cogntion. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 
We need the Palestinian leadership to rise and say, simply "We have had enough 
of this conflict. We recognize the right of the Jewish People to a state its own in 
this Land. We will live side by side in true peace."… The fundamental condition 
for ending the conflict is the public, binding and sincere Palestinian recognition of 
Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish People… Palestinians must truly 
recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people.1 
– Israel Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, “Bar-Ilan Speech,” June 14, 2009 
 
The 'Jewish state.' What is a 'Jewish state?' We call it the 'State of Israel.' You can 
call yourselves whatever you want, but I will not accept it. I say this on a live 
broadcast. It's not my job to define it, to provide a definition for the state and what 
it contains. You can call yourselves the Zionist Republic, the Hebrew, the 
National, the Socialist [Republic]. Call it whatever you like. I don't care.2  
– Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, April 26, 2009 
 
I don’t feel we need declaration from the Palestinians that they recognize Israel as 
a Jewish state… The whole concept, to me, of the State of Israel is that we 
recognize ourselves; that after 2000 years of being dependent on people, we are 
now independent and make our own rules.3  
– Former Israel Minister of Finance Yair Lapid, October 7, 2013. 
 
 
This is a study on empathy; more precisely, the barriers to its development. The study 
will not involve direct explication of the contours of empathy, the history of the concept, 
its importance for human life and social health, its exploration and development through 
the academic literature, or other critically important issues that deserve – arguably require 
                                                 
1 “Full Text of Netanyahu’s Foreign Policy Speech at Bar Ilan,” Haaretz, June 14, 2009, accessed May 4, 
2016, http://www.haaretz.com/news/full-text-of-netanyahu-s-foreign-policy-speech-at-bar-ilan-1.277922. 
 
2 The quote pre-dates Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan speech but was in response to the weeks preceding 
Netanyahu’s election in April 2009, when the Prime Minister began to iterate this demand.  
Palestinian Media Watch, last modified April 19, 2009, accessed May 4, 2016, 
http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=381&fld_id=381&doc_id=1143. 
 
3 The Charlie Rose Show, October 7, 2013, accessed on May 4, 2016, https://charlierose.com/videos/23266. 
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– serious attention. And yet, a concern for and with empathy provides the motivation and 
background of this study.  
More immediately, this is a study on the concept of recognition. In what follows, I 
argue that the concept of recognition, developed through the 20th century as a form of 
political legitimation, has served a central if problematic role in understanding 
international politics. The term has an inherent tension that arises from its dual function. 
On the one hand, recognition aims toward establishing essential collective identities that 
must be conceived as relatively stable in order to then gain respect, receive political 
protection, and occupy both physical and discursive space. On the other hand, recognition 
tacitly accepts a social constructivist view of the subject who can only become whole 
unto itself – and in turn exercise positive liberty, freedom, or agency – through the 
implied assent or explicit consent of another. The ends of recognition (political stability) 
appear to be at odds with its means (social construction). 
Through the 20th and into the 21st century, the process and practice of recognition 
has perpetuated forms of ontological violence that can often slip into corporeal insecurity 
and harm to peoples. The modern conception of recognition in this way offers a false 
promise of security. It is my intention to hold the modern conception of recognition to 
account for all the risks involved in its promotion. The principles of the enlightenment – 
rendered in the Kantian and Hegelian sense as the development of Reason through 
History – are betrayed by the modern rendering of recognition, a concept that has been 
entrusted to light the way toward achieving the highest aspirations of the human species: 
freedom, liberty, sociality, agency, and the virtues that might provide access to these lofty 
goals. In order to extricate ourselves from the harmful binds of the modern recognition 
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discourse, I offer a case for placing (re)cogntion – and the ethics implied by the concept, 
which I will develop shortly – at the center of our political practice.  
In order to enter into the concept, history, politics and performativity of 
recognition, I have chosen to focus on what is often viewed as an exceptionally complex 
and uniquely controversial case: the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Israel-Palestine conflict 
is perhaps the most contentious and notorious struggle for recognition in the 20th century. 
Alongside what were the seemingly intractable conflicts in South Africa and Northern 
Ireland, the Israel-Palestine conflict has been described as a case that is hopelessly 
fraught with injustice.  
Solutions, when they are offered, almost always resign themselves to some degree 
of necessary harm done unto the conflicting parties. Early Zionist leaders, for example, 
understood the tension inherent in their ideal, even if their conclusions pointed toward the 
inevitability of tragedy. Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the ideological father of Revisionist Zionism 
and a man not especially sympathetic to Palestinian aspirations, explained that “the 
tragedy lies in the fact that there is a collision between two truths… But our justice is 
greater.”4 Similar views had been expressed by such notable Zionists as Chaim 
Weizmann, Israel’s first President and the Zionist movement’s chief negotiator in the pre-
State period, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founding father and first Prime Minister, and 
Albert Einstein, the brilliant physicist and pride of the Jewish people.  
The inevitability of tragedy was similarly noted by the other peoples who settled 
Palestine. Early Arab and later Palestinian nationalists were sympathetic in general to the 
                                                 
4 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: 
Vintage, 2001), 108. 
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suffering of the Jewish people throughout the 19th and 20th century. They could hardly 
accept the principle, however, that the Jews had a unique right to the Land of Palestine, 
especially not over and above the rights of those who had lived in the Promised Land for 
centuries prior to the development of Zionist movement. The demand for the creation and 
recognition of a Jewish homeland in British Mandate Palestine, for recognition of the 
State of Israel following the 1948 War, and for recognition of Israel as a Jewish State in 
recent years all appeared as violent impositions. Palestinian nationalist responses, like 
those of the Zionist movements, ranged from outright rejection of Jewish Statehood to 
timid recognition of the State of Israel as a new reality. And like many Jewish 
nationalists, Palestinian nationalists advocated less for co-existence as they did for 
separation and the requisite recognition of each community’s separate if not equal right to 
parts of the land.  
Both movements suffered at the hands of the other in the decades that followed. 
The aspiration of mutual recognition, viewed by many to hold the promise of 
coexistence, nonetheless seemed to always bear varying degrees of injustice. Israeli 
recognition of the Palestinian State would in the eyes of many Jews amount to a self-
denial and abdication of the Land promised to the people by God. For many secular Jews 
not swayed by religious fervor, acceding to Palestinian demands amounts to rewarding 
the heinous acts of violence, terror and incitement against Jewish Israelis since the 
founding of the state.  
For some Palestinians, recognizing the Jewish State amounts to an abdication of 
their inherent rights to the land from which they were displaced not a generation ago. For 
many others, recognizing the Jewish State is tantamount to denying their own tragic 
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history of injustice at the hands of the Jewish settlers and colonizers. But if the politics of 
recognition implied a surrender to violence that could not be justly supported, then 
neither could recognition be ignored or dismissed.  
As Palestinian nationalists are well aware, Zionists throughout history and into 
modern times have argued that the Palestinians are a modern invention, and as such, have 
no right to their own state. As the old Zionist slogan went, Israel was “A land without a 
people for a people without a land,” whatever the truth might have been.5 As Israeli 
Prime Minister Golda Meir stated in 1969, “There was no such thing as 
Palestinians…They did not exist.”  
In light of these arguably still dominant views – dominant if current Israeli 
political discourse is any sign – Palestinian nationalists have understandably placed 
importance on their own recognition. Whether in recognition of the PLO during the Oslo 
Accords, in the negotiations with the Government of Israel to recognize the State of 
Palestine, or in diplomatic relations with other states and international bodies like the 
UN, recognition of the Palestinians right to a state of their own is a central condition for 
the Palestinian nationalist movement. As one of the longest standing and as of yet 
unsettled post-colonial nationalist struggles, official representatives of the Palestinian 
national movement continue to push for a solution via the problematic concept of 
recognition.  
                                                 
5 As Benny Morris documents, Ahad Ha’Am wrote during his 1891 visit to Palestine: “We abroad are used 
to believing that Eretz Israel is now almost totally desolate, a desert that is not sowed… But in truth this is 
not the case. Throughout the country it is difficult to find fields that are not sowed. Only sand dunes and 
stony mountains…are not cultivated.” Morris, Righteous Victims, 42.  
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As I argue below, the politics of recognition, while appearing as a general 
political trend since the 19th century, has seen a modern re-emergence and qualitative 
shift. Until the first decade of the 21st century, the Zionist political project aimed at 
securing Jewish hegemony over the land designated as Palestine by force and this project 
was largely if not completely successful. Unable to secure full dominance and legitimacy 
by force, a new strategy has recently emerged which cannot quite extirpate itself from 
past violence. This new strategy, which seeks explicit annunciation of recognition by the 
Palestinians of Israel as a Jewish State, is itself a too often unacknowledged form of 
violence. For all the pretensions of a negotiated, mutual agreement on a peaceable final 
status solution for control over the lands between the Jordan River and the 
Mediterranean, the recognition discourse in its current form would bind the peoples, both 
Jewish and Palestinian, to an all-too-rigid and exclusivist political relation that would 
only serve to extend the tragedy of two peoples (are there only two?) in one land.  
 
The Jewish State 
 
Before trying to present recognition of a Jewish State as a form of violence, it may be 
worthwhile to recite, if only briefly, the underlying history, logic, and affective appeal of 
the Jewish State. The Jewish State is an aspirational project with a goal toward not simply 
providing a home for the Jewish people, but providing a Jewish home. Notice, for 
example, the settler-inspired political party led by Naftali Bennett, appropriately called 
Ha’Bayit Ha’Yehudi (The Jewish Home). If this attachment to a Jewish Home were 
merely represented in the right-wing neo-revanchist elements of the Zionist movement 
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and ideology, that would be enough. But in fact, this aspiration is diffuse and appears to 
represent the values of the majority of Jewish Israelis.  
As early as the Balfour Declaration, the “establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish People” had been the guiding principle of the Zionist project. Of 
course, the October 31, 1917 declaration included the proviso that it be “clearly 
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights 
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” The extent to which this latter proviso 
can be made consistent with a state that declares an ethno-national character cannot be 
easily ascertained. The difficulty has to do with the ideals of liberalism that work at 
cross-purposes. The Liberal (Republican) State is based on the conception that the will of 
the people are represented in government actions, even if “the people” are not directly 
involved in decision-making practices. The people must have their interests represented 
in state action simply as part of their basic, generic identity as human beings with 
universal equal rights. However, the Liberal State also depends upon the unique social, 
cultural, and national affiliations of a distinct people – it depends upon identity conceived 
in terms of difference. Between these particularistic interests (i.e., national interest) and 
the universal rights (i.e., human rights) there exists constant tension that is resolved (or 
not) through the discursive performance and affective engagement of politics.   
It is important to note that while Balfour called for a home for the Jewish people, 
it did not articulate the notion of a Jewish Home, and there are important differences 
between these two conceptions. There has been a trend in recent years within the Zionist 
movement from seeking a home for the Jewish people toward seeking a Jewish Home. 
This is not to say that the latter has not been central to elements of the Zionist movement 
  8 
from the outset. The character of the State of Israel has long been debated and one can 
readily find historical precedent or influence from previous eras in the contemporary 
political scene. Still, I argue that the logic of the Zionist project as a whole – and thus of 
the government of Israel – has increasingly become one best expressed by former Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak: “us over here, them over there.”6 In recent years, forces across the 
political spectrum have attempted to make this slogan appear reasonable, plausible, and 
desirable.  
This slogan, it turns out, was one that emerged from the center-left Labor Party. 
Recall that the Labor Party, in the most recent elections (2014), decided to form a 
coalition and adopted the party name Mahane Ha’Zioni (The Zionist Camp). This was the 
Labor Party, the purported left spectrum of mainstream Israeli politics, the party 
responsible for negotiating with Arafat, trading Land for Peace, and defending secular 
Israeli values (largely Ashkenazi) against those radical religious devotees (whether in 
Jerusalem or in the settlements). Even here, on the mainstream left – in matter of fact the 
center-left – the ideal of Israel as a Jewish home is unquestionable and held in high 
esteem. Their Zionism, too, depends in large part upon maintaining virtual silence around 
the history immediately preceding the establishment of the State of Israel and the current 
de facto binational character of the state within the Green Line. As I claim above, the 
                                                 
6 This echoes earlier slogans both from the Moledet political party in 1988 and from Rabin’s 1992 
campaign slogan: “Us here, them there, peace with Rabin.”  
Robert Blecher, “Living on the Edge: The Threat of ‘Transfer’ in Israel and Palestine,” Middle East Report, 
32 (Winter 2002), Accessed on May 17, 2016, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer225/living-edge. 
There is more to say here regarding the reasons for this shift in logic. Neve Gordon demonstrates how 
Israel underwent a shift from an integration principle (using Palestinian labor, maintaining relatively open 
borders to the territories) to a separation principle that began in the early 1990s but pursued in earnest 
around the time of Ariel Sharon’s Disengagement Plan.  
Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
  9 
desirability of a Jewish State has general agreement between left and right factions of 
Zionism, leaving the bi-nationalist Zionism in the early days of the movement (best 
represented by Brit Shalom) to appear foolish and a mere relic of history. 
Let me try to be clear so that I am not misunderstood. The desire for a Jewish 
state, and the entire history of the Zionist project which worked toward this end, can be 
justifiably viewed as a triumph; a rare example of self-determination for a peoples living 
through a long history of repression based on their identity. There can be little doubt that 
the multiple pogroms suffered by the Jews – preceding but leading up to that Holocaust 
that remains the most horrifying case of cold human rationality directed toward inflicting 
inhumane levels of suffering – left a deep impression of insecurity for most who 
identified or were identified as Jewish.  
For those like my grandparents who fled Poland and Romania and were unable to 
convince their families to join them – their families who would later face the life of the 
ghetto, followed by that of the concentration camp, and ultimately the death camp – this 
was not a mere matter of history. For those like my parents who were born into a family 
and neighborhood of survivors and victims – born into the State of Israel – setting a 
distance between their identity and discrimination was unsurprisingly difficult. As such, 
the successful creation of a strong Jewish political entity – first the World Zionist 
Congress and later the State of Israel – can stand as a heroic example of devoted political 
action in the face of historical injustice. It can be seen as an answer to the question: what 
is to happen to us, to us as Jews? But as much as this narrative resonates with a great 
number of Israelis, and as much as identification with this narrative could be viewed as 
justifiable, it is a gross over-simplification.  
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The State of Israel was not developed on a blank slate. The “Land of Israel” was 
not without a people, a society, a community, an indigenous culture. Indeed, these should 
all be put in the plural – not without a peoples, societies, communities, indigenous 
cultures. The Arabs, both Muslim and Christian, the nomadic Bedouins with their own 
complex political networks of tribal-family lineages, the Orthodox Jewish communities 
in the Old City, the Druze, Assyrians, Circassians, and on and on. Each of these distinct 
peoples were integrated, assimilated, expelled, repressed, or promoted to varying degrees 
at different points in time by different relevant centers of political power. The most 
politically salient community, not surprisingly, were the majority Arab Palestinians who 
were made the counterforce to the Zionist project – made so either by the Hegelian Spirit 
of history or through the plans and manipulations by centers of political power, the Arab 
Higher Committee of Hajj Amin al-Husseini being most prominent. 
But this well-documented history and structure, complex enough in itself, is still 
not the full story. After all, and as with most identities, there is considerable disagreement 
over the conditions for belonging. If it were just a matter of competing rabbinates 
interpreting texts and performing Jewish rites differently, that would be enough. But the 
tension is found not only in varying interpretations of relatively stable biblical texts. The 
vagaries of history – with all of the implied shifts in human understanding of worldly 
phenomena and the chaotic migrations of social groups across an expansive geographical 
space – create new realities that must be enfolded into our thoughts and actions.  
With every new migration to the Land of Israel by those who affirmed a Jewish 
identity – from “Arab” Jews in the 1950s (Mizrahi), to black Jews from Ethiopia in the 
early 1990s, to agnostic and non-practicing Jews from the Former Soviet Union in the 
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1990s – the debate over belonging was re-opened. Who can be accepted as Jewish? How 
might they prove their Jewishness? How might we confirm their affirmations of group 
belonging and establish non-arbitrary, non-contingent guidelines that would allow for 
some identifiable notion of a Jewish State? Can “we recognize ourselves,” as Yair Lapid 
would have it? 
Part of the problem here has to do with the nature of identity. Collective identity 
has no objective existence outside of the process by which it is apprehended and 
performed. This is not to say that it does not exist. As with language, identity must 
emerge from some grounds, whether they be metaphysical, biological, or epiphenomenal 
to some universal laws or Forms. But as Plato argues, and Hegel after him, the 
presumption of form does not allow one to assert that they have directly apprehended 
Truth grounded in Form. At best, what is apprehended is parasitic on universal form. It 
should not be mistaken for the universal, seductive as this may be.  
All this is to say that when one is asked to point to the absolute grounding of 
already present collective identities (Jewish, Palestinian, Algonquin, or otherwise), they 
must either end their inquiry on the plane of historical emergence and social reproduction 
or else pin their faith on a myth of origins and distinction of peoples (e.g., Adam and Eve, 
the Tower of Babel, Plato’s myth of the metals). Contemporary studies of nationalism 
since Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism and Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities have rejected the latter (primordialism) in favor of the former (modernism), 
pointing to the historically contingent development of national and ethnic identity 
through economic, mediatic, and political structures. In short, outside of theology, there 
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is a virtual unanimity in understanding identity as socially constructed and contingent 
rather than ontologically grounded and stable. 
So does that leave us – any of us, but in this present case let me say the Jewish 
people, understanding that any ethno-national marker could be put in its same place – 
without a real collective identity with which to judge belonging or exclusion? Does it 
mean that we cannot ultimately lay claim to group belonging because the contours and 
characteristics of the group are radically – or rather ultimately – indeterminate? Not 
exactly. After all, performance and practice make for affective identification. Axel 
Honneth, for example, tries to embed his notion of affective disposition within human 
psychology in order to gain some universal ethic of equitable and just recognition.7 
Honneth relies on affectivity – more precisely a praxis of empathetic engagement - to 
ground the universal desire for recognition between the individual and the world and 
between the self and others. As he demonstrates, humans reveal an innate desire to not 
just apprehend the world through cognitive operations but to be at home in the world, in 
themselves and with others. 
This appeal to a human psychology and existential engagement (or “affective 
disposition”) could help justify the desire for recognition, revealing it as a natural and 
necessary condition for the flourishing of the individual and society. Still, in order for 
human psychology to serve as the justificatory grounds for a politics of recognition, we 
would have to address through a Foucauldian genealogical survey the way in which this 
fields (i.e., psychology) understanding is subject to its own unique history of concepts, 
                                                 
7 Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Nancy 
Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London: 
Verso, 2003). 
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citations, logics, frameworks, and knowledge/power networks. This sort of genealogy of 
the concept of human psychology – more specifically the centrality of empathy – would 
take a volume to deconstruct and is not the goal of this present study. Even if such an 
account were undertaken, it would not leave us with a true form of human psychology, 
but rather, a contingent understanding and appreciation for patterns and relations that the 
subject (whether as individual or social agglomerate) has traversed over time.  
So what are we to do? Where does this leave us when we seek to understand what 
exactly recognition might offer, how it operates, the extent to which it is a necessary 
condition of peaceable human affairs, and the manifold uses of the concept and politics of 
recognition? In my view, which I develop throughout this project, it leaves us at the 
doorstep of an ethics of epistemology. Viewing knowledge networks as sites where 
power is enacted and exercised, we might be able to better understand the logics that prop 
up a politics of recognition that implies social privilege to some and social harm to 
others. We are ethically bound to understand the ways in which a politics of recognition 
can be rallied toward ends that imply harm so that we might motion beyond this politics 
toward more just approaches at settling social conflict.  
 
Ethno-nationalism: Sometimes a Great Notion 
 
Let us take this as our jumping-off point. What might we take for our ethics of 
epistemology, here and now (though not forevermore), in the face of the absurdity of 
collective identity? First, we need to understand why it is that collective identity strikes 
us. If this notion, great though it may seem, turns out to be little more than an instinctive 
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affectation developed from repeat experiences of belonging or worse yet, an externality 
of violent imposition from without (by institutions, broadly construed in the social sense), 
then it could not be the basis for a universal ethic by which we can secure ourselves 
against some other. And surely, the project would be quite simple if we were to assign 
ethno-nationalism to something ordained by God; that is to say, if we would take 
scripture seriously (and in the process have to submit to its commandments). Put another 
way, if the Jews are right that God designated them as some distinct people – one should 
say uniquely or exceptionally distinct given their having been chosen – then there would 
be no mystery. The Jewish State would be the clear submission to divine instruction. This 
is the ideology of Revisionist and Religious Zionism that has been adopted by the 
increasingly powerful rightwing settler movement and the political parties who represent 
their interests. The problem here is that the majority of Israeli Jews are not devout and 
will rarely if at all call upon Hashem for justification, at least not without some blushing 
and perhaps shame for profaning the sacred.  
Eschewing at the outset the biblical, divine narrative that would end all debate, I 
turn to the human, arguably profane narratives that make similar attempts. These 
narratives – from officialdom of the academy, the state, or the military – rely on different 
epistemological foundations into which they stake their claims. Each has their own 
position regarding justice influenced in part by their own particular modes of veridiction 
– “the set of rules enabling one to establish which statements in a given discourse can be 
described as true or false.”8 This Foucauldian terminology is deliberate. Speaking of 
                                                 
8 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79, ed. Michel 
Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 35. 
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modes of veridiction helps to better conceive political power as an operation of 
translations flowing through circuits – through networks – that do not transmit so much 
as transform their objects of inquiry.9  These modes of veridiction, in turn, determine 
what might be taken as “serious” or “legitimate” and what falls beyond the pale of reason 
and logic. As Foucault explained: 
What is important is the determination of the regime of veridiction that enabled 
them [i.e., experts] to say and assert a number of things as truths that it turns out 
we now know were perhaps not true at all. This is the point, in fact, where 
historical analysis may have a political significance. It is not so much the history 
of the true or the history of the false as the history of veridiction which has a 
political significance.10  
 
In the case of the politics of recognition, “serious” and “legitimate” turn out to be crucial 
discursive tools that work to establish a certain kind of bifurcation of the social world 
(between collective-self and collective-other), a particular distribution of power, and a 
consequent hierarchy of rights. In so doing, these discursive props have the potential of 
creating real bodily harm and an inequitable and unjust distribution of ethical duties to 
self and other. Put another way, it places at risk the practice of recognition, not in its 
technocratic or juridical register (which it in fact supports), but in its higher aspiration, as 
a practice bearing the promise of empathetic engagement.  
In the present study, I focus on three epistemic communities and their unique 
modes of veridiction. These spheres of inquiry do not exhaust the networks that produce 
a particular form of a politics of recognition but their selection is not arbitrary. The 
                                                 
9 Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, viewed as an extension of this Foucauldian epistemology and 
ontology, has had strong influence on my approach as well. See: Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: 
An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Bruno Latour, An 
Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2013).  
 
10 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 36. 
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decision to focus on the academic, state, and military/security networks is motivated by 
their dominance in the discourse that works to comprehend the Israel-Palestine conflict. 
How does each lend stability to a politics of recognition based on an ontology of identity 
that risks reproducing the very violence that it promises to eliminate? 
For the state, the politics of recognition is reproduced by recourse to civitas, that 
purportedly real and established collective-self-identity subject to common law and 
speaking in a single sovereign voice. As explained above, the annunciation of a group 
identity is hardly satisfying grounds for justifying a bifurcation of the social and political 
world.11 Proclamation of a grounded identity appears more as truism than epistemic 
foundation. Those who speak in the voice of the state often take recourse in an 
unverifiable foundational identity or a myth of origins. It is no mistake, after all, that 
Plato’s foundational Noble Lie is that of the peoples springing forth from the soil. This 
need to bind a peoples so that they could be bound to the state was appreciated by many 
of the Great Political Thinkers. Machiavelli understood the necessity of a civic religion, 
as did Hobbes, as did Rousseau. The noble lie is absolutely necessary for the state to 
function as if it were a collection of individuals sharing a common identity. But we 
should not mistake the noble lie for truth.  
The State’s insistence on crafting and determining the relevant history that would 
establish belonging – typically in ways that make the narrative most amenable to 
technocratic control and political planning – reveals the conceit involved in speaking of 
                                                 
11 As Marx demonstrated, national identity could be viewed as a false consciousness usefully disseminated 
by elites (the bourgeoisie) in order to bind the common man (the proletariat) to a submissive system of 
economic and social reproduction, distracting them from their common interest by promoting superficial 
difference. 
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States and Nations as steady, stable, relatively unproblematic objects (unproblematic 
once put in their proper place). Moreover, the very production (both practical and 
discursive) of States and their national histories reveals itself to be transnational in 
character, further undermining the ontology of discrete and autochthonous collectivities 
(i.e., peoples, nations, states). This argument is developed and demonstrated in Part One. 
For the academy, the politics of recognition is reproduced by recourse to 
historical texts, anthropology, archeology, geography, and the like. The field of 
international relations, which concerns itself with theorizing the organization of peoples 
into nations, nations into states, and states into geopolitical actors, is arguably implicated 
in the politics of recognition more than any other academic discipline. With its origins in 
race theory, a racist corpus of knowledge by definition, international relations theory has 
not yet escaped the more insidious effects produced by its knowledge/power claims.12 
Central to the claims made in international relations is the concept of the national interest.  
In order to lend coherence to state action, political scientists refer to the pursuit of 
the national interest by policymakers. This national interest is not a mere whim of 
policymakers, but is thought to have some true content and form, the understanding of 
which is deferred to politicians and intellectuals, who in turn make the national interest 
their property to define, defend, and protect. In light of this, one would hope to find some 
basic agreement on the concept of the national interest, but upon examination, we find 
this not to be the case. As I argue in Part Two, the decisive decision on the national 
                                                 
12 For a history of the field of international relations and its origins in imperialist race theories, see: Robert 
Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2015); Robert Vitalis, “The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making 
Racism Invisible in American International Relations,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29, 2 
(2000), pp. 331-356. 
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interest – never fully achieved – defines the very contest of political practice. The 
national interest is not a final and stable bi-product of theory, a culmination of history, or 
an agreement reached via a social contract. It is a void at the heart of politics, one never 
quite filled by academic discourse but made nonetheless productive for certain networks 
of knowledge/power that aspire to control and dictate political society. 
For the military/securities networks, on the other hand, the politics of recognition 
is reproduced by recourse to security practices, discourses and ideologies that work to 
mold and sustain group differences. These practices and the discourse on which they 
depend are hardly internal to the military institutions subordinated to the sovereign power 
of the State. Those institutions, including the state military, private arms manufacturers, 
and private security consultancy firms, display characteristics of what Deleuze and 
Guattari identified as the War Machine. While the State continues to appropriate these 
forces toward its ends by necessity13, the irreducible and irascible nature of these forces is 
continually revealed. At the same time, the embodiment of these forces relies on a 
common mode of veridiction based on the successful performance of identity. In this 
case, the identity relies in part on a dividuation of characteristics and in part on an 
ontology of the abstract enemy.14  
                                                 
13 By necessity because they are the necessary condition for the State project of securing sovereign claims 
over territory, people, and language. To be more accurate, there can be no separation between these 
tendencies – State sovereignty and the War Machine. They logically entail and entangle one another. 
 
14 Dividuation here refers to the vivisection of the individual or social body into constituent parts, 
characteristics, or “independent variables” made amenable for calculation, regulation and control. Gilles 
Deleuze, identifying this tendency that portends a “Society of Control” explains how “We no longer find 
ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, samples, 
data, markets, or ‘banks.’” The Society of Control – which bears similarities to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
discussion on the State or “royal” sciences – “substitutes for the individual or numerical body the code of 
the “dividual” material to be controlled.”  
Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October, Vol. 59 (Winter 1992), 3-7.   
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Whether in their embodied manifestations as bullets and bombs; their imaginative 
manifestations in blueprints, statistical models, Grand Strategies, and not-so-grand 
tactical playbooks; their discursive manifestations that define “enemy” or “target;” 
identity is necessary for the meaningful and legible operations of these political networks. 
And yet, the untethered nature of the War Machine’s movement result in the State project 
losing some of its ability to legitimate the power exercised in its name. Unable to enfold 
these forces that always point outwards, the State can only perform its unity with more-
or-less success, unable to assert it now and forever. Part Three provides a historical 
account of the War Machine in relation to Israel, offering a perspective that destabilizes 
the already tenuous sovereign identity of the Jewish state. 
Together, these networks of veridiction work to construct the notion of ethno-
nationalism as a necessary political logic that holds the promise of everything put in its 
right place: Us here, Them there. But this form of recognition, of recognition as 
“separate-but-equal,” is on the surface a commitment to ontological violence. It can bind 
individuals to community identities from which they would then assert their rights and 
duties or from which they would be subject to discriminations and incriminations.15 Once 
these categories are established, they can also serve as areas of exclusivity, denying 
access as well as voiding duties to some while providing others with a range of exclusive 
“club goods.” Against this concept of recognition, I advocate for (re)cognition, an 
iterative practice that opens in face-to-face interactions.  
                                                 
15 As I argue elsewhere, Muslims in “the West” have been subject to all sorts of incriminations and tasked 
with special responsibilities by governments who view them as part of a discrete and uniquely dangerous 
community. Donald Trump’s call for temporarily banning all Muslims from entering the U.S. is a 
particularly stark example of this threat. See: Eyal Bar (2015), “The Nexus of Enmity: Ideology, Global 
Politics, and Identity in the 21st Century,” CrossCurrents, Vol. 35 Issue 3, DOI: 10.1111/cros. 
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Influenced by the philosophy of Emanuel Levinas, and supported by the works of 
Alphonso Lingis, Wendy Brown, Jacques Derrida, Patchen Markell, and others, I show 
the ways in which our current politics of recognition is best read as violence. By tracing 
three discursive networks of knowledge/power implicated in our modern politics of 
recognition, I demonstrate forms of symbolic violence waged against the entire complex 
of the Israel-Palestine conflict in ways that preclude a just resolution based on mutual 
empathy, acknowledgment, and (re)cogntion.  
Before entering into my case study, I will now turn to an exegesis on the concept 
of recognition, followed by a more detailed explication of my use of the term 
(re)cognition. After presenting the above-mentioned case studies (the discourse of the 
State, Academic, and Military-Security networks), I end the project with some 
speculative theorizing on an ethics of epistemology on recognition.  
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CHAPTER 1 
FROM RECOGNITION TO (RE)COGNITION 
As a modern political concept, recognition is characteristically used in reference to the 
nation-state system. The United Nations, for example, recognizes some 193 states, who in 
turn recognize one another, as well as several other non-state groups. In the post-
Westphalian system, two states must exchange recognition before they can secure their 
independence from one another.16 This is the ideal of internal and external sovereignty, 
an ideal more often revealed as “organized hypocrisy,” but a functional one 
nonetheless.17 Even if states intervene regularly in the affairs of other states, either 
overtly or covertly, the general view is that esteem for the principle of sovereignty 
provides for relative stability.  
As a political tool, the discourse on recognition serves to legitimate modern forms 
of political organization (i.e., the nation-state system) and helped to escape the previous 
age of imperialism. It is important not to forget how truly modern is the nation-state 
system. In the first decades of the previous century and up until decolonization in the 
1960s, the world was divided into several empires whose scope of powers was not 
limited by ethno-linguistic borders (e.g., the Ottoman, French Colonial, British, Prussian, 
German, Spanish, American, and Soviet empires). It was only after the Second World 
War that the nation-state norm overtook the Imperial powers and began to dominate, and 
then only in a lagging and partial manner. Within this new system, states and smaller 
                                                 
16 Tracing the origin of this mode of state sovereignty back to the Westphalian system has been challenged 
by some. See, for example: Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian 
Myth,” International Organization, Vol. 55 No. 2 (2001), 251-287. 
 
17 Stephen Kraser, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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political groups are granted recognition after meeting some generally agreed upon 
guidelines that served to legitimate their power and actions. This recognition amounts to 
an invitation to the figurative and literal round table of international politics (e.g., the 
United Nations).   
Mirroring the politics of recognition at the interstate level was a domestic politics 
of recognition. Following the Second World War, an increasingly popular but by no 
means universal requirement for state legitimacy was the exchange of recognition 
between the institution of the state and the people placed under its putative authority and 
care. In order for a state to sustain its power and achieve stability and longevity, the 
governing regime had to face its people – at times all of the people but more often a 
“selectorate” or “winning coalition” – and receive their tacit approval, consent, and 
deference.18 However, in this process of facing and representing “the people,” the state is 
met with a definitive challenge which threatens an existential crisis. The mythic unity of 
the state is met with plurality and disunity; multiple languages, religions, cultures, values, 
and “peoples” exist within a state. Desiring to speak in a single voice, the state is met 
with an irrepressible cacophony. Even if a single privileged voice emerges or is violently 
asserted, what is the state to do with all of those other voices calling from the balcony, 
sidelines, or within the crowd?   
It was in this context of internal upheavals within states across the globe that 
Charles Taylor published his 1992 essay “The Politics of Recognition.”19 Since then, 
                                                 
18 For a review of selectorate theory, see: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, 
and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005). 
 
19 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25-73. 
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many academics have turned their attention to the process by which states might 
reconcile their unified national ideal with the reality of ethnic, cultural, and religious 
diversity (i.e., cultural pluralism). All states, like Taylor’s Canada, include multiple 
ethno-national communities and a diversity of cultures, each with their unique histories, 
beliefs, languages, or traditions, who often seek state protection in order to sustain their 
heritage in the face of homogenizing social forces (i.e., the educational institutions, 
public services, the media, the workplace, etc.). These groups seek recognition by the 
state, whose powers and institutions extend privileges and grant legal protections to said 
groups.  
In a similar vein, the recognition discourse was rallied for the purposes of 
securing the rights of women, the LGBTQI community, and disabled persons. Taken up 
by post-structuralist scholars like Judith Butler, Wendy Brown, and Nancy Fraser, who 
introduced a deconstructionist ethic to questions of sovereign identity, this politics of 
recognition presented a challenge to the ontological positivism of Taylor’s politics of 
recognition.20 Pointing to the social constructivist and performative aspects of identity in 
the politics of recognition, these authors exposed the political logic that implicates the 
state in the production of identity. This relation between the state and identity often 
manifested itself in an invasive and violent register, revealing state-maker’s insatiable 
desire to assert sovereignty over the constitution and order of things, including identity. 
                                                 
20 See: Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995); Judith P. Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century 
France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories 
in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution 
or Recognition?: A Political-philosophical Exchange (New York: Verso, 2003); Simon Critchley, The 
Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 
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Like Taylor, these writers demonstrated the difficulty in reconciling presumptive 
universal rights with normative differences and the diversity of values, lifestyles, or 
cultures found within single political units (i.e., states). But more than that, they 
challenged the very presumption of ontology as the grounding of a politics of 
recognition.21  
The variants of a politics of recognition mentioned above – interstate, civic 
republican, and identity-based – focus on ensuring legal protection, ensuring the rights of 
one community against some other community, or else rectifying injustice done unto 
particular identity-holding subjects. More often than not, and with the important 
exception of the above-mentioned post-structural and post-modern theorists, these 
variants approach the problem of recognition from a technocratic and problem-solving 
register. These approaches – emanating from the 18th century Liberal tradition that 
continues to run through the modern politics of recognition – sought to ground rational 
politics within the framework of a social contract, tying together an ideal view of man as 
both inherently free and inherently social. It would be a mistake, however, to view 
recognition merely as a technocratic form of political organizing. In order to understand 
                                                 
21 Without developing an exhaustive genealogy, it is worthwhile to mention the “hermeneutics of 
suspicion” that helped to inspire these thinkers and resuscitate a concern for ethics. These post-structural 
political theorists took inspiration in large part from the phenomenology of Hegel and later Heidegger, 
Nietzsche’s explosive brand of existentialism, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, critical Marxism, the 
language theory of the late Wittgenstein, Levinasian ethics, and Derridean deconstruction. Exposing the 
technocratic impulse in the history of philosophy up to that point, these writers sought to reinterpret the 
state and its objects of concern by way of exploring – as Hegel did before them – the operations of 
consciousness. Hegel, performing a philosophy that seemed to resurrect dimensions of an earlier Platonism, 
worked to the trace consciousness from the granular level (the individual consciousness) to a grand scale 
(the State). This movement, discerned within the Phenomenology of Spirit itself, could be more fully 
apprehended when that text is placed in the context of Hegel’s later political writing, Philosophy of Right. 
Depending on how one read Hegel, they could either view the state as a natural culmination of 
consciousness – a kind of metaphysically-rendered teleology or telos of the subject – or else a constant 
struggle, also natural, but unbounded, unsettled and unsettling. Here, a new kind of liberty could be 
discerned, but it was not the liberty of Liberalism. 
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the ethical kernel that gives movement and legitimacy to the concept of recognition in the 
first place, it would help to review the strange history of Liberalism and the State. 
 
The Liberal State 
 
The liberalism that emerged in the 18th century, in its classical as opposed to reform 
variant, was marked by a concern with the individual as the locus of liberty, a bearer of 
natural rights, and a rational agent who consented to being governed. By the 19th century, 
liberalism underwent a significant “reform,” focusing on the individual as a perfectible 
and ever-changing being. While the notion of the inherent dignity of man might have 
existed throughout history, it was not the dominant political view until the 19th century, 
and did not appear in political philosophy but with some exceptions in theological works. 
The distinction is often made between ancient and modern philosophy in that the 
former was concerned with the body politic while the latter became concerned with man 
as an abstract, universal agent. Individual rights are rarely the focus of ancient and 
medieval texts on politics and philosophy, unless of course that individual were a king or 
The Prince. Justice – the foundational question in philosophy – was that which served to 
guarantee the health and survival of the principality or city-state. The individual, if he 
was mentioned at all, was a subject who had duties but not rights. Take for example 
Socrates who, for all his virtue and genius, nonetheless submitted to the unjust dictates of 
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his city, ingesting the hemlock rather than fleeing as his closest friends had urged him to 
do.22  
It was with the Liberal turn of the Enlightenment that individuals became subjects 
of greater, even universal, depth. It was here that a higher form of recognition found its 
foothold, establishing itself as a necessary condition for justice. Until one could recognize 
the universal and inherent value of other individuals, one could not expect to escape 
relations of domination and violence – amoral relations that had acquired nominal 
legitimacy from ancient times to the present.23 Until one opened to the face of the other, 
the other would remain an object, abstract and separate, a means and not an ends.24 
The emerging Liberal ideology soon provided a new ground from which the State 
could establish its sovereign presence. Taking up the language of the liberal subject, the 
State could begin to demand a similar recognition – a recognition of its unity, 
sovereignty, and universal right. Recall that through the 19th century, most governments 
were monarchic in form – the divine right sitting comfortably in the not-yet-severed head 
                                                 
22 The common reading of Socrates action is that he could not betray the laws of the city that raised him, 
even if the judgment of the Senate was ill-founded and amounted to a miscarriage of justice and truth. To 
the credit of this view, Socrates says as much himself. Still, I should note here that I have my own reading 
of Socrates’ choice, viewing it as a political act without which his thought, all his work, his philosophy 
would not have reached across the centuries to our modern times. Socrates as the crucified Jesus – before 
that figure emerged – who could only propagate his messianic message by accepting the role of martyr. For 
a similar argument that has influenced my reading, see: Jay Haley, The Power Tactics of Jesus Christ, and 
Other Essays (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1969). See also: Plato, The Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992); Plato, The Apology and Crito, trans. Hugh Tredennick, 
in The Last Days of Socrates (Baltimore: Penguin, 1954). 
 
23 This is reference to the “realist” tradition characterized by the logic of “might makes right,” that has been 
reproduced since the Melian dialogues through to Nietzsche’s (a)morality and into the modern realist 
school of international relations theory. 
 
24 I am referring here to first philosophy as outlined by Emmanuel Lévinas (i.e., an ethics dictated by a 
phenomenology of alterity in the face of the Other).  
See: Emmanuel Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?,” Basic Philosophical Writings. Eds. Adriaan T. 
Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 6. 
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of the King (soon to be replaced by the Head of State – the honorific title itself is telling). 
The State could proclaim its presence as a natural extension of God on earth with the 
King having been hand-chosen by divine ordinance. Asserting its authority, demanding 
allegiance and tribute, capturing and disciplining the individuals within its orbit, the State 
could demonstrate through force – using the arms of the State – its rightful place in the 
political and social space.  
With the Enlightenment, the divine right of kings began to erode, and with the aid 
of developments in industrialization and bureaucratization (i.e., technopolitics), a new 
ontology began to develop. States persisted as the great moral agents of history much in 
the same way as the ancient city-states were conceived – this time not because the king or 
prince had special communion with the divine, but because the survival of the social 
body demanded it. Constitutional law could provide a strong scaffolding on which the 
State would hang its decisions and expand its powers to sites previously left to the 
management of the church, civil society, or the family. Like Marx turning Hegel on his 
head, the Liberal tradition helped to turn the Right of Kings on its head, placing at the 
moral center of the state not the head of the king but an agglomeration of divine 
individuals: the people, ethnos, or volk. As the 19th century gave way to further 
technologies of discipline and control, the people as a category became less a collection 
of individuals and more a social body unto themselves.  
Foucault observed how the growing capillary powers of the state and their 
concern with the management of the population-as-a-whole – what he termed bio-power 
and bio-politics – created a logic of the State that would necessarily fall to racism. This 
racism – but let us call it nationalism – treated the people as a natural category that could 
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fit within a single and complete identity. The state form could now present itself as a 
natural political extension of the people, a being who had an identity rather than an 
institution wielding a sword and exercising control through sheer and brute force. As 
states became republics, and some even approached forms that could be described as 
more or less democratic, the performance of unity became all the more believable.  
The abstraction of the nation-state allowed for a kind of legitimation that proved 
highly adaptable; it proved to be a veritable evolution in international politics. The 
principle function of the United Nations would be to establish a politics of recognition 
based on the nation-state model, introducing terms like “self-determination” into the 
common lexicon, and providing a venue where the mutual exchange of recognition 
between these abstract entities could gain legitimacy and public acknowledgement. In 
this context, the number of those natural categories – States – began to proliferate, from a 
measly 51 states in 1945 to 193 in 2016 (South Sudan being the most recent member in 
2011).  
 
The State of Being and Recognition 
 
Liberalism allowed for a transmogrification of the State that pushed this form of political 
organization beyond an order instituted by power and toward one that could claim ethical 
presence. The State, however, much like the liberal individual, did not shed its desire for 
sovereignty. In the statist conception of recognition, adaptability and flux are viewed as 
destabilizing forces that must be restrained. The relation to the core virtue of empathy 
that recognition might have served in statecraft was pushed to the background. Now 
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states could achieve recognition, but it was not the recognition of affection, empathy, or 
universal depth. Instead, it became a political tool – a vise and chisel – that if wielded 
properly allowed statesmen (policymaking elite) to carve and hold the world in such a 
way as to manage it.  
Throughout this project, I argue that the modern variant a politics of recognition, 
based as it is on the ontology of a transmuted state, has led many to lose sight of the 
affective, ethical, and intersubjective nature of recognition which provides the grounds 
for sociality in general. It is this aspect of recognition – its affective, empathetic, and 
ethical connotations – that I would like to retain and reintroduce as central to 
contemporary politics, all despite submersion of these aspects of recognition in the 
increasingly practical and problem-solving approaches that dominate modern political 
thought.  
As a word that recurs in continental philosophy since Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit, recognition entails ethics and the concept of respect, whether formally through 
declarative statements and inscription in text, or informally through personal dispositions 
and human interaction.25 This view has gained such purchase that the modern colloquial 
use of the term recognition implies deference and just deserts. People are told to 
recognize the authority of the police and disperse in an orderly fashion lest they be 
arrested or subject to a barrage of teargas canisters. We are impelled to recognize the 
brutal history of slavery when discussing race and politics in the United States. We are 
compelled to recognize the struggles that women face on a daily basis, from workplace 
discrimination to harassment on public sidewalks or in bars. The chair recognizes the 
                                                 
25 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baille (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967). 
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Senator from Vermont for 15 minutes, granting him the right to speak uninterrupted, if 
only for a moment. In this way, the colloquial use of “recognition” reveals its origin as a 
concept imbued with the values of respect and due deference. This is, however, only one 
aspect – and an arguably more advanced form – of the practice of recognition. 
Recognition is often used to convey the psychological or phenomenal act of 
apprehension. The term conveys some sense in which an individual affirms the content 
and quality of some object, whether tangible or intangible, sentient or non-sentient. The 
question then becomes, what is it that is being recognized and how? In Axel Honneth’s 
essay, “Reification,” recognition indicates a “stance of empathetic engagement in the 
world, arising from the experience of the world’s significance and value.”26 This can be 
applied broadly to individual apperception of the contents found “out there,” but also 
implies a feedback process between what an individual experiences and some pre-
existing content of their psyche. In this register, recognition is firstly an apprehension of 
some external stimulus: it is the phenomenological impact of some outside force on the 
unwitting consciousness of the individual.  
This recognition is empty of any rich concepts that emerge from cognition. It is 
the catalyst for onto-genesis, the first instance wherein that which is thought of as outside 
of the self-contained body or consciousness impresses upon this self the requirement that 
the stimulus be interpreted, ordered, inscribed in some network or matrix that would lend 
it meaning. In this context, “recognition comes before cognition.”27 The individual is 
                                                 
26 Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 38. 
 
27 Honneth, Reification, 40 
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violently confronted with the outside and only then can the individual begin to order 
these bits of information, to exert its own symbolic violence on the stimulus. 
And yet, Honneth appears to lend to the act of recognition some pre-existing 
value; namely, empathy, which itself arises from “the experience of the world’s 
significance and value.” So that, while recognition is conceptualized as preceding 
cognition, it nonetheless requires an emotional disposition or a state of “empathetic 
engagement.”28 Recognition, beyond being a refraction of the external world, is invoked 
as a necessary condition for ethical life. Recognition involves a relation between at least 
two enclosed bodies, or as it is often characterized, between a self and an other. Whether 
this recognition is conceived of as distinctive and separate from cognition (i.e., Reason) 
as Honneth implies, or whether it develops through morphogenic play with Reason (i.e., 
Sittlichkeit) is a point of contest. Furthermore, whether this initial binary opposition of 
self and other is justified as something other than a heuristic remains contested. In either 
case, recognition is given some content or is linked to certain values that are granted to 
one by another. One recognizes beauty or enmity or cowardice or freedom in some other. 
In other words, recognition in this context makes little sense unless there is something 
that is said to be recognized.  
Beginning with Hegel, that something that would be recognized was the mutually 
constructive relation between the individual consciousness and what lay outside it, 
                                                 
28 Withholding for now a dialogue on what cognition might entail, a forced break between “emotion” and 
“cognition” appears unjustified, as has been demonstrated by Martha Nussbaum and Karen Fierke, among 
others. See: Karen M. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1998); Karen M. Fierke, “Links across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations” 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 46 No. 3 (2002): 331-354.  
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whether that outside is the world or another individual. Against the view that an 
individual is whole unto itself and independent, Hegel introduced the metaphor of the 
Lord and Bondsman to develop the concept of intersubjectivity.  Hegel describes the 
encounter this way, worth quoting at length: 
Self-consciousness is primarily simple existence for self, self-identity by 
exclusion of every other from itself. It takes its essential nature and absolute 
object to be Ego; and in this immediacy, in this bare fact of its self-existence, it is 
individual. That which for it is other stands as unessential object, as object with 
the impress and character of negation. But the other is also a self-consciousness; 
an individual makes its appearance in antithesis to an individual. Appearing thus 
in their immediacy, they are for each other in the manner of ordinary objects. 
They are independent individual forms, modes of consciousness that have not 
risen above the bare level of life (for the existent object here has been determined 
as life).They are, moreover, forms of consciousness which have not yet 
accomplished for one another the process of absolute abstraction, of uprooting all 
immediate existence, and of being merely the bare, negative fact of self-identical 
consciousness; or, in other words, have not yet revealed themselves to each other 
as existing purely for themselves, i.e., as self-consciousness. Each is indeed 
certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own certainty of itself is 
still without truth. For its truth would be merely that its own individual existence 
for itself would be shown to it to be an independent object, or, which is the same 
thing, that the object would be exhibited as this pure certainty of itself. By the 
notion of recognition, however, this is not possible, expect in the form that as the 
other is for it, so it is for the other; each in its self through its own action and 
again though the action of the other achieves this pure abstraction of existence for 
self.29 
 
It is important to note that Hegel’s Lordship/Bondsman relation is not a struggle between 
two individuals, but rather, between two “modes of consciousness.”  
In this experience self-consciousness becomes aware that life is as essential to it 
as pure self-consciousness. In immediate self-consciousness the simple ego is 
absolute object, which, however, is for us or in itself absolute mediation, and has 
as its essential moment substantial and solid independence. The dissolution of that 
simple unity is the result of the first experience; through this there is posited a 
pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for itself, but for 
another, i.e. as an existent consciousness, consciousness in the form and shape of 
thinghood. Both moments are essential, since, in the first instance, they are unlike 
and opposed, and their reflexion into unity has not yet come to light, they stand as 
                                                 
29 Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, 232 
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two opposed forms or modes of consciousness. The one is independent, and its 
essential nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent, and its essence is life or 
existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman.  
The master is the consciousness that exists for itself; but no longer merely the 
general notion of existence for self.30  
 
From this passage it is clear that the Master is self-consciousness as Ego, the part of the 
psyche that seeks mastery and control. The interaction between Lord and Bondsman, 
however, reveals to both their mutual dependence. With this new awareness, an 
inescapable responsibility begins to emerge. The self, having recognized its very being as 
intimately tied-up with that of the other (including its internal other), can no longer exist 
purely for itself. A pure self-existence can only be achieved through violence and even 
then, the attempt will always be disturbed by the recognition of an I outside the self – 
whether that I is a repressed aspect of the self, another individual, the external world, or 
metaphysical and ontotheological forces (e.g., Geist, the Idea, The Forms).31  
Despite the recognition of the intersubjective character of existence, the impulse 
toward self-sufficiency, self-existence, or sovereign agency (being for itself) is readily 
visible in every action at every moment for every consciousness. Control is sought, if not 
achieved, by holding everything outside oneself in place long enough so that the self can 
take some confident and assertive steps. This desire for control, however, is inherently 
violent and ultimately thwarted at every step in light of intersubjective being. The desire 
for independence is consistently foiled by the reality of mutual interdependence.  
                                                 
30 Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, 234 
 
31 There is more to say about the reading of the Lord as Ego. The image recalls Plato’s tripartite soul as 
well as categories of the psyche in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. I will undertake a more full 
explication of these relations in the future.  
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Where, then, does this leave the human individual and that new transmogrified 
individual of State? According to Emmanuel Levinas, “the other is not an object of 
comprehension first and an interlocutor second. The two relations are intertwined. In 
other words, the comprehension of the Other (autrui) is inseparable from his 
invocation.”32 This process of comprehension and insight into its operations can similarly 
be found in Judith Butler’s discussion of Althusser’s interpellation – the way in which a 
subject is constituted in language.33 If we are to follow Levinas’ insight, we have 
comprehension and the other as mutually constituted, as a process by which invocation 
and comprehension work to construct and isolate an other. No longer a case of some 
outside reality imposing itself on one’s consciousness, recognition now appears as an 
engaged activity. Recognition is given agency. Once again, the foundations of 
recognition are disturbed by the prospect that what is recognized did not exist before its 
recognition, could not exist before being invoked. To add to the confusion, recognition 
now appears less like comprehension of some other’s essence and more like a one-sided 
imposition of identity over what might be a recalcitrant agent.  
Levinas, before Derrida’s popularization of the theme of ontology-as-violence, 
wrote that “comprehension…does not invoke these beings but only names them, thus 
accomplishing a violence and a negation.”34 The violent act of naming and therefore, 
enclosing, stabilizing, making static some system of content that might then be inscribed 
into an order seems to deprive recognition of its conceptualization as an innocent, natural, 
                                                 
32 Emmanuel Levinas, Is Ontology Fundamental?, 6. 
 
33 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge, 1997). 
 
34 Levinas, Is Ontology Fundamental?, 9. 
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and unproblematic occurrence. As Foucault pointed out in The Order of Things, the logic 
of a system depends first on containing and then organizing phenomena. When we look 
to recognition as an act or process that lends ethical and affective content to the objects 
being recognized, we are met with the question of how a system is organized such that 
particular logics develop into ethical categories, a question on the episteme and ethics of 
recognition.   
Here, we arrive at what distinguishes between the recognition-as-phenomenology 
and recognition-as-ethics. Ethics is a system that depends on logic, parameters, rules, and 
instructions on how the agents and the structure interact. What might be possible, 
whether these possibilities reflect an inherent core or source of values (e.g. affection, 
empathy, universal being, the Forms, or God), and the process by which values are 
crafted and then organized all depend on the objects that are presupposed in a system of 
ethics and their positioning within that system. Naming might represent the initial step 
(onto-genesis) which then allows for order and, consequently, applied logics and ethics.  
Thus far, we have moved from recognition as a phenomenological, perhaps 
violent, confrontation between a subject and some content external to its subjectivity (at 
least initially), to recognition that includes (either inextricably, by logical necessity, 
causally or probabilistically) practices of naming, ordering, and cognition from which 
ethical claims might emerge. It seems as though recognition cannot escape the demand to 
give identity to its other. Is there a way to escape this ontological violence? As I argue, 
recognition may be released from this desire and return to an ethics of relationality if it 
were viewed as an iterative practice that always destabilizes the identity of its objects of 
concern. 
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My view of (re)cognition is similar to Patchen Markell’s writing on 
acknowledgement in Bounded by Recognion.35 While there are small differences 
in our approach, possibly emerging from differences in our literary influences and 
intellectual histories, both our works cautiously test the recognition discourse 
against the promise that gives it purchase. For Markell, recognition as it has been 
addressed by dominant figures in the literature – most notably Charles Taylor – 
fails to grasp an internal contradiction. As Markell describes it, “there is a 
profound irony involved in the ideal of recognition: the desire that makes that 
ideal so compelling – the desire for sovereign agency, for an antidote to the 
riskiness and intermittent opacity of social life – may itself help to sustain some of 
the forms of injustice that many proponents of recognition rightly aim to 
overcome.”36  
Markell’s solution is to introduce a distinction between recognition and 
acknowledgment, the latter overcoming the contradiction by introducing the 
concepts of temporality and sovereignty to the recognition discourse. In so doing, 
he admirably preserves what we might value in the concept of recognition – the 
promise that it holds for autonomy, intersubjectivity, positive liberty, and 
companionship to which one may even include love.37 Temporality, for Markell, 
frees one (whether an individual or collective) from the inherent bind of 
                                                 
35 Patchen Markell, Bounded by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
36 Markell, Bounded by Recognition, 5. 
 
37 An optimism that finds support in the writings of Alphonso Lingis, himself heir to the principled thought 
of Emmanuel Levinas, and others. See: Alphonso Lingis, The First Person Singular (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007); Brian Schroeder, Altared Ground: Levinas, History, and Violence 
(New York: Routledge, 1996). 
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recognition – the demand that one pronounce, affirm, cosign, or insist on their 
identity. As he rightly points out, this bind may exist whether the identity being 
recognized is “positive” or “negative.”  
My own approach, no doubt similar but with some difference, focuses on 
viewing recognition as an iterative performative practice guided by an ethic of 
deference and vulnerability toward the other. One way to highlight this view of 
recognition as an iterative practice is to follow what has become a mark of 
poststructural though, influence in large part by Derrida’s playful and 
substantially meaningful approach to language, and alter the standard inscription 
of the word: to speak of (re)cognition in place of recognition. The language of 
temporality, while implicit in my argument, is not the approach taken here. 
Instead, the language of performativity will be central. Where Markell turns to 
Arendt, I turn to Levinas. Where he turns to Marx, I turn to Foucault.  
In order not to test the reader’s patience, a discussion of these differences 
is deferred to a later date. Having grounded this study in classic and contemporary 
literature on recognition, I now turn to an application of these insights directed 
toward three knowledge/power networks – the State, the Academy, and the 
Military/Security networks.  
In politics, people look to solutions that will fix things once and for all, provide a 
stable and secure being, some peace and with it peace of mind. The desire for recognition 
is driven by the same sense of promise. Finally, once and for all, we or I will be given a 
space where I can get down to my autonomy, freedom and true being. The State is 
thought to provide the space where that promise of liberation can flourish but a closer 
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look at statecraft reveals its nervous reproduction achieved by exercising flagrant 
exclusions and violent confinement of persons and ideas. It is to the practices of the State 
network that I now turn.  
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PART ONE: THE STATE NETWORK 
Chapter Two: States of Mind – The Politics of Recognition in Israel-Palestine 
 
 
This project began with a simple observation on the Israel-Palestine peace 
process. In recent years, a new condition for a final status agreement between the relevant 
parties has emerged. This condition – that the Palestinians recognize and affirm Israel’s 
existence as a Jewish State – is political significant for several reasons. First, it appears to 
have emerged in earnest only in the last decade, at a time when Israel has achieved its 
highest level of security since its founding. Threats from Israel’s neighbors and former 
belligerents – Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia– had subsided for the 
most part by the time Israel signed the Oslo Accords in 1993. Border skirmishes with 
terrorist organizations, occasional mortar fire and kidnappings continued (e.g., Hezbollah, 
Hamas, PIJ), but these did not reach the level of existential threat faced from surrounding 
armies in 1948, 1967, and 1973. The internal security threat brought on by waves of 
terror during the Second Intifada was more serious but the scope and scale of these events 
had subsided with the introduction of security barriers, closure policies, and reinforced 
internal security measures of the mid-2000s. Around the time that Israel began its 
separation policy in relation to the Palestinians, the problem of Israeli identity reemerged 
in a new, security-laden format.  
Second, this condition of recognition is arguably the most contentious and 
difficult issue to resolve, even in the face of ongoing questions on the final status of 
Jerusalem, the settlement projects in the West Bank, sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, 
and the Hamas government in Gaza. The demand for recognition appears to have 
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trumped “rational,” realist-oriented political concerns (security, economy, deterrence), 
introducing an element of idealism into the diplomatic process.  
Third, whether this condition of recognition has been met can never be resolutely 
verified. Israeli policymakers do not want to merely hear the Palestinian leadership utter 
“we recognize Israel as a Jewish State;” they and a large segment of the Israeli public 
need to believe that this utterance is genuine. Alternatively, the Palestinians need to 
perform this utterance in such a way that Israeli policymakers and the Israeli public 
cannot question its veracity. However, political performance depends upon agreeing to 
the same script, establishing trust among participants, and making the performance 
visible to the audience. As I demonstrate, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations often lack these 
elements.  
The new condition of recognition in the peace process has been read by most 
political pundits as a cynical move by Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, undertaken 
in order to stall negotiations with the Palestinians and maintain the status quo. 
Understanding the political risks to Palestinian policymakers in affirming Israel as a 
Jewish State (i.e., the domestic political costs they would incur, their legitimacy in the 
face of other factions like Hamas, and the loss of support of the Palestinian people), 
Netanyahu could expect a deadlock while continuing to build settlements in the West 
Bank and expanding Israeli control over the Palestinian economy and social life. Counter 
to this perspective, I argue that the demand for recognition reflects a serious concern at 
the heart of the Israel’s state-making project, a concern that had been deferred for nearly 
a century.  
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Casting the State 
 
As I argue in the Introduction, the politics of recognition operating in Israel-
Palestine are a veiled extension of violence – an iron fist in velvet glove. Israel-Palestine 
as a case study for the dissimulation of ongoing, violent, state-building practices is ideal: 
first due to the contemporary nature of developments central to the current political 
concerns and secondly due to the as-of-yet partial fulfilment of the state-making project. 
A brief look at the modern history of Zionism shows how this project might have looked 
different, the other possible paths that might have been taken before Israeli policymakers 
ultimately cast the state in a stifling mold accurately described as “ethnocracy” by Oren 
Yiftachel.38 
The establishment of a unified ethno-linguistic community based on Judaism and 
the Hebrew language is a recent development in the scope of a history of the Hebraic and 
Judaic people. The process by which we came to speak of a Jewish people let alone a 
Jewish State is more complex than many give credit and owes much to the artifice of 19th 
century scholars from Western and Central Europe. As Shlomo Sand demonstrates in his 
The Invention of the Jewish People, the concerted effort to develop a unified Jewish 
national identity emerged in Western Europe beginning in the 19th century. Efforts at 
tracing the origins of the Jewish nation to the Hebrews of the Bible and unifying the 
disparate communities into a single historical narrative was subject to not a little debate 
among the first modern historians. 
                                                 
38 Oren Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
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As nationalism began to spread throughout the continent, scholars – many of them 
German-Jewish – had sought ways to secure the rights of Jews as equal citizens in their 
respective states. While adopting the language and historiography of the emerging 
nationalism in the region, unanimity over the place of Jews in Europe was lacking. Early 
Jewish historians primarily argued for recognizing the distinctiveness of the Jewish 
people toward the ends of better integration and even assimilation within their respective 
states. It was only later, toward the end of the 19th century, that advocates for Jewish 
nationalism began to consider a state of their own for the Jewish people.  
As a diasporic community whose people spoke many languages, had adapted to a 
minority status in their given states, and had assimilated to many of the customs and 
culture of the places where they resided, the “Jewish people” where in want of a unifying 
element. Many German Jews, for example, were well-assimilated, urban, and secular, 
having little connection to the devout Jews living in Eastern European shtetls or with 
those tight-knit Orthodox communities that attended synagogue, sent their children to a 
cheder (a Jewish seminary), and donned religious garb.39  
The emergence of Zionism (Jewish nationalism) in the late 19th century, 
especially in its cultural mode, brought with it the resurrection of the Hebrew language 
and a biblical genealogy. As cultural Zionism gave way to political Zionism, the goals of 
Jewish nationalism changed, from a solidarity movement to a political program. By the 
early 20th century, when Zionists began to migrate to Israel in increasing numbers, the 
Hebrew language helped unify the diasporic community, with Jews coming from places 
as diverse as Yemen, Poland, the Soviet Union, and in later years, Argentina and 
                                                 
39 See: Shlomo Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People, trans. Yael Lotan, (Verso: London, 2009). 
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Ethiopia. To this day, Israeli culture, like most cultures exposed to the centrifugal forces 
of modernity, continues to evolve with the introduction and development of new styles of 
music, dress, colloquial language, and other cultural artifacts alongside changing values. 
In light of these forces and despite them, many Jewish Israelis display a nervous desire to 
justify and ground their belonging in the land. As mentioned before, this desire is 
understandable even if the methods toward achieving its ends are unjustifiable and 
unrealistic.  
Calling upon a myth of origins and citing surface level similarities to establish 
unity has thus far proven insufficient to fulfilling the desire for full, uncontested, 
sovereign presence. The social body still displays signs of its prior mythic dispersal and 
the real variation in its origins, the moving parts are not yet seamlessly integrated and 
smoothly coordinated. Difference remains ever-present. However, as part of the project 
of developing legitimacy in the region, the representatives of the Government of Israel 
continue in their attempts at establishing unity in the face of the diverse communities and 
lifeworlds found within the borders of the state.  
The demand for recognition in recent years exposes a break, fracture or gash that 
needs to be reset, cast, or cauterized before the State of Israel can put its state-making 
project to rest and claim its secured presence and belonging in the Middle East. Universal 
recognition of the state as it would like to be recognized could lend the legitimacy that 
would allow the state to enter a new phase, one in which violent self-assertion would be 
replaced by the unmistakable presence of the state – its hegemony unchallenged, its 
existence natural, its place rooted. While this aspiration is sincere and legitimate insofar 
as it concerns itself with the bodily security and social well-being of millions of people, 
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the current strategy toward its attainment is aggressive, counterproductive, and 
exclusionary due to a misapprehension regarding the source of legitimacy in the practice 
of recognition. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the force that lends to recognition its near-
universally accepted esteem is less that which provides for stability in the objects of 
social inquiry than it is that which engenders appreciation for the qualities most valued in 
the human individual and species – its freedom, creativity, and engaged exploration of 
the mysteries of consciousness in communion with others. It is this aspect, the internal 
ethical relation that opens in the face-to-face encounter, that first gave recognition its 
force – coming out of the enlightenment era and developed into the ideals adumbrated in 
the emerging Liberal school of thought. When transposed into the politics of state – its 
contemporary form following an ancient, more violent, more aggressive, and more 
assertive “Realist” school of thought that predated what would later be called 
“civilization” (i.e., Hobbes called the “State of Nature”) – the concept of recognition 
entered into dangerous terrain from which it might never escape. If the ethical core were 
to persist, then recognition would have to polish off the patina of positive political being 
it had accumulated in modernity.  
There is a risk in removing that protective layer of the State (i.e., the presumption 
of ontological being) that state-makers found necessary to guarantee the continuity of 
their power in history. Power in the hands of the statesman – whether monarch or 
oligarch (are there any other kinds?) – may persist so long as the kabuki mask of State 
remains firmly in place. So long as the participants (performers) are able to operate as if 
their social production affects the creation of a true ontological beingness, the artifice can 
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persist.40 In order for this performance to succeed, two other matters have to be taken into 
consideration: clearing the set and silencing or marginalizing the “bad actors” – those 
who either refuse to play their part or actively work to undermine the performance. 
However, this action must remain cloaked. Any appearance as brute violence is displayed 
at the risk of legitimizing those others who refuse to play their assigned roles. It must 
retain the appearance of legitimacy as if nothing in the world were more natural than 
States speaking as one voice from out of a single body. 
If some voices have to be silenced, others have to be projected loudly and 
confidently. The conjuring whereby speaking of the State brings the State into existence 
is aided by an ever-important script. This script, or text, is viewed as the noblest construct 
that political man – and before them God – had ever created: the Law.41 Here, a problem 
arises; Law is instituted for the purpose of serving and representing the dictates of 
Justice, but in its very institution, reveals that Justice has no grounds but those composed 
and imposed by force of Law. As Derrida explains, and here he is worth quoting at 
length: 
The very emergence of justice and law, the founding and justifying 
moment that institutes law implies a performative force, which is always 
an interpretative force: this time not in the sense of law in the service of 
force, its docile instrument, servile and thus exterior to the dominant 
power but rather in the sense of law that would maintain a more internal, 
                                                 
40 For more on the indeterminacy, performativity, and deferred identity of the state, see: Richard Ashley, 
“The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984): 225-286; Richard 
Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, “Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the 
Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, 34 (1990): 367-416; 
Richard K. Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique,” 
Millennium Journal of International Studies, 17 (1988): 227-262; Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Desire all the way 
down,” Review of International Studies, 26 (2000): 137-139; Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Aporia: A Critical 
Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory,” European Journal of 
International Relations, 3 (1997): 365-392. 
 
41 This could also be read as “the Word” or the sovereign. 
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more complex relation with what one calls force, power or violence. 
Justice – in the sense of droit (right or law) would not simply be put in the 
service of a social force or power, for example an economic, political, 
ideological power that would exist outside or before it and which it would 
to accommodate or bend to when useful. Its very moment of foundation or 
institution (which in any case is never a moment inscribed in the 
homogenous tissue of a history, since it is ripped apart with one decision), 
the operation that consists of founding, inaugurating, justifying law 
(droit), making law, would consist of a coup de force, of a performative 
and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust 
and that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment 
could guarantee or contradict or invalidate. No justificatory discourse 
could or should insure the role of metalanguage in relation to the 
performativity of institutive language or to its dominant interpretation. 
Here the discourse comes up against its limit: in itself, in its performative 
power itself.42  
 
This leads Jacques Derrida to conclude that, “since the origin of authority, the foundation 
or ground, the position of the law can’t by definition rest on anything but themselves, 
they are themselves a violence without ground.”43 Looking to the origin of the Law, 
whether through Hobbes or Derrida, helps reveal its necessary relation to violence. 
Similarly, looking to the origin of the demand for recognition exposes the same otherwise 
overlooked relation; that in the project of state-building, violence is very real, very 
present, on-going, and upon close inspection, absolutely necessary. This necessary 
violence is not unique to Israel; rather, it is observed in all cases where a state is asserted. 
The State is, through and through, an institution of violence.44 
                                                 
42 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” trans. Mary Quaintance, 
Cardozo Law Review, 11 (1990): 941-943. 
 
43 For more on the foundational, law-making, and law-maintaining violence of the State, see: Walter 
Benjamin “Critique of Violence,” Walter Benjamin Selected Writings Volume 1 1913-1926, eds. Marcus 
Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002); 
Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” trans. Mary Quaintance, Cardozo 
Law Review, 11 (1990): 919-1045. 
 
44 In using the word violence, I am not referring primarily to corporeal or subjective violence, but a more 
expansive understanding of violence that operates through symbolic, structural, ontological, and discursive 
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Turning from abstract theory and metaphor to practical reality, we can think of the 
entire separation principle enacted by Ariel Sharon as evidence of this violence, the 
demonstration of strength which reveals a deep-seated weakness.45 Using U.S. State 
Department cables released by Wikileaks, I trace the development of the recognition 
discourse, trying to find the major inflection points where the concept develops and 
begins to gain greater attention. In order to understand how the recognition discourse is 
implicated in the current diplomatic process, we should trace the networks that have 
transmitted, altered, developed, or performed this discourse. As the reader will notice, the 
act of tracing networks requires some agility and a willingness to cross-over into new 
networks. A few more words are necessary to orient this demand in the modern history of 
the Israel-Palestine conflict.  
 
Tracing Recognition in the Diplomatic Network 
 
The logic of Netanyahu’s demand for recognizing Israel as a Jewish State appears 
to be in-line with the principle of excision of impurities, of separation rather than 
                                                 
registers. Put another way, my primary focus is on what Zizek terms “objective violence.” It is here that the 
discourse and practice of recognition reveals itself as violence. Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways 
Reflections, (New York: Picador, 2008). 
 
The authority of the state grounded in the exercise of violence appears throughout political philosophy. 
See: Max Weber, Politics as Vocation; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the 
Political, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976); Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making 
as Organized Crime,” Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda 
Skocpol, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
 
45 This is an oblique reference to Hannah Arendt’s view of Violence not as a sign of strength but rather one 
of weakness. Power, for Arendt, exposes its lack when it can only bend the will of others through brute 
force. It also recalls Gramsci’s discussion of cultural hegemony. See: Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1969); Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks. 
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integration. Netanyahu’s demand for recognition can be read as a refusal to recognize the 
internal other. Whether you set your gaze toward the security barrier built along the West 
Bank, the hermetic closure and shifting technologies of governance in Gaza, or the new 
calls for a Palestinian population transfer plan by right-wing parties Israel Baitenu or 
Habayit Ha’Yehudi, you see a desire to avoid all contact with the other. Less dramatic but 
equally demonstrative is the attempt to pass legislation during the 2009 election that 
would require a loyalty oath from members of the Knesset, explicitly targeting outspoken 
Arab-Israeli legislators like Haneen Zoabi and Ahmed Tibi. If only this other could just 
disappear, or at least quiet down, or barring that possibility, have the decency to 
announce that the Jewish character of the state is rightfully dominant, that political 
Zionism is a morally just and ethically sound project, and that she is an aberration, an 
Other, then maybe Israel could fulfil the dream of a Jewish State.  
The demand for recognition as a Jewish State was not always central to 
negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians although the principle of Israel as a 
Jewish State does extend back to the creation of the State, first inscribed in Law in the 
years following the Second World War. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181, passed 
on November 29, 1947 called for the partition of Palestine into two states: a Jewish State 
and an Arab State. Similarly, Israel’s Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948 
declares the establishment of the Jewish State in Eretz Israel (The Land of Israel). Both 
documents also affirm the rights of the Arab minority in the State though in the case of 
Israel, the principle of equal rights was hardly followed.  
Following the 1948 War, Arabs in Israel were under military administrative rule 
until 1966. In addition to this, the Law of Return in Israel recognizes the right of Jews 
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from across the world to make Aliyah. No similar “right of return” is extended to the 
Palestinians who fled after the war or their successive generations. Indeed, and as the 
diplomatic documents indicate, the demand to recognize Israel as a Jewish State is 
understood by both sides to imply the revocation of the right of return to Palestinian 
exiles and refugees.46 
The claim could be made that, given the text of the Declaration of Independence 
and UN 181, Israeli demands that Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish State is pro 
forma and not at all controversial. It would be a mistake, however, to read the 
contemporary demands for recognition from the vantage point of the mid-20th century. 
This is true for at least two reasons.  
First, colonialism and a politics of racial segregation were still dominant at that 
time of the U.N. vote and Israel declaration. Africa and Southeast Asia had not yet 
undergone their waves of decolonization. Segregation was a widely accepted practice 
throughout the U.S. The legitimation of ethnically-defined states by the U.N. and Israel, 
even with reassuring words toward respecting minority communities, must be read in 
light of the ideology of the time. In addition to this, the demand for recognition as a 
Jewish State was not necessary for much of the 20th century because Israel had never 
recognized the Palestinian national movement as legitimate. It was not until the Oslo 
                                                 
46 As a Kuwait News Agency report cited in the Stratfor cable dump reported, Netanyahu, in front of the 
Israeli Knesset in 2011, “stressed the ‘the necessity of Palestinians' recognition of Israel as the national 
state of Jewish people, and that any peace agreement should lead to ending dispute, capping Palestinian 
demands, and resolving the Palestinian refugees' issue outside the borders of Israel." 
Wikileaks, Stratfor Cables, “ISRAEL/MIDDLE EAST-Netanyahu Links Peace To Palestinians'' 
Recognition of Israel as Jewish State,” June 6, 2011, Accessed on April 28 via: 
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/30/3030614_israel-middle-east-netanyahu-links-peace-to-
palestinians.html  
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Accords that the Government of Israel accepted the Palestine Liberation Organization as 
a negotiating partner.  
Second, the demand for recognition as a Jewish State is fairly recent in the 
diplomatic history. The Declaration of Principles of the Oslo Accords (1993), for 
example, make no mention of the PLO recognizing Israel as a Jewish State. The word 
Jewish is nowhere to be found, nor is that of a Palestinian or Arab State.47 This is to say 
that from the U.N. Resolution until the first decade of the 21st century, peace was not 
conditional on recognition of a Jewish State. A search of diplomatic cables released 
through Wikileaks further demonstrates the novelty of this demand.  
Isolating the phrase “Jewish State” and searching documents that also contain 
either “recognize” or “recognition” yields only 7 matching documents between the years 
2000 and 2005. These documents, as I will explain further below, do not yet place 
recognition of Israel as a Jewish State as a central condition in the negotiations. 
Repeating the same search for 2005-2006 yields 10 matching documents. For 2006-2007, 
29; 2007-2008, 69; 2008-2009, 33; 2009-2010, 154; 2010-2011, 541; 2011-2012, 2647; 
2013, 3.48 This rough accounting reveals that after 2005, the demand for recognition as a 
Jewish State gained purchase, with a spike in 2007 and again in 2009 onwards. We can 
now turn to a closer reading of the cables, discerning some inflection points and their 
                                                 
47 “Text: 1993 Declaration of Principles,” BBC News, last modified November 29, 2001, accessed on May 
5, 2016, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1682727.stm 
48 The drop-off in 2013 is due to the limited files authored in 2013 that were released via Wikileaks though 
the demand for recognition as a Jewish State was ubiquitous in 2013 and since. It should also be noted that 
the number of documents changes as new leaks are made and new files are processed.  
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corresponding events that would explain the sharp rise in the prevalence of the 
recognition discourse in the diplomatic network. 
 
“Israel for the Jewish People and Palestine for the Palestinians” 
 
The earliest mention of Israel’s demand for recognition as a Jewish State in cables 
obtained through Wikileaks (covering the years 1985 to 2010) appears in May of 2002.49 
The cable recounts a series of meeting between PolCouns and two Jordanian religious 
leaders, the Mufti of the Kingdom, Sheikh Said al-Hijjawi and the Chief Justice of the 
Sharia Court, Sheikh Izzeddine al-Tamimi: 
Why is it that Jews demand a "Jewish state" in Jerusalem, Hijjawi asked, when 
there is no archeological proof that a Jewish temple ever existed under the Haram 
al-Sharif (the Muslim complex containing the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa 
Mosque on top of Temple Mount)? From there, Hijjawi wove a familiar web of 
suspicion of Israel based on half-truths and popular misconceptions. Tamimi, as 
well, criticized "Zionist extremists" for perpetuating the "Jewish occupation" of 
the West Bank and Gaza, and cited verses from the Quran advising that Muslims 
use great caution in dealing with Jews. PolCouns responded that Arabs and 
Muslims would have to deal with Jewish beliefs just as they asked Israel to deal 
with Islamic beliefs (02AMMAN2432, May 16 2002, italics added).50 
 
What is interesting about the above passage are the quotes around Jewish State. They are 
in the original cable but it’s not clear how these quotations are operating. Did Hijjawi put 
those words in quotations? Was it PolCouns who added these markings? The author of 
the Amman embassy cable appears to be U.S. Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm; perhaps 
                                                 
49 Wikileaks Cable Gate, www.cablegatesearch.net. 
 
50 The cable goes on to characterize the two religious clerics as "moderate, establishment Islamic figures 
who represent mainstream Jordanian Sunni thought. Both expressed admiration for the piety and freedom 
of Americans, are strong advocates for Muslim-Christian understanding in Jordan, and publicly condemned 
(and continue to condemn) the September 11 attacks as un-Islamic.” 
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he placed these indicators over the words. When noticing the quotation marks around 
“Zionist extremists” and “Jewish occupation,” it appears as though Gnehm (did he author 
the cable?) placed the quotation marks to indicate a construction that he is calling into 
question. Was the author of the cable incredulous at the use of this term “Jewish State,” 
as if this construction reveals the unsophisticated way in which these clerics think and 
speak of Israel (“Jewish State,” “Zionists extremists,” “Jewish occupation”)?  
This is not a trifling matter because without knowing the author of the quotations, 
we can’t be sure what or whose purpose they were meant to serve. This is a good starting 
point not only because it is the first mention of the demand for a Jewish State (though in 
this case they do not mention a diplomatic demand for “recognition” and appear 
concerned with Jerusalem in particular), and not only because the reference is 
volunteered by these Jordanian clerics rather than Israeli representatives, but also for its 
very ambiguity. If we were to establish a law based on this text, who could we interrogate 
to discern its meaning? Will it always be the same person/people and will the ruling as to 
its meaning remain consistent over time? 
In June 2003, a U.S. Cable from the Amman Embassy reported on media 
reactions in the Arab World toward the Sharm al-Sheik and Aqaba Summits. On June 3rd, 
Al-Rai columnist Sultan Hattab wrote the following in an article titled “Will the Aqaba 
Summit Succeed in Describing Sharon As An Occupier?”: 
Those who meet at Sharm and in Aqaba should wrench two issues from Sharon: 
The first is that the territories on which his forces have been stood since 1967 are 
occupied territories. The second is that his government should commit itself to a 
vision of two neighboring states on the historical land of Palestine, namely, Israel 
and Palestine. This should be done before Sharon wrenches from the meeting, 
particularly from the Palestinians, the recognition that the State of Israel is a 
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solely Jewish state, which means writing off the Palestinians right of return 
(03AMMAN3233, June 3 2003, my emphasis). 
 
This is the first instance in the U.S. Cables from Wikileaks where recognition of Israel as 
a Jewish state is mentioned as central to the negotiations. Still, it is referred to as a 
concession that Sharon would try to elicit from the Palestinians during the summit, and 
not a condition already central to the Israeli position. It seems to be more a conjecture 
than anything else. Once again, the concept is inscribed into the U.S. State Department 
cables not by Israeli policymakers but by the reaction of Arab commentators.  
A memorandum from Bannerman & Associates (a D.C. lobbying firm) recounting 
an informal conversation at the Brookings Institution in Washington dated June 20th, 
2003 revealed this emerging demand, but not from Israel. The memo was released by Al-
Jazeera as part of the Palestine Paper leak in January of 2011, the largest dump of internal 
documents relating to the Israel-Palestine peace process from 1999-2010. The author of 
the cable, long-time diplomat Ed Abington, writes that “a former U.S. Government 
official, who until recently was at the National Security Council, provided an off-the-
record account of the policy debate within the Bush Administration as the Road Map was 
being formulated.”51 According to this former government official, “Bush’s commitment 
to Palestinian statehood stems in part from his personal commitment to Israel’s physical 
safety and its identity as a Jewish state” and that Bush “accepts and has internalized the 
argument that Israel cannot continue to occupy indefinitely the West Bank and Gaza and 
at the same time remain a democratic, Jewish state.”  
                                                 
51 “US Lobbyist Memo: Evolution of the Road Map – An Insider’s Accounts,” The Palestine Papers, June 
20, 2003, Accessed on April 29, 2016 via: 
http://transparency.aljazeera.net/en/projects/thepalestinepapers/201218233446421714.html 
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This condition began to disseminate and secure a central position in the discourse 
on the conflict. A State Department cable from August 21st of 2003 reports on an editorial 
in Canada’s conservative National Post which mentions that peace will not be achieved 
with the Palestinians until they “accept the existence of a Jewish state in their midst” 
(03OTTAWA2389). This comes from a Canadian editorial board, and is not yet a 
reference to Israeli policy. There is also room for debate here as to whether the mention 
of “Jewish state” is just a trope or is meant to emphasize the Jewish character of the state; 
however, the earlier unverified statement by Bush (according to the former government 
official in the Stratfor Cable) soon became official policy. 
Recognition of Israel as a Jewish State received a substantial boost in a statement 
released by U.S. President George W. Bush on April 14, 2004 in support of Ariel 
Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan. In the public exchange of letters between Bush and 
Sharon, the president explains that “the United States is strongly committed to Israel's 
security and well-being as a Jewish state.” This statement is bolder than that inscribed in 
the Sharon Plan, which only mentions “the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish 
people.”52 This language did not pass without notice. The Vatican, for example, 
questioned whether President Bush’s reference to Israel as “the Jewish State” could have 
implications for religious freedom in the state (04VATICAN1548). 
In 2005, the concept of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State was bandied about in 
greater frequency during the public and diplomatic debates on Sharon’s withdrawal from 
                                                 
52 The difference between these two pronouncements was referenced in the Introduction. The former lends 
the State itself an identity as a single embodied form, reflecting the transubstantiation of the State aided by 
Liberalism. The latter maintains a legalistic vision of the State, separating it from the body of the people 
(the Jewish people) though offering them protection. 
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Gaza. This is telling because it is precisely here – when the Israeli government began to 
implement its separation principle in earnest – that policymakers appear to have become 
conscious of the identity issue that could not be resolved by disengagement.53 The 
principle of security on which Israeli governments had based their actions (in rhetoric if 
not in actual fact) was about to shift to a principle of identity. Identity, in turn, would 
soon become the focal point of securitization. 
Throughout, the production of the discourse regarding identity and the Jewish 
State was transnational in character. A report by the American Research Initiative on 
demographics in Israel/Palestine helped demonstrate the nervous character of the debate 
that had serious implications not only for Israel’s identity but also its final borders and 
the concessions that it should (not) be willing to make to the Palestinians. The report 
claimed that previous demographic studies had over-counted the Arabs in Israel. These 
findings provided support to those who argued that Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan 
could not be legitimated based on the threat of a “demographic time-bomb.”54 This threat 
was one rhetorical tool used to legitimate the Sharon Plan, unpopular as it was within his 
own Likud party. Indeed, Sharon had to create a new political party, Kadima, in order to 
institute his plan. Placing the demographic threat at the center of its logic would increase 
                                                 
53 Neve Gordon, in writing on the shift from a colonization to a separation principle, focuses on the events 
of the Second Intifada as the inflection point (200). Israel’s decision to build the security fence around the 
West Bank in 2002 is a major turning point. However, the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, soon followed 
by the hermetic closure of Gaza and the shift in the resource supply chain there (from truck convoys 
traversing the border to the institution of drop-points, trans-border conveyor belts, and the tunnel 
economy), is an equally dramatic turning point and one that appears more immediately related to the 
development of the recognition discourse. 
54 The “demographic time-bomb” is the notion that within a few decades, the number of Palestinians in 
Israel (or in the territories under Israeli sovereignty – Gaza, West Bank, and Israel Proper) will outpace the 
number of Jews. 
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the likelihood of securing the support from right-wing constituents otherwise averse to 
ceding any territory to the Palestinians.  
The American Research Initiative Report, presented at the American Enterprise 
Institute (an ideologically conservative D.C. thinktank) and published by the Begin-Sadat 
Center For Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, purportedly demonstrated that the 
threat of a demographic time-bomb was overblown.55 In other words, according to this 
report, there was no urgent need to cede territory to the Palestinians. Palestinian 
autonomy was not a pressing issue. The U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv added to its analysis of 
the demographic problem a question about the ideological leaning of one of the financiers 
of ARI report:  
the U.S. businessman who financed the ARI report denied to poloff that he has 
any political agenda, he is known to support settler groups and is the founder of 
the "American Friends of the Golan." (05TELAVIV633, February 2 2005). 
 
The businessman is Bennett Zimmerman, who is described in an article by Ha’aretz 
editor-in-chief Aluf Benn as: 
A businessman who runs a small fund for investing in shares of Israeli high-tech 
companies. He votes Republican and loves the old songs of Elton John. He got 
into politics a few years ago when he established American Friends of the Golan 
and fought against the withdrawal plan of former prime minister Ehud 
Barak…Zimmerman is part of a group of Jewish activists from the West Coast 
who bypassed the traditional Jewish establishment and launched aggressive pro-
Israel activity during the intifada.56  
 
                                                 
55 Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise, “The Million Person Gap: The Arab 
Population in the West Bank and Gaza,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 65 (2006); Bennett 
Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael Wise, “Arab Population in the West Bank & Gaza: The Million 
and a half Person Gap,” 
Presented at American Enterprise Institute, January 2005. Accessed on May 1 2016 via: 
www.acpr.org.il/resources/050110Demographic-Study.ppt 
56 Aluf Benn, “You Can Count on Them,” Haaretz, January 28, 2005, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=533294. 
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Bennett Zimmerman was also a Strategic Consultant for Bain & Company, the 
management consulting firm best known for its connection to 2008 U.S. Presidential 
Candidate Willard Mitt Romney. It was also the former employer of a 28 year old 
Benjamin Nitay (Benyamin Netanyahu), as he was called then, following his graduate 
education at MIT.57 As Aluf Benn explains, Mr. Zimmerman first became concerned 
about the demographic issue in 2003, writing an article in November of that year entitled 
“Time for a Recount.”58 For an interest that would represent a unified people within a 
bounded territory, it is surprising how Israeli identity politics were being played outside 
of the state, finding their ways into diplomatic knowledge, and altering the discourse 
within policymaking circles. 
The politics of recognition continued to gain traction and spread across the 
expansive State Department network. In June of 2006, the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires 
cited an article on the state of the Israel/Palestine conflict. The article mentions “the latest 
incident, which was triggered by the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, occurred precisely 
when Hamas agreed to implicitly acknowledge the existence of a Jewish State” 
(06BUENOSAIRES1454, June 23 2006). No other mention is made in the cables of 
Hamas’ implicit acceptance of a Jewish State and it’s not clear whether the journalists 
conflated previous concession by Hamas with this more serious concession. Hamas, for 
example, have expressed a willingness to accept Israel on the 1967 borders, to recognize 
                                                 
57 This is not to say that there was a direct connection between these individual. It does, however, point to 
the transnational networks of power and knowledge that can at times undertake responsibilities and actions 
traditionally associated with the State. What sort of personal networks and ideological positions are 
rendered through these firms is a worthwhile avenue for future research.  
 
58 Bennett Zimmerman, “Op-Ed: Time for a Recount,” November 27, 2003, Arutz Sheva, Accessed on 
April 27, 2016 via: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/3014. 
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the legitimacy of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and to abide by previous agreements 
between Israel and the PLO on the condition that these terms are ratified by a public 
referendum. My research has not uncovered any other mentions of Hamas recognizing or 
acknowledging Israel as a Jewish State as such a concession would likely risk Hamas’ 
support, based as it is on taking a more hardline position than that of Fatah and PLO 
“collaborators.” 
The cables throughout the mid-2000s often reflect the older demand put on the 
Palestinians since Oslo; namely, the recognition of the State of Israel. As late as May 
2009, in talks with Jeffrey Feldman and National Security Council Middle East and North 
Africa director Dan Shapiro, there was an insistence that Hamas “recognize Israel” and 
“renounce violence.” Up until this point, U.S. diplomatic cables obtained by Wikileaks 
have few mentions of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State, and never as a condition for 
negotiations or even as a required utterance. Until the disengagement, reference to Israel 
as a Jewish state was marked as a basic principle that the Palestinians would have to 
accept. Even with President Bush’s annunciation of Israel as a Jewish State, the demand 
for recognition was not yet a central to negotiations. Part of this reflects Ariel Sharon’s 
unilateral approach but as I argue, it was only after Sharon’s separation policy that Israeli 
policymakers appeared increasingly nervous about the future identity of the state. The 
negotiations with the Palestinians, even if they culminated in a final status agreement and 
an end to hostilities, would still leave the issue of Israel’s internal other unresolved.  
In this context, the narrative began to focus more intently on how the issue of 
settlements and Israel’s Arab population might be resolved, giving Israel a secure and 
stable identity as a Jewish State. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in 2006, proposed a 
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consolidation of the settlement population in settlement blocs closer to the Green Line 
(the Convergence Plan), a move that could create final status borders that might retain 
Israel as a “Jewish state” next to a Palestinian state (06TELAVIV1600). But even here, it 
was not the case of Olmert initially demanding that Palestinians recognize Israel as a 
Jewish state. Rather, it was something to be pursued, the end goal of all negotiations, and 
perhaps something that Israelis could affirm without the aid of the Palestinians. But 
slowly, the concept became entangled in the negotiations, until such a point that Israel 
would need to secure the utterance by Palestinian representatives that Israel is recognized 
as a Jewish state. The negotiations leading up to the Annapolis conference in 2007 had 
finally seen the demand made explicit and a central sticking point.  
A February 13, 2007 Memorandum from the Palestinian Negotiation Support Unit 
(NSU) headed by longtime diplomat Saeb Erakat, released as part of the Palestine Papers 
leak, reveals the concern with Israel’s wish to extract this concession.59 The memo 
enumerates the concerns mentioned above – the novelty of this demand in comparison to 
previous rounds of negotiation, its implications for the right of return, the lack of 
precedence in international law, the repercussions for Israel’s non-Jewish minority, and 
the internal debate among Israelis as to the interpretation of “Jewish” in law and society. 
The demand became one of the primary sticking-points of the negotiations leading up to 
the Annapolis Conference, and was pushed adamantly by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, 
                                                 
59 “NSU Memo Re: Precondition of Recognizing Israel as a “Jewish State”,” The Palestine Papers, 
February 13, 2007, accessed on April 29, 2016 via: 
http://transparency.aljazeera.net/en/projects/thepalestinepapers/20121823145359921.html 
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who described the concept as “Israel for the Jewish people and Palestine for the 
Palestinians.”60 
Saeb Erakat, in a one cable reporting his meeting with an EU delegate – the EU 
were a member of “The Quartet” which oversaw the Bush “Road Map” – is quoting as 
saying: 
My negotiations with the Israelis are so complicated. The last thing to do is to fall 
in the trap of discussing the nature of the religion of their state and get involved in 
their internal debates. It’s not my business what their religion is, what their flag is, 
or nation or symbols, or identification. But they cannot ask me to become a 
member of the Zionist movement. I told Livni ‘‘how can you say Jewish State 
when 20% of your population is non Jewish’’?61 
 
In the end, the Annapolis Conference, like so many other attempts at peace, went 
nowhere. Several months after the meeting, Prime Minister Olmert, plagued by 
accusations of corruption for which he would later be indicted, was defeated by Tzipi 
Livni for leadership of Kadima. Livni, however, was unable to hold together the 
governing coalition of parties triggering another election. In February of 2009, Benyamin 
Netanyahu, whose Likud party earned slightly less mandates than Kadima, was 
nonetheless able to form a majority coalition and return to his previous post as Prime 
Minister. This time, he had a new implement – cast by a complex network of advocates 
that included the U.S. President, former Prime Minister Sharon, and the Kadima party 
under the direction of Olmert and Livni – that he would leverage in negotiations with the 
Palestinians whose right to a state he had not yet been officially recognized.  
                                                 
60 “Meeting Minutes: 3rd Negotation Team Meeting,” The Palestine Papers, October 19, 2007, accessed on 
April 29, 2016 via: 
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Between the time of Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan and Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan 
speech in 2009, the concept of recognition went from a secondary concern (secondary to 
security) to a primary concern. Part of this has to do with the success of Israeli security 
forces in the intervening years, which since 2006 were relatively non-violent. Israeli 
casualties from terror peaked in the years before the implementation of the Sharon Plan 
and have steadily declined since then. The separation fence and redeployment from Gaza 
appeared to have worked. However, now the more serious existential question had to be 
asked, a question that was put on hold from the 1937 Peel Commission until the first 
decade of the 21st century. What is the identity of the State of Israel? How can it be 
secured? The Obama administration would prove to be a useful ally in this project.  
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Chapter Three: Frames of Mind – U.S. State Department Perspectives on the  
Israel-Palestine Conflict62 
 
 
In January of 2013, following Barack Obama’s re-election and just before the 
Israeli election, Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic revealed President Obama’s 
disappointment with Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu.63  Obama, despite his 
many public statements supporting the State of Israel and avoiding political confrontation 
with the Netanyahu regime, was reported to have stated in private that the Israeli Prime 
Minister was a “political coward” who did not know the best interests of his country. For 
those who have become accustomed to the U.S. Government’s consistent support of the 
Israeli government in both word and deed, this came as a surprise. During the 2013 
Operation Pillar of Defense, Obama publically supported the IDF assault on Gaza, 
restating Israel’s right to defend itself against militants who indiscriminately attack the 
homeland. At the same time, the U.S. administration seemed largely mute on Israeli 
settlement expansion, and directly opposed Palestinian bids for UN non-state member 
status.  
Following John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s highly critical and controversial 
study on the Israel Lobby and its influence on U.S. policy, one would expect the 
president to avoid public denunciations of Israeli policies, and indeed, this seemed to 
have been the case throughout the 2012 election cycle. While the “leaked” conversations 
                                                 
62 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association, San Francisco, CA, April 3-7, 2013. 
 
63 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama: ‘Israel Doesn’t Know What Its Best Interests Are’”, Bloomberg Online, 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-14/what-obama-thinks-israelis-don-t-understand-.html, 
January, 14, 2013), March 27, 2013.  
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beg several questions on the character of U.S. strategy, politicking, and the beliefs of U.S. 
policymakers, definitive answers to such questions are difficult to establish. Unable to 
enter the world inside leader’s minds, political analysts are left with only words and 
deeds to uncover intent and perspective.  
In this chapter, I explore the representation of the Israel-Palestine conflict through 
texts created by the executive and the legislative branches of government. In doing so, I 
wish to undergo a (con)textual analysis that might illuminate the construction of both the 
actors and the structure of the conflict, focusing on issue-framing, the sublimation of 
contradiction, and expressions of empathy. My contention, before beginning my analysis, 
was that both executive and legislative policy documents – meant to be unbiased and 
impartial – would exhibit traits of framing, naturalization, and differentiation between 
Israel and Palestine, favoring the former by relying on a grammar of victimhood. Sticking 
to best-practices in a discourse analytic methodology, I attempt to consider the broader 
historical context of the conflict using my prior knowledge and engagement in the 
literature, and turn an ear toward both spaces of silence and of amplification.64 Put 
another way, this chapter pursues “the bias implicit in the absent” and the delicate 
message buried in the cacophony of recited clichés.65 
Following the example of Karen Fierke’s work on the Cold War, I initially sought 
out to uncover the general grammar within which recurring metaphors and tropes would 
be prominently recited. Grammar here refers to “how boundaries are established in 
                                                 
64 Yoshiko K. Herrera and Bear Braumoeller, “Symposium: Content and Discourse Analysis,” Qualitative 
Methods, Spring (2004), 16.  
 
65 Marda Dunksy, “Missing: The bias implicit in the absent” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23 No. 3 (2001), 
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practice by the subjects of analysis, that is, what are the objects populating their world 
and what are the possibilities of these objects.”66 Going beyond the issue of whether the 
U.S. is an unbiased negotiator – a topic explored in various studies on the U.S. media and 
government practices – the interest here is on how the U.S. policymakers perceive the 
conflict and potential solutions. Rather than taking U.S. government representations as 
reflections of objective fact, I focus on the power as productive approach, investigating 
how the “subject, object, and interpretive dispositions” are “socially constructed such that 
certain practices [are] made possible.”67  
Here, there is the expectation that both subject and structure are prematurely 
concretized and naturalized through a process of casting out new information as aberrant 
or impotent in changing the identity of the actors, structure, or “game.” Doing so requires 
multiple close readings of the documents. As Timothy Mitchell observes, “objects of 
analysis do not occur as natural phenomena, but are partly formed by the discourse that 
describes them. The more natural the object appears, the less obvious this discursive 
manufacture will be.”68 As I will demonstrate in the following pages, the surface features 
of the U.S. discourse – including tone, tropes, and demands – offer important yet 
arguably superficial insights. More interesting are the contradictions and cognitive 
dissonance that are at times explicitly excised and other times deferred. 
                                                 
66 Karen Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 
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67 Roxanne Lynn Doty. “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 37 No. 3 (1993), 298. 
 
68 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics and Modernity, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), 210.  
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Acknowledging my role as analyst, I do not claim to reach unequivocal 
conclusions. However, the analysis reveals new ways of viewing the conflict, the actors, 
and the realm of possible actions by the United States. Lastly, my interest is this chapter 
is less a question of “why” such and such relations exist, but rather, “how” these relations 
are constructed, reflected or imagined in text.   
 
Methods 
 
 
Being unable to dig into the minds of policymakers, we must rely on words and 
deeds which represent tendencies and dispositions. While words and phrases might 
represent particular dispositions, we are met with the difficulty of differentiating between 
signals that are “true”, those meant to deceive, and those with little import. Doty’s study 
on Imperial Encounters offers a good template for approaching this topic. For Doty, an 
important question is how the subject is created and positioned, and how it is possible for 
these constructions to come about. She has two concerns; the formation of the subject and 
its field of movement, and the positioning (focusing on hierarchy in particular) created 
through discourse.  Similarly, my interest is not in what language reveals, but in what it 
does.69 
In order to get a view of what language does, I collected documents authored by 
members of the State Department and Congressional Research Service. There was a 
conscious decision in choosing documents that were intended for internal circulation 
                                                 
69 Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
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rather than public release. This decision is based on the desire to eliminate the potential 
“noise” that one is likely to find in documents meant to address the public. Those sorts of 
documents or speeches might be targeted toward particular audiences, might appear more 
opaque in their rhetorical strategy, or might be situated within a multilevel complex of 
political calculations.  
Documents meant for internal circulation, on the other hand, are more likely to 
express the official position and decision-making framework of the relevant department. 
While several of the documents contain talking points and serve as briefing memos, these 
are intended for the use of diplomats during consultation with government and 
intergovernmental organizations (the UN in particular). Whether an appreciable 
difference between these documents and those statements addressed to domestic 
audiences differ is a matter deferred to a later date.70 
Several of the documents from the State Department were classified as “secret” or 
“confidential” and were leaked by Wikileaks, others were eventually de-classified for 
public distribution and still others were unclassified (though still unavailable through 
official channels). Selection criteria for these documents were as follows: (1) the 
document must be primarily concerned with each actor in relation to the conflict (i.e. a 
document discussing Israel in the context of the Iranian nuclear program would not be 
included) (2) the document must be authored during the Obama administration (3) the 
document should not be redundant (i.e. several documents might address the same topic 
within a short span of time, using the same paragraphs of earlier drafts) (4) the documents 
                                                 
70 The literature on Operational Code Analysis directly addresses this concern. See, for example, the edited 
volume: Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer, Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, 
Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations, (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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should not be minutes or summaries of dialogue with some other nation, but should 
instead only take the form of internal deliberation and communication.  
To understand how the Executive Branch constructs the Israel-Palestine conflict, I 
use Wikileak documents from the State Department, under the authority of Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton. These documents are authored and disseminated by the State 
Department between January of 2009 and February of 2010. There are 23 documents 
from the office of the Secretary of State in total which fit the abovementioned criteria. 
These represent the population of available documents through Wikipedia’s cablegate.net 
website at the time of the analysis.71 Some of these documents include “action requests” 
to either UN representatives or embassy officials. There is an issue with the selection 
criteria insofar as only those documents that have been released (leaked) are analyzed. 
The extent to which these documents represent the population of documents, or the 
percentage of leaked documents to those still under classification cannot be determined. 
Furthermore, relying on leaked documents constrains the analysis of the executive branch 
to the years 2009-2010, excluding much of the administrations tenure to date. 
To understand how the Legislative Branch constructs the Israel-Palestine conflict, 
I use both leaked and public documents authored by the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS). The CRS is known as Congress’ think-tank, and provides reports to any 
congressperson at their request. The CRS prides itself in being an unbiased source of 
information from which congresspersons can make informed decisions on pertinent 
issues. These reports, 16 total, span from December 2008 to January 2013, and are not 
intended for public distribution ex ante, though many are later released. The reports 
                                                 
71 New documents have continued to be released since this analysis took place in 2013. 
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gathered are authored by several different analysts, which might result in different 
frames, metaphors, or grammars.  
The extent to which continuity between these documents will be found lends 
further support to the analysis, highlighting the extent to which particular framings 
disseminate and diffuse throughout the system. With additional time, each authors 
framing could be differentiated. Here, the documents are taken as part of the same 
population. Those documents authored conterminously with the available State 
Department cables were given priority in close reading. Subsequent documents were used 
to find key words but not combed for emergent patterns.   
Following a grounded theory approach, this chapter allows for some induction if 
particular patterns begin to emerge from the reading. As will be evident in the Results 
and Discussion section, the inductive insights offer more novel readings while the 
deductive insights evince more apparent biases in representation. The framework that 
emerges from the documents is analyzed in light of event histories, showing what sorts of 
actions, words, or events are necessarily excluded in order for the actors and system to 
appear natural, whole onto themselves, or unbiased.  
 
Expectations  
 
I had general expectations prior to analyzing the data that are worth mentioning. 
As will be discussed in the result section, these general expectations proved to be 
oriented in the right direction but represented in unexpected ways. The prior expectations 
were largely guided by a content analysis methodology which proved to be poorly suited 
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for what became a largely hermeneutic approach. In other words, this chapter initially 
began as a content analysis but soon gave way to a discourse analysis which offered 
novel explanations grounded in both the history and contemporary context of the conflict. 
The expectations are included here in the spirit of full disclosure and help raise 
methodological questions on the appropriateness, benefits, and potential setbacks of close 
reading toward emergent patterns as opposed to hypothesis testing and word frequency 
counts. 
I had expected the documents to resurrect the difficult and tragic past of the 
Jewish people, exiled throughout ancient history and the victims of calculated, routinized 
extermination during the horrors of the Holocaust. I had also expected to encounter 
discussion of the Palestinian “Nakhba,” the plight of those Palestinians scattered 
throughout the Middle East in dilapidated refugee camps and their perpetual status of 
second class citizens in surrounding states, and perhaps allusions to South African 
apartheid as a metaphorical, if not substantive, analog for the occupation of the 
Palestinian territories.72 These expectations were largely due to my familiarity with the 
corpus of texts on the conflict. Whether we look to Benny Morris’ history of the conflict 
in Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-2001, Edward Said and 
Christopher Hitchens edited volume, Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the 
Palestinian Question, or Jimmy Carter’s book, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, the 
discussion of the conflict appear to be quite often placed over a background of tragic 
history.  
                                                 
72 To be clear, I find the comparison to apartheid unhelpful due to its simplified application. I mention this 
because it recurs in journalistic accounts, private conversations, and most famously in Jimmy Carter’s 
political memoir.   
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While the works referenced inhabit a space outside of what is commonly consider 
the discipline of political science and might be more comfortably placed within the 
disciplines of history, journalism, or political memoirs, they nonetheless reflect a popular 
framing of the Israel-Palestine conflict as one of competing victimhoods. These texts are 
not unique in this regard; they reflect the common narratives and cultural practices of the 
relevant societies.  
The shadow of the past is ever-present in Israel culture and woven into 
regularized practices. For Israeli Jews, the end of Passover is quickly followed by Yom 
HaShoah (Holocaust Remembrance Day), which leads into Yom HaZikaron (Memorial 
Day) one week later, immediately followed by Yom Ha’Atzmaut (Independence Day). 
The logic of this chain of holidays, from exile, to persecution, to struggle and finally 
liberation, is not lost on many Israeli Jews. In the case of Memorial Day and 
Independence Day, the latter begins after sundown of the former; the mood in the country 
turns from mourning to jubilance instantaneously. For Palestinians and Arab Israelis, the 
Nakhba (Catastrophe) is remembered on May 15th as well as during Yom Ha’Atzmaut. 
Yom Al-Ard (Land Day) also carries the shadow of history, with annual commemoration 
of the 1976 strike by Arab Israelis in the Galilee against land seizures by the Israeli 
government. Both are often met with counter-demonstrations by Israeli Jews. When 
speaking to Palestinians, Arab Israelis and Israeli Jews about the Israel-Arab conflict, the 
conversation quickly turns to collective memory and the lessons of past victimization.  
My aim, then, in undergoing a close reading of U.S. diplomatic documents was to 
understand whether and in what way these frames entered into the foreign policy process 
and to develop some plausible and novel interpretations of how these might enclose, 
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constrain, guide, or direct the American approach to the conflict. As will be seen shortly, 
the close reading of the documents not only overturned some of my expectations, but also 
presented new analytical postures that might help to clarify the ways in which history and 
affective positions guide foreign policy framing. 
While some acknowledgement of responsibility for both Israelis and Palestinians 
was likely to appear in the documents, I expected different characterizations of 
rationality, agency, and intentionality toward the two sides. More specifically, both the 
executive and legislative would likely characterize the “Palestinians” as irrational, 
affective, impotent, ambiguous, speaking with many voices, and emitting mixed signals. 
“Israel”, on the other hand, was more likely to be characterized as rational, calculating, 
effective, unambiguous, uniform and emitting intelligible signals. These representations 
would be consistent with a generalized character of Western historiography toward the 
Middle East, wherein the West (Israel) is portrayed as “rational, developed, humane, 
superior” and the Orient (Palestine) as “aberrant, undeveloped, inferior.”73 This differs in 
important ways from Edward Said’s Orientalist thesis in the expectation that Israel (“the 
West”) would be viewed as uniform while the “Oriental other” (Palestine) will present an 
irreconcilable challenge to ontologization. To put it another way, I expected that Israel 
would be unproblematically represented while the Palestinians would be presented as 
resistant to a stable classification.  
Between the two groups of documents, I expected a similar grammar of 
victimhood but with a greater emphasis on Israeli suffering. Borrowing from Israeli 
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historian Benny Morris, I expected the image of Israel to cohere with that of “Righteous 
Victims.” I also expected both the executive and legislative documents to use similar 
tones and present similar affinities, with Israel being a part of the U.S. “family” (terms 
like “common bond”, “shared commitment”, etc.) and Palestinian actors being something 
of “paroled criminals” (terms like “acknowledge responsibility”, “prove”, “demonstrate,” 
etc.). Lastly, I expected that both the legislative and executive documents would more 
often “speak for” Israel while “speaking about” Palestine. That is to say, phrases such as 
“according to the Palestinians…” would be more likely than “according to the Israelis,” 
while phrases such as “Israel can’t…” would be more prevalent than “the Palestinians 
aren’t able to.” This further strengthened the expectation that Israel would be positioned 
closer to the U.S., while the Palestinians would remain at a distance. 
With these prior expectations laid out, it is important to detail the theoretical 
underpinnings of this chapter. This is helpful for several reasons. Firstly, this chapter fits 
within a social science tradition and a subsection of the political science discipline which, 
though outside the mainstream, has nonetheless contributed important insights. Secondly, 
grounding the chapter in theory allows me to make clear the scope and limits of my 
claims and to avoid possible misunderstanding on the part of the reader. Thirdly, explicit 
orientation within the field of methodologies helps open potential avenues for thinking 
about multi-method and cross-discipline communication and collaboration. Lastly, this 
exercise serves as a series of sign posts for this author toward developing future research 
agendas.  
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Theory 
 
 
There are two potential handicaps in social science research which this chapter 
attempts to address and avoid. These can be organized in their relation to temporal space 
as follows: (1) premature ontologization of the objects of analysis may occur before any 
empirical investigations are brought to bear and (2) an insufficiently theorized 
teleological view might be set such that the analyst presupposes a denouement thought to 
resolve the conflict being addressed. Put into the context of this study, I attempt to 
problematize the characterization of both Israel and Palestine by revealing empirical 
observations which are minimized, excluded, or “unseen” within the text. I also leave 
open the possibility that a two-state solution, the most often ascribed goal of the Israeli 
government, Palestinian Authority, and the U.S. government, is neither the necessary nor 
desirable target, a stable and knowable destination, or an optimal and realizable end. As I 
show later, these possibilities are not discounted, but rather treated as necessarily open 
questions which tend to be neglected in the examined discourse. Consideration of these 
open questions is aided by grounding the analysis in theory.   
 As Karen Fierke has pointed out, the linguistic turn in social science and the 
poststructuralist challenge to scientific realism, though initially shaking the foundations 
of the discipline, was eventually consolidated into what she terms “conventional 
constructivism.”74 While investigations of language and intersubjectivity were given a 
place at the table of political science orthodoxy, they often were only granted entry if 
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holding firm to positivist assumptions. These approaches, while laudable in their efforts 
to take language seriously, remain wedded to predictive models, formal games, and 
econometric analysis. Implicit in these approaches is a concern with “what” policymakers 
might do “when” and “why.” These approaches fit within a paradigm populated by what 
Robert Cox has called “problem-solving theory,” which takes for granted the stability of 
actors and structures, as opposed to “critical theory,” which tends toward addressing the 
shifting characterizations of the social world as ideology.75  
While it is not the case that policymaker’s identities or beliefs are presupposed 
within the “conventional constructivist” approach, there is nonetheless an expectation 
that utterances correspond in a one-to-one relationship with beliefs or attitudes. If a 
policymaker indicates distrust through an utterance, then our narrative is necessarily 
constructed along dimensions of distrust. This distrust becomes an explanatory variable. 
It is here that a problem arises. What distrust might mean, how it frames the horizon of 
possible actions and interpretations, or how the concept itself is constructed are left as 
either uncomfortable theoretical discussions that must be deferred to some later date, or 
else are marked as outside the frame of rational discourse or useful analysis. If these 
suppositions are not made explicit, they risk giving the analysis a false stability which 
might be overturned in light of different cultural or historical contexts.  
Taking this example further, let us consider an utterance of distrust (e.g., “the 
U.S. is unsure whether or not Netanyahu’s recent settlement moratorium represents 
sincere efforts toward peace”). Does the actor distrust the other in the way that one might 
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distrust a used car salesman? A convicted felon? A pathological liar? A jealous lover? 
Each of these assumes a different intention on the part of the distrusted other. The 
salesman is untrustworthy because he is trying to extract more money than the product is 
worth, not for the purpose of injury, but for the purpose of bolstering his own utility. The 
pathological liar is untrustworthy because he cannot be anything but that, leaving no 
recourse to negotiating trust. The felon, depending on the crime, might be untrustworthy 
because of the position she is in (e.g., stole a loaf of bread because she is in poverty), or 
because she exhibits traits of psychopathy which might indicate a desire to injure (unlike 
the used car salesman). The jealous lover might be untrustworthy because he might 
withhold information that reflects poorly on him, not out of the desire to injure, but out of 
the desire to be loved.  
How one approaches the distrusted other is context dependent, with the context 
created through language and implying a closed set of solutions. One would not try to 
assure a psychopath that they love them in order to turn them into a trustworthy friend, 
nor would one chastise an untrustworthy salesman for his role as a profit-maker in hopes 
of changing his interests. For the above reasons, a focus on isolated utterances is not 
sufficient for an understanding of what “game” leaders are playing and how they 
conceive of the other-in-context. 
Beyond the potential for compacting otherwise expansive and manifold vantage 
points of particular social constructs or labels, an analyst takes a gamble in defining their 
endgame or that of the actors who are represented in their analysis. One of the more 
trenchant critiques of the rationalist approach to social science is the tendency to take as a 
given the preferred outcome or stable resolution of the object or system under analysis. 
  80 
Put in the cynically romantic words of Michel Foucault, “the great dream of an end to 
History is the utopia of causal systems of thought.”76 To use the ethnic conflict literature 
as an example, analyses often seek to uncover ways of mitigating conflicting ethnic 
identities through assimilation, segregation, the granting of partial autonomy, or the 
development of consociational governing structures.  
In establishing the preferred outcome and assigning the relevant variables of 
analysis (available resources, structural constraints, path dependencies, etc.), there is a 
risk that new information will not be able to enter into the prescribed resolution. This is 
not to say that positivist studies necessarily shackle themselves; a good analyst should be 
open to changes in circumstance and how they might alter the veracity of their analysis. 
Rather, the intention here is to pose the always recurring possibility and risks of imbuing 
structure and agent with a stable “beingness” that relies on non-reflective ahistoricity.  
This practice is least problematic when the analyst makes explicit the conceptual 
gamble involved in such methods. When these practices are employed in a non-reflective 
manner, the risk of naturalized ontologies increases at the same time that analytic and 
pragmatic flexibility decreases. As I will discuss later, the framing of Israel as a Jewish 
State and the goal of “two-states for two peoples” betrays a grossly simplified perspective 
on the ethnic, religious, geographic, and demographic makeup of the land between the 
Jordan and the Mediterranean. It also assumes that “two-states for two peoples” means 
identical things to all sides. Lastly, even in the case of a single, pure, and shared 
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interpretation amongst all parties, the goal leaves itself open to the flux of perception 
through history.  
This work also offers some important insights that arise from engagement with 
the literature on Operational Code Analysis. In order to strengthen the veracity of this 
approach of foreign policy analysis, there is the need to take seriously the literature on 
language as a constitutive and not merely reflective. To echo a previously articulated 
concern,  
The question is what is gained or lost in the translation [of 
text and its patterns] into numbers. What is gained is 
credibility within a world of science that values 
quantification over other forms of analysis and one in 
which the word formal has acquired the meaning of using 
quantification. What is potentially lost is the very human 
social and political processes by which actors call the world 
around them into question.77 
 
Most importantly, what is potentially overlooked in quantitative analyses of 
language are complex metaphors, deliberate word choice, and qualified phrases which 
might reveal political concerns otherwise overlooked in deductive hypothesis-testing 
approaches. Though I do not develop the specific ways in which discourse analysis and 
operational code analysis might contradict or complement one another, I pose this 
question here, opening a space and deferring its exploration to the future, sticking a 
figurative place-marker for the time being. All that said, my hunch is that such an 
exploration would yield a conclusion that both methods provide useful insight into 
political processes, giving support to a pluralistic methodology in the field of foreign 
policy analysis.  
                                                 
77 Karen Fierke, “World or Worlds? The Analysis of Content and Discourse,” Qualitative Methods (Spring 
2004), 38. 
  82 
It should be stressed that the above position is not a wholesale critique of the 
rationalist research paradigm; in fact, such a critique would likely occupy the rest of this 
paper and several additional volumes if it were to be attempted. Besides, these issues 
have received substantial treatment in journals of political science along with special 
issues and symposia. Rather, this brief and admittedly cursory treatment of the 
philosophy of social science is pronounced in order to highlight the analyst’s 
responsibility to be keenly aware of potentially debilitating analytical presuppositions. In 
order to counteract the potential for such reflexivity to become subsumed to efficiency 
and problem-solving approaches, this study seeks to open a space for careful scrutiny of 
the American perspective toward the Israel-Palestine conflict. With that, I turn to the 
Israel-Palestine conflict as represented by the Obama administration during the first year 
of his presidency. The peace process can be summarized (though not fully grasped---and 
indeed problematically obscured) by a particular set of frames and conveniences which 
appear and reappear in both State Department cables and Congressional Research Service 
Reports.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
History and Suffering. My initial engagement with the materials was directed at isolating 
significant words relating to a victimhood grammar. Contrary to my expectations, the 
words “Holocaust” and “Nakba” were entirely absent from the State Department cables. 
Furthermore, Operation Cast Lead was only mentioned once in the cables emanating 
from the Secretary of State, despite its onset and cessation in the month prior to Obama’s 
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inauguration. When it was mentioned, it was in reference to PA Prime Minister Salam 
Fayyad’s message that the PA will be receiving EU funding to “help restore private 
sector activity and bolster local markets” that were debilitated in the three-week conflict 
(09STATE100749). The word “suffer” appeared in the State Department cables 8 times, 
5 referring to the suffering on both sides, and 3 referencing the suffering in Gaza (one of 
which placed the blame solely on Hamas). The word “history” did not appear in reference 
to either the Palestinians or the Israelis. These results were an initial surprise, especially 
in light of several cables being directed at UN diplomats to use as talking points (5 out of 
the 22). Contrary to my expectations, it seems as if the history of the conflict and of the 
parties was largely put aside.   
 The CRS Reports were slightly different in this regard. During the same time 
period (2009-2010), the available CRS Reports mention history-as-object twice. Both 
relate the history of the Jewish people.  
President Obama told an Arab audience that America’s 
bond with Israel “is unbreakable. It is based upon cultural 
and historical ties, and the recognition that the aspiration 
for a Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that 
cannot be denied” (RL33476). 
 
And again; 
 
On April 14, Sharon acknowledged that Israel would have 
to part with some places bound up in the history of the 
Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize 
the Jewish people’s right to its homeland and abandon their 
claim of a right of refugees to return to Israel (RL33530). 
 
 A later CRS Report authored in December of 2010 entitled Hamas: Background 
and Issues for Congress provides a chronology of key events relating to the Hamas 
organization. In what appears to be an uncharacteristic narrative of the conflict, this 
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timeline describes Baruch Goldstein’s 1994 rampage at the Mosque of Abraham in 
Hebron, which killed 29 innocent Palestinians. The event was followed by the first 
suicide bombing in Israel. According to the report, the bombing was an act of retaliation 
precipitated by the massacre (CRS41514). This narrative appears uncharacteristic in that 
Hamas are described as responding to violence rather than initiating violence.  
 Some CRS reports mention the historical background of Israel, focusing on the 
Nazi holocaust, invasion by Arab armies in 1948, and Palestinian terrorism. However, 
these are placed in subsections and, with the exception of the above two quotes, are not 
mentioned in relation to the current conflict. References to Jewish historical ties to the 
Land of Palestine often exclude the mentioning of Palestinian historical ties to the same 
land. Though the historical ties are implied – there are Palestinians there after all – they 
do not receive explicit mention nor are they framed in terms of an affective bond to the 
land.  
 To summarize, the State Department cables by and large avoid a victimhood 
narrative. Suffering, when mentioned, is attributed equally to both sides, though Gaza 
receives special mention. The key events of the Nakhba and Holocaust are absent from 
State Department cables though the CRS report do reflect this history. If one compares 
these results to public statements by President Obama, a substantial difference is noticed. 
Though I have not undergone a careful analysis of public statements, President Obama’s 
2013 speech in Israel is demonstrable, with several mentions of Jewish history and 
tragedy.78  
                                                 
78 In the same speech, Obama states that "Palestinians must recognize that Israel will be a Jewish state.” 
Barack Obama, “Remarks of President Barack Obama to the People of Israel,” March 21, 2013. Accessed 
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 Although victimization receives no mention in the State Department cables, the 
CRS reports contain several explicit and implicit references to the Jewish people’s 
affective ties to the land. These references are not mirrored in relation to the Palestinians 
who have occupied the land for centuries. A reader familiar with the issue of Palestinian 
nationality might recall the famous statement by Golda Meir that “there is no such thing 
as Palestinians.” The glaring absence of Palestinian history in the CRS reports is 
significant. It helps establish an image of a Jewish people with a rich history and 
rootedness in the Land of Israel and a Palestinian people whose existence is 
acknowledged yet contains little depth.  
 These results are lent significance when put into the context of two telling quotes 
in the State Department cables and CRS reports. The first, dated from June 23, 2009, 
states:  
The Arab-Israeli conflict must become a spur for looking 
forward, not back. Arab states must help the Palestinian 
people develop institutions that will sustain their state, 
recognize Israel's legitimacy, and choose progress over a 
self-defeating focus on the past. (09STATE64642, 
emphasis added) 
 
A similar message is found in a CRS Report: 
 
In the closed-door session of the September 2009 trilateral 
meeting in New York, President Obama reportedly laid out 
the following vision for negotiations to Netanyahu and 
Abbas:  
There’s an historical record of the entire past negotiations 
and there are principles. We won't start the negotiations 
from scratch, we will not take the historical record and toss 
it aside. Nor will we wait for the perfect formula.... It’s 
difficult to disentangle ourselves from history but we must 
                                                 
on April 28, 2016 via: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/21/remarks-president-barack-
obama-people-israel 
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do so. The only reason to hold public office is to get things 
done. We all must take risks for peace. (CRS40092) 
 
 Far from making an effort to only look forward and disentangle the process from 
history, it appears as though Jewish history was given priority in U.S. discourse and 
deliberations. As I explain in the next section, this call to move beyond the messy past 
and “get things done” is further problematized by one of the primary demands by Israel 
from the Palestinians which has become part of the American perspective.  
 
Security, Economy, and Recognition. There are three primary concerns from the 
perspective of the U.S. in relation to the Palestinians and Israelis which arise from the 
sampled cables and documents: security, economy, and recognition. Security is 
represented in one of three ways (1) as a public good which the Palestinians must deliver 
to the Israelis (2) as a set of Palestinian institutions to be developed with the aid of U.S. 
financing and training (3) as a final stable condition. Economy appears subsumed to 
security, with the cables describing American practices relating to the Palestinian 
Territories (mostly in the West Bank) through the disbursement of foreign aid and 
providing funds for the training of PA security forces in Jordan. Restrictions on 
movement and access, when mentioned in regard to the West Bank, are framed in terms 
of their effects on the economy. Lastly, recognition is represented as an assurance that the 
Palestinians must deliver to the Israelis.  
 Beginning with security, the term often appears within a context of Palestinian 
responsibilities and obligations to fight terrorism and end incitement. The sources of 
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insecurity emerge from the Palestinian Territories and its population. The direction of 
insecurity is always projected outward toward Israel. This relation is never inverted: 
The Palestinian Authority must combat terror and 
incitement against Israel. The United States and its partners 
have provided funding and training for a reformed 
Palestinian security force, which has impressed everyone 
with its recent demonstrations of professionalism and 
effectiveness. Israel should not expand settlements, 
dismantle existing outposts, and should allow the 
Palestinians freedom of movement and access to economic 
opportunity and increased security responsibility 
(09STATE46591, emphasis added). 
 
Palestinian obligations include continuing with security 
cooperation and reforms, strengthening the rule of law, and 
ending incitement (09STATE86157, emphasis added). 
 
The Palestinians also have responsibilities to create the 
environment for peace. These responsibilities include 
continuing to improve security, ending incitement, and 
dismantling the infrastructure of terrorism. They also 
include refraining from actions and speech that make 
negotiations more difficult, including support for one-sided 
criticism of Israel in international fora (09STATE95932, 
emphasis added). 
 
That's why we've urged the Palestinians to expand and 
improve their security efforts and to take strong and 
meaningful action on incitement (09STATE122214, 
emphasis added). 
 
 These excerpts are representative of the general tone and content of the State 
Department cables in regard to security. Incitement is only attributed to the Palestinians, 
though the content of this incitement is never explicitly defined. Incitement appears to 
reference attempts at shaming Israel through UN resolutions in some cases, but might be 
a broad reference to any activities that highlight the occupation, whether these are 
protests, public statements, or violent actions. The expansion of settlements, housing 
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demolitions and eviction, Israeli raids and detainment sweeps, settler violence, and 
restrictions on movement do not appear in relation to incitement. There are no mentions 
of Israel ensuring Palestinian security nor is there any mention of Israel threatening 
Palestinian security. A vague reference to the security of the Palestinians appears once in 
the sample: 
We must show tangible support for Abu Mazen and the 
Palestinian Authority now; their budget is facing a critical 
point. - The PA’s need for immediate budgetary assistance 
is acute. The PA will not be able to meet the education, 
health, and security needs of its people (09STATE122214). 
 
The security needs of the Palestinian people remain ambiguous. There are also references 
to Hamas and weapons smuggling into Gaza as security threats: 
Hamas' continued rocket attacks against southern Israel 
constitute a serious and immediate threat to regional peace 
and security, putting innocent lives at risk and threatening 
to set off another deadly round of violence 
(09STATE28850). 
 
I mention this not to argue that Hamas, the PIJ, and other organizations that 
indiscriminately attack civilians are not security threats. The actions of these 
organizations, in the opinion of this author, are brutal, unjust, and morally reprehensible. 
However, this view should not preclude a contextualization of these actions. What 
appears to be lost in the cables is a treatment of a chain of reactions or actions placed 
within a series.  
All other mentions of security reference the “security wall” bordering the West 
Bank, the actions of the UN Security Council, the training and funding of PA security 
forces, as well as one mention of “the lack of clear and consistent procedures” in 
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accessing the West Bank affecting the “safety and security of USG personnel” 
(09STATE117652). A similar concern is not explicitly extended to the Palestinians. 
 Insecurity, then, appears to come from two sources; first, from within the 
Palestinian population in the West Bank. This threat is addressed in large part by U.S. 
funding and training of the PA Security Forces. The second source of insecurity comes 
from Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza. While this would not be surprising from 
internal cables of the Israeli government, whose concern is to protect the livelihood and 
bodily security of its population, it does appear at odds with the mission of the U.S. as 
mediator. What these cables lack is a sense in which Palestinian insecurity might arise 
from occupation. Israeli raids meant to detain suspects and transfer them to Israeli 
prisons, Israeli military strikes, restrictions on movement which affect access to health 
services and have resulted in food insecurity in Gaza, and the vivisection of Palestinian 
lands by security fences, Israeli-only roads, and settlement projects are not part of the 
security discourse. Nor are any of these actions identified as incitement. As mentioned in 
the previous section, victimization was not found to be addressed directly by the cables; 
however, the analysis of security in the discourse does seem to represent an imbalanced 
perspective. Namely, Israelis are insecure, and the cause lies directly with the 
Palestinians.  
 Interestingly, this characterization appears to be at odds with the messages 
contained in cables emanating from the Jerusalem Consulate and Tel Aviv embassy to the 
office of the Secretary of State. A partial reading of those cables revealed that the above 
concerns were being addressed and relayed at the local level. In 9 sampled cables from 
the Consulate in Jerusalem and Embassy in Tel Aviv, the word “arrest” appeared 14 
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times in total and the word “raid” appeared 12 times in total. These words appear in 
reference to IDF cross-border raids, arrests of activists demonstrating against the 
separation barrier in the West Bank town of Bi’lin (these demonstrations occur weekly), 
and IDF arrests in Area A (those areas of the West Bank wherein PA forces are 
recognized as having security autonomy as stipulated in the Oslo Agreement). In the 23 
cables from the Secretary of State, however, the word “arrest” appears once and “raid” 
does not appear at all.  
It may be relevant that the Secretary of State at the time was Hillary Clinton. If 
her exchange with Bernie Sanders in an April 14, 2016 debate held in New York City 
was any indication, it is no surprise that references to Palestinian suffering were avoided 
or excised under her State Department.79 The network of cable dispatches, transfers and 
readings contains structural elements that may also determine how and what information 
gets passed along, what is considered useable, actionable, or relevant. The combination of 
structural characteristic, ideological presuppositions, and domestic pressure groups (e.g. 
AIPAC) all lead to silences and redactions that demonstrate a partial and contingent 
understanding of the conflict.   
 Turning to the economy, references to the Palestinian economy are prominent in 
the State Department cables and mostly relate to American foreign aid. “Economic 
growth”, “economic development”, “the Palestinian economy” and variations of these 
phrases appear 23 times in the sample. When the cables indicate a concern for Israeli 
checkpoints in the West Bank and the siege on Gaza, it is placed in the context of the 
                                                 
79 Patrick Healy and Amy Chozick, “In Democratic Debate, Clinton and Sanders Spar Over Judgment,” 
New York Times, April 14, 2016. Accessed on April 28, 2016 via: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/us/politics/democratic-debate.html?_r=0 
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effects on the Palestinian economy. This might not be surprising for those familiar with 
Netanyahu’s focus on an “economic peace” with the Palestinians, but is telling in its 
political implications. So long as the Palestinian economy is growing, other issues can be 
deferred. Referring to a strong Palestinian economy echoes earlier phases of the Israeli 
occupation wherein Israel carefully recorded household, labor, and agricultural statistics 
toward promoting prosperity in the territories. As Neve Gordon explains in his detailed 
analysis of the history of the occupation; 
The one feature that stands out as almost completely unique 
when comparing the occupation’s first decade with those 
that followed is Israel’s attempt to manage the Palestinian 
population through the promotion of prosperity. A series of 
practices were introduced to increase the economic utility 
of the Palestinian inhabitants, both as a way of harnessing 
the energies of Palestinian society to advance Israel’s 
economic interests, but also as a way of raising the standard 
of living in the OT.80 
 
The concern for raising the Palestinian standard of living eroded as Palestinian 
nationalism gained in strength and especially following the first Intifada. As Gordon 
recounts, Israel soon transitioned from a logic of integration to that of separation. During 
this transition, Netanyahu refused to recognize the right of the Palestinian people to a 
state of their own – until 2009 and then with great hesitation – and instead promoted an 
“economic peace” as the path to resolving the conflict.81 
While security and economy appear to be part of a realist approach to foreign 
policy, amenable to balance of power strategies and rationalist empirical testing, there is 
                                                 
80 Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, 62. 
 
81 Raphael Ahren, “Netanyahu: Economics, Not Politics, Is the Key to Peace,” Haaretz, November 20, 
2008, Accessed on April 28, 2016 via: http://www.haaretz.com/netanyahu-economics-not-politics-is-the-
key-to-peace-1.257617 
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one other primary focus in the documents which appears out of place. The call for 
Palestinians, and Hamas in particular, to “recognize” Israel has been paramount in public 
discussions as well as in the sampled documents. The language differs from utterance to 
utterance, calling for the Palestinians to “recognize Israel’s legitimacy” 
(09STATE64642), “recognize Israel’s rightful place in the region” (09STATE86157), 
and most often “recognition of Israel.” Interestingly, the demand to “recognize Israel as a 
Jewish State” was not mentioned in the State Department cables from 2009-2010, though 
it is described as the “goal” of the peace process and “our [the U.S.] clearly stated goal” 
(09STATE118799). The cables do mention the U.S. view that a resolution to the conflict 
must include a “Jewish State and an independent State of Palestine,” and the Israeli 
demand for recognition of Israel as a Jewish State was one of the reservations written into 
the 2007 Road Map by Israel (CRS 40092).  
 The demand for recognition is curious given Israel’s distrust of Hamas. Generally, 
the view of Hamas is that of conniving terrorist who can’t be trusted. At the same time, 
there is a demand for Hamas to “give Israel its word”, so to speak. Why would a Hamas 
statement of recognition eliminate the perceived nefarious intentions of the organization? 
Perhaps Israel views such utterance as a credible signal. Indeed, public recognition of 
Israel by Hamas might weaken the latter’s domestic base which views the organization as 
a resistance movement against Israeli aggression. Recognition of Israel might signal a 
willingness to take a hard hit for the prospect of peace.  
This view, however, is problematic insofar as it takes Hamas to be an isolated 
organization whose policies appear to materialize out of the ether and whose statement of 
recognition would do away with Palestinian grievances. It fails to consider how Hamas’ 
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recognition might weaken the organization and drive hardliners toward rival groups such 
as the PIJ. There is no evidence that either the State Department of CRS consider this 
outcome as likely. The role of the population, the pressures on Hamas, and its 
representation of Palestinian discontent is not considered. This simplification and focus 
on Hamas works to cover the underlying conditions that lend the organization support; 
namely, the occupation and episodic violence. Hamas’ policies are not seen as a reaction 
to pressures, whether internal or from Israel, but rather untethered, non-rational and 
incomprehensible. 
The demand for recognition of Israel as a Jewish State also contains an important 
political consideration already mentioned in the previous chapters:  
Palestinians contend that recognition of Israel as a Jewish 
state would negate Palestinian refugee’s “right of return” 
and would be detrimental to the status of Israel’s Arab 
citizens. On April 27, Palestinian Authority (PA) President 
Abbas said, “It’s not my job to give a description to the 
state. Name yourself the Hebrew Socialist Republic—it is 
none of my business.” According to his spokesman, in his 
meeting with [Special Middle East Envoy George] 
Mitchell, President Abbas stressed the commitment of the 
Palestinians to a two-state solution and signed agreements 
and obligations, particularly freezing settlement activities, 
including natural growth, stopping house demolitions, and 
not building in E-1 (a corridor of land between Israel and 
the Ma’ale Adumim West Bank settlement), and demanded 
that the same criteria be applied to Israel (RL33530). 
 
Deferring a discussion on the “right of return,” I would like to briefly focus on that of 
Arab citizens of Israel.  
The insistence that Israel is a Jewish State is at once obvious and inaccurate. It is 
obvious because of the state’s origins in the Zionist movement, in the display of its 
national symbols (e.g. the flag), the identity of a majority of its citizens, and its 
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perception by most of the world. It is inaccurate because over 20 percent of Israel’s 
citizens are Arab (Christian and Muslim), most Israeli Jewish refrigerators carry hummus 
and pita bread, Israeli popular music is infused with Arabic scales and aesthetic qualities 
(“Mizrahi” music), and Arabic remains one of the three national languages (appearing on 
road signs and official government documents), among other things. That is to say, to 
identifying Israeli culture as Jewish is an oversimplification.  
If it is an oversimplification, efforts have been made to make reality reflect this 
dream. For example, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s political party Likud, the largest in the 
governing coalition, merged with Avigdor Lieberman’s Israel Bietenu in the 2012 
election. The latter party had expressed its desire to “transfer” the Arab population of the 
Galilee to the future Palestinian state, or else carve the borders in such a way that a 
maximal number of Arabs would be left outside of Israel. In this way, a pure Jewish State 
might become reality. Perhaps the desire by some Israelis to create such a situation is 
understandable, but why would the U.S. take up this language? 
 
“Two states living side-by-side” and settlements. When describing the end-goal of a 
negotiated resolution to the conflict, the phrase which most often appears is “two states 
living side by side in peace and security.” The phrase is repeated so often that one tends 
to glance over it without giving it much thought. This goal has been the basis of 
negotiations since the Annapolis Conference but is on close inspection not easy to 
reconcile with the realities on the ground. How can the call for “side-by-side” pass 
without notice?
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Figure 1. (CRS-R40092) 
 
As the above map shows, the extent to which two states side-by-side can be 
conceived requires not a little imagination. Recall that Gaza, to the West and outside the 
frame of the above map, is also meant to be part of the Palestinian state. A more accurate 
but no less helpful description of the final status might be “two states side by side by side 
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by side.” The point here is not that the Israeli settlements are necessarily permanent 
fixtures which may not be dismantled and relocated during negotiations; rather, the most 
often repeated phrase contains a contradiction which elicits a sense of cognitive 
dissonance or else requires something of a double-think approach. The U.S. repeats “two-
states side by side” in full knowledge of the architecture of power and the orientation of 
the physical space being considered. 
The desire for a clear division of political space, with pure entities existing on 
each side of a clearly demarcated border, is overturned by the empirical realities. Along 
with the problem of purifying the identity of Israel mentioned above, there is the issue of 
conceiving political space in a two-dimensional framework. The “side-by-side” concept 
needs to exclude or excuse not only the existence of settlements, but also put aside the 
field of power surrounding the West Bank and Gaza Strip both in the air and below the 
terrain. As Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2009 Bar-Ilan speech explained: 
To ensure peace we don't want them to bring in missiles or 
rockets or have an army, or control of airspace, or make 
treaties with countries like Iran, or Hizbullah. There is 
broad agreement on this in Israel. We cannot be expected to 
agree to a Palestinian state without ensuring that it is 
demilitarized. This is crucial to the existence of Israel - we 
must provide for our security needs.82 
 
The above map doesn’t capture the full field of power over a territory. If the Gaza Strip is 
any indication, Israel seeks to retain power over the electro-magnetic field, and airspace 
alongside elements of internal politics (i.e., treaties and diplomacy). Adding to this 
                                                 
82 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Full Text of Netanyahu’s Foreign Policy Speech at Bar-Ilan”, Haaretz Online, 
(http://www.haaretz.com/news/full-text-of-netanyahu-s-foreign-policy-speech-at-bar-ilan-1.277922, June 
14, 2009), May 2012. 
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disparity the desire of Israeli policymakers to retain access to aquifers in the West Bank, 
the notion of two states side-by-side begins fracture.  
The consideration of power in three-dimensional space has been explored by 
some, most notably Eyal Weizman in Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. 
Practical examples relating to these concerns can be found in the discussions over the 
control of the Temple Mount (surface and subterranean holy sites), as well as at 
archeological digs in the Silwan Neighborhood of East Jerusalem (also known as “City of 
David”) outside the walls of the Old City in Jerusalem. Lastly, the movement of peoples 
and economic ties between the territories challenges the extent to which two discrete 
entities can be conceived. These considerations, far from being abstract, relate to 
empirical practices on the ground, under the ground, in the air, and at the borders. 
Whether these complexities are actively removed from policymaker’s considerations, or 
whether they exist in the proverbial blind spot of the vehicle riding along the Road Map, 
remains an open question.  
 When discussing the settlements, the U.S. State Department cables contain 
revealing qualifiers: 
settlement activity is unhelpful and we call on Israel to 
dismantle outposts erected since March 2001 
(09STATE28850, emphasis added). 
 
Israel's obligations include stopping settlement growth 
(09STATE86157, emphasis added). 
 
Israel should not expand settlements, dismantle existing 
outposts, and should allow the Palestinians freedom of 
movement and access to economic opportunity and 
increased security responsibility (09STATE46591, 
emphasis added). 
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We appreciate Israel's stated intent to place limits on 
settlements, and will continue to discuss this issue with 
Israel (09STATE95932, emphasis added). 
 
Whether or not the U.S. is resigned to the continued presence of Israeli settlements in 
perpetuity is difficult to answer, both because the true intentions of policy-makers is not 
entirely represented in the cables and also due to shifting pressures, interpretations, or 
readings of the political field that might occur at present and in the future.  
What the above excerpts do show is that the U.S. State Department is reluctant in 
issuing unequivocal statements on the illegitimacy and illegality of settlements, 
statements otherwise common in the international community. More importantly, there is 
no evidence of a cognizance of the irreconcilability of settlements with the “two states 
living side by side” cliché. Settlement growth, expansion, and activity are deemed 
unhelpful; the language used to express this is for the most part anodyne. Not a little 
cognitive dissonance arises when these State Department representations are taken 
seriously. “Two states side by side” appears hostage to the reality of Palestinian cantons 
and Israel’s current control of a three-dimensional field as well as the stated future 
intentions of the sitting Prime Minister. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter begged two important questions which deserve careful consideration. 
First, does the apparent partiality of the U.S. make it an unhelpful mediator in the Israel-
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Palestine conflict?83 As was shown, several Israeli positions are not only well-represented 
in the State Department cables, but appear to have merged into the U.S. position on the 
conflict. At the same time, an understanding of the conflict from the perspective of 
members of the Palestinian community is largely absent from the cables. Although CRS 
reports better represent these concerns, and while cables from the consulates and 
embassies on the ground might relay these concerns, they do not appear to have entered 
into the State Department framing of the conflict.  
 The second critical question is whether the pursuit of a grand bargain in the form 
of the two-state solution is the only, preferred, or viable goal. As was shown, a two-state 
solution increasingly appears to neglect empirical realities. It is also handicapped by the 
position that an all-or-nothing agreement can be reached. Might a focus on daily practices 
be a more effective way to deal with Israel-Palestine? Could we imagine a step-by-step 
approach, concerned first with security for both sides, then with legal autonomy, then 
property rights, and so on? How might such an approach look? Are there historical 
analogs?  
 The focus on cables from 2009-2010 leaves open the question of change and 
continuity in relation to U.S. State Department and Executive Branch perceptions of the 
conflict. The veracity of the analysis might be aided by the inclusion of public speeches 
as well as the leaked cables that have appeared since this research took place.  
 The expectation of a grammar of victimhood in the cables was met, though not in 
the expected ways. The tone toward the actors, the recited demands, and the blinkered 
                                                 
83 For more on the history of U.S. mediation in Israel-Palestine and Third-Party Mediation, see: Jeffrey Z. 
Rubin, Principles of Third Party Mediation: Kissinger in the Middle East (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1981). 
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view of events and issues significant to the parties to the conflict indicate the perception 
that Israel is insecure and needs reassurance. This appears to come at the expense of a 
similar reading toward the interests and concerns of the Palestinians. Rather than merely 
indicating a bias toward one party and against the other, these representations indicate a 
stubborn or else calcified (il)logic. The desperate recitation of Israel’s Jewish character, 
the nervous repetition of “two states living side by side”, and the superficial and ahistoric 
representation of the Palestinian people all work to construct something of a paper tiger 
peace process.  
The peace process, a grand design, appears hollow and feeble, unable to address 
the rich context and complexity of the conflict, choosing instead to simplify, to 
disentangle, to purify so that we can “get things done.” Alternatives, including a bi-
national state or regional federation, have been discussed for decades but have been 
largely marginalized, as have alternative voices on both sides. There is reason to doubt 
that these exclusions help to simplify the process and improve the chances of reaching a 
practicable resolution to the conflict. The occupation is entering its 49th year. 
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PART TWO: THE ACADEMIC NETWORK 
Chapter Four: The Academy and the National Interest84 
 
 “Political actors will no doubt continue to make extensive use of the national interest in 
their thinking about foreign-policy goals and in their efforts to mobilize support for them. 
And, to the extent that they do, political observers must take cognizance of the national 
interest. In other words, while the national interest has little future as an analytic concept, 
its use in politics will long continue to be a datum requiring analysis.”  
–James Rosenau, 196885 
 
In June of 2009, Israel’s newly re-elected Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu delivered 
his Bar-Ilan speech, outlining his government’s foreign policy position on a range of 
issues, and perhaps most importantly, the Israel-Palestine question. For the first time, 
Netanyahu publicly announced his support for a two-state solution, alongside a set of 
conditions meant to address what he viewed as the core of the conflict. According to 
Netanyahu, “the simple truth is that the root of the conflict was, and remains, the refusal 
to recognize the right of the Jewish people to a state of their own, in their historic 
homeland.” Netanyahu continued: “[t]he Palestinian leadership must arise and say: 
‘Enough of this conflict. We recognize the right of the Jewish people to a state of their 
own in this land, and we are prepared to live beside you in true peace.’"  
Summarizing his view of the conflict, Netanyahu explained that “a fundamental 
prerequisite for ending the conflict is a public, binding and unequivocal Palestinian 
                                                 
84 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA. February 
18, 2015. 
 
85 James Rosenau, “National Interest,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills 
(New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968). 
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recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.”86 This condition, now 
central to deliberations between Israel, the PLO, and the U.S., has received little critical 
inquiry from the fields of foreign policy analysis and international relations theory. The 
demand for recognition by Israel is notable because it indicates a pivot away from the 
traditional concerns surrounding the conflict – territory, security, sovereignty – toward 
concerns that fit within the broadly defined field of identity politics. In effect, 
policymakers are asking their adversary to recite back to them their preferred identity that 
they have, up until now, failed to secure within their own sovereign territory.  
To be clear, this shift toward identity is overdrawn insofar as identity politics have 
been ever-present in nationalist struggles and social movements. What is new, in the case 
of Israel, is the bringing into relief those aspects of nation-building that were otherwise 
left implicit, relegated to the domestic realm, or allowed to lay dormant within the 
international political realm.87 It is not uncommon for states to enact domestic nation-
building practices or privilege certain identities over others, whether through public 
discourse or by recourse to discriminatory legal frameworks. States attempt to construct a 
                                                 
86 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Address by PM Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan University”, Available at: 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/Address_PM_Netanyahu_Bar-Ilan_University_14-Jun-
2009.aspx 
It should be noted that another translation of the speech appears in Haaretz’s website with some important 
differences. Regarding the final quote, Haaretz’s translation refers to “the fundamental condition” rather 
than “a fundamental prerequisite.” The second quote reads as follows in Haaretz: “we need the Palestinian 
leadership to rise and say, simply ‘We have had enough of this conflict. We recognize the right of the 
Jewish People to a state its own in this Land. We will live side by side in true peace.’” 
Benjamin Netanyahu, “Full Text of Netanyahu’s Foreign Policy Speech at Bar-Ilan”, Haaretz Online, 
(http://www.haaretz.com/news/full-text-of-netanyahu-s-foreign-policy-speech-at-bar-ilan-1.277922, June 
14, 2009), February 2015. 
 
87 For a more developed critique of the tendency to falsely represent identity politics and the role of identity 
in political discourse and social movements as new-in-kind, see: Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as 
Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser” in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or 
Recognition: A political-philosophical exchange, (London: Verso Books, 2003), 123. 
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common identity through legal means, cultural symbols, holidays, public events, or other 
nationalist trappings. What is striking in the case of Israel is an attempt by the dominant 
power to re-frame, outsource, and internationalize a project of domestic identity politics 
and to do so in the name of security.88  My claim is that the demand for recognition as a 
Jewish state reflects a desire to end, once and for all, the nation-building project and 
settle into a stable, representable, unified, and privileged identity. This desire, however, 
can never be sated without abandoning principles of democratic pluralism and can only 
be pursued by means of manifold forms of violence.  
The heightened attention to identity politics, I argue, presents a challenge to the 
pretensions of many political-analytic productions that have long benefited from a largely 
unnoticed, unrecognized, or utterly ignored void at the center of their analytic 
frameworks. The void at the heart of mainstream international relations theory and 
foreign policy analysis is best demonstrated through the concept of national interest, a 
concept that has managed to uphold the hegemony of the realist-rationalist paradigm in 
the field despite not having any definable and consistent form or content. As the epigraph 
to this essay indicates, and as I will demonstrate shortly, political analysts have long been 
aware of the indeterminate nature of the concept of national interest. Despite this, and 
perhaps because of this very indeterminacy, the concept has lent both analysts and 
policymakers substantial room for rhetorical manipulation.  
                                                 
88 One notable analog, and one that is far from flattering, could be South Africa’s attempt to inscribe 
ethnocratic principles in law throughout the Apartheid regime and to seek international legitimation despite 
growing pressures against that system. Comparisons might also be drawn to the politics and history leading 
to consociational frameworks in Lebanon and the republics of former Yugoslavia, though 
consociationalism is by definition pluralistic, and the degree to which these conflicts were internationalized 
from within (rather than having been imposed upon from without) is a complicated matter.  
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In what follows, I demonstrate the uncritical reproduction of a form of statecraft 
rooted in the concept of national interest. This tendency, ubiquitous in mainstream 
political science, works to close-off otherwise productive paths of theorizing that might 
be rallied toward resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict. In the case of Israel, the identity 
of a unified Jewish nation that stands in contradistinction to the Palestinian nation is 
reproduced uncritically and with the predictable result of foreclosing paths toward 
binationalism and democratic pluralism. A review of scholarly attempts at grappling with 
the concept of national interest further reveals that the concept is too indeterminate to 
serve as an analytic category and, despite a long history, has failed to capture a consensus 
within the discipline of political science. Despite confusion as to what the national 
interest might be, the term serves an important ideological function. Here, Walt and 
Mearsheimer’s Israel Lobby thesis can serve as a foil – for lack of a better term – in order 
to demonstrate the process of assigning status and privilege to some interests over others.  
Walt and Mearsheimer, despite their self-identification as realists, sneak in values 
otherwise relegated to idealist approaches to international politics. These values, which 
manifest themselves in the ideological positions of American exceptionalism and Jewish 
nationalism, provide the content on which Walt and Mearsheimer’s realist perspective is 
parasitic. The selection of those values spirited into an otherwise realist conception of the 
national interest expose an unavoidable site of contestation, as revealed by the 2005 
dissolution of the editorial board at the fortuitously named journal, The National Interest. 
I end the chapter by reintroducing the concept of recognition as a first principle in 
international politics which can paradoxically serve both democratic and authoritarian 
political projects.  
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The View from the Tower 
 
Careful attention needs to be paid to the way descriptions of Israel operate in 
mainstream academic productions. Most often, scholarship on the conflict works to erase 
the aforementioned historical process by uncritically referring to Israel as the Jewish 
State. These seemingly apolitical descriptions of an already stable, fully formed, 
uncontrovertibly Jewish state are imbued with power political meaning. They 
prematurely proclaim an end to identity politics, and in so doing, implicitly support a 
particularly conservative vision of Zionist hegemony. There are a number of possible 
sites toward which to direct our gaze, but for the present analysis, I will focus on the 
academic discourse surrounding the U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Part One of the dissertation demonstrated the central function of U.S. policy 
networks – in the Department of State and the Executive – in helping create an 
incontrovertible essence from which the State of Israel projects its voice and power. 
Along with the overwhelming U.S. military support to the Israeli military and preferential 
political support in international fora like the U.N., networks of power that traverse the 
physical and discursive fields of the U.S. work to define the boundaries of legitimate 
debate and dictate the policies that are deemed rational. Here in Part Two, I once again 
include the U.S. as a central component, this time with tacit acceptance of the view 
forward in Walt and Mearsheimer’s Israel Lobby thesis.  
Walt and Mearsheimer carefully draw out some of the aforementioned networks 
of power, aggregating them to what they call the Israel Lobby, “a loose coalition of 
individuals and organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-
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Israel direction.”89 The authors conclude that the Israel Lobby has successfully steered 
U.S. foreign policy in the so-called Pro-Israel direction. They further argue that a 
resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict will remain elusive until the lobby can be reined 
in by more rational networks – presumably those identified with the arms of the State – 
who are better suited to determine and pursue the U.S. as well as Israeli national interest.  
And it is precisely here – at the national interest – that Mearsheimer and Walt 
abandon their otherwise scrupulous analysis. As I demonstrate, U.S. and Israeli foreign 
policy rely on an identity politics that only functions properly if it can be maintained as 
unquestioned, implicit, or taken-for-granted. This identity politics, discreetly spirited into 
the realist/rationalist paradigm, and patiently lying dormant in concepts like “the national 
interest” and “recognition,” creates a common core of assumptions that work to support 
the policies, establish the hierarchies, and entrench the rhetorical structures of dominance 
recited by those who would claim to speak in the voice of both the State of Israel and the 
United States of America. 
Walt and Mearsheimer’s Israel Lobby thesis elicited reactions from all corners of 
the political map. Politicians, pundits, public intellectuals and academics all weighed in. 
Some denounced the work as classic anti-Semitism, recalling the old myth of a shadowy 
cabal of Jewish financiers who manipulate politicians and utilize a sophisticated 
propaganda machine to turn all would-be critics into complacent yes-men. Others praised 
its boldness and perspicuity, offering a clearheaded analysis of U.S. foreign policy during 
a time of heightened national security concerns emanating from the Mideast region. It is 
                                                 
89 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 5. 
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exceedingly rare for an academic work to resound out from the ivory tower into the halls 
of Washington, through the mainstream media and down to Main Street in the way that 
Mearsheimer and Walt’s work was able to do.  
Part of the purchase of the work no doubt relates to its subject matter, long viewed 
as something of a third rail in American politics, with Democrats and Republicans 
proudly stating their support for the State of Israel and taking exception to all attempts at 
altering the “special relationship”. One could, of course, challenge specific aspects of a 
given policy, just so long as the “special relationship” between the two states was 
allowed to stand as an unshakable pillar of enlightened, rational politics guided by moral 
conviction.  
The reactions to Walt and Mearsheimer’s study, diverse as they were, nonetheless 
failed to address several problematic and foundational assumptions in their Israel Lobby 
thesis. As I argue, these assumptions, rooted in the belief of a positive national interest, 
have been central to the project of 21st century statecraft and have allowed for various 
abuses that have emerged from its rationalist/realist paradigm.  
The authors insist that the U.S. national interest and the policies advocated for by 
the lobby are incongruous. What, then, does the national interest entail? While the 
authors provide examples of the national interest and the general interest of the U.S., they 
fail to develop a theory of the national interest that would lend the requisite stability to 
the concept. Whether this omission is an oversight on the part of the authors, whether it 
was consciously excised from the argument, or whether the authors believe that this does 
not deserve consideration (because consensus has been reached as to the form, content, 
and meaning of the national interest) is an interesting but largely immaterial question. 
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Regardless of the author’s intention, the void at the center of their thesis functions as a 
highly productive, and arguable necessary, component. National interest serves as the 
point de capiton90, a nodal point around which the entire discourse revolves despite its 
lack of positive meaning.  As such, it offers little in the way of an analytic concept and 
can only function properly as a political concept if left over-determined.91  
Too rigid a definition of the national interest would eliminate democratic political 
practice – the process of achieving consensus through dialogue on issues of policymaking 
– pushing a pronouncement of the national interest into a brutish realm often relegated to 
authoritarian regimes. Too loose a definition of the national interest would open critical 
space for political deliberation but would leave the term utterly useless for analytical, 
positivistic, problem-solving political science.  
The susceptibility for both analysts and laymen to simplify social life along 
Cartesian dimensions – establishing clear demarcations between inside and outside such 
that pure categories can be discerned and made governable – has been demonstrated 
                                                 
90 “It is true that each signification refers to another one and so on and so forth, and that both metaphoric 
substitution and metonymic combination can, in principle, be described as infinite, but, for Lacan, this 
endless movement of signification is stopped by the prominent role attributed (retroactively) to certain 
signifiers. These signifiers he calls points de capiton: the point de capiton is the signifier which ‘stops the 
otherwise endless movement (glissemement) of the signification’ (E: 303)…[I]t is clear that the point de 
capiton, this quilting point, is the point with which all concrete analysis of discourse must operate (III: 
267). These signifiers fix the meaning of whole chains of signifiers….The point de capiton fixes the 
signifier to a signifying knot and not to an object. Although without the retroactive (and retrospective) 
function of the point de capiton there would be no meaning, on the other hand, the existence of points de 
capiton never produces an eternally stable meaning, only a relative and temporary – albeit necessary – 
fixation; nevertheless, this fixation is, most of the time, mythically invested with the properties of the final 
one.” 
Yannis Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1999), 60. 
91 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Second Edition (London: Verso, 
1985, 2001), 111-3; Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-
South Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).  
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elsewhere.92 The observation rings especially true when we are speaking of communities 
of identity wherein discrete units (e.g., state, nation, ethnic group) are thought to contain 
uniquely representable and singular unifying characteristics, or put another way, are 
thought to demarcate spaces within which difference has been expelled and identity has 
been achieved.  
Walt and Mearsheimer’s Israel Lobby thesis is just one of the more prominent 
theses among many others which rely on an implicit assumption that states have 
representable identities. Once state identity is taken for granted, analysts are able to 
present deductive statements on what actions the national interest dictates.93 It bares 
mentioning that implicit assumptions are not in themselves problematic; however, there 
are many cases in which they tend to do a lot of work below-the-surface or behind-the-
scenes, like stagehands in a Broadway production. This allows the performance, in this 
case statecraft, to proceed with the illusory impression that it reflects reality, that it 
operates according to the way things really are, that the practices undertaken at any given 
moment are enclosed within a stable structure that dictates by deduction the realm of the 
possible.  
Those involved in the practice of social science might do well to heed the advice 
of Bruno Latour, who implores analysts to be explicit when it comes to the leg-work 
                                                 
92 See: R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
93 Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitick 
Without Politics,” Review of International Studies 19 (1993), 63-80; Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the 
National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978), 36-42. 
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being done by social concepts, or to use Latour’s phraseology, entelechies.94 In the realm 
of social science, the construction of the social objects of inquiry must be made explicit if 
we are to understand political action at its various levels. This is especially important 
given the many cases in which the work of social construction is submerged in ideology 
and where moral, ethical, or generically normative insights are offered in the form of 
empirical, rational things. Pointing out these operations is an uncomfortable task. 
Revealing the underlying ideological structures of political practice risks ruining the 
performance and undoing the palliative effects of socially acceptable abstraction.  
With that in mind, I now turn to the concept of the national interest and 
investigate how it has functioned in the academic literature and among policymakers. In 
so doing, I intend to retrieve both the political dimensions of the political science field 
that have been erased or submerged by claims of scientific rationality as well as retrieve 
the scientific aspects of political science that have been similarly neglected despite the 
pretensions toward an objective analysis of foreign policy invoked by scholars 
throughout the history of the field.95  
 
                                                 
94 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1988); Bruno Latour, An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013); Bruno Latour, Reassembling The Social (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
95 The claim that political scientists, and especially structural realists, have undermined political analysis 
with their emphasis on science is not a new insight. As Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil point 
out in their 1994 piece, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and 
the International System”:  
Ironically, in the attempt to meet the ideal of science, neorealists have cut themselves off 
from some of the important insights of George Kennan and other realist practitioners who 
shaped nineteenth- and twentieth-century politics.  
Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The 
Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” International Relations Theory and The End 
of the Cold War, eds. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappan (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995): 134. 
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The Integrity of the National Interest 
 
 
The concept of the nation is most often described as a modern form of political 
legitimation, typically traced back to the 19th century. Early political scientists were well 
aware of the tension developing from new political configurations and the strain between 
the growing technologies of statecraft on the one hand and the change of values entailed 
in the march toward modernity on the other. Max Weber most famously pointed out the 
emerging bureaucratization and rationalization of social life – already well-developed in 
the first decades of the 20th century – that issued a challenge to both the scientific study 
and control of human society and later, the social study of science. The eminent scholars 
associated with the Frankfurt School, in large part indebted to Weber, Georg Simmel, and 
Karl Marx, further highlighted the relation between scientific knowledge and power. No 
longer able to speak of science as value-neutral, these thinkers demonstrated how two 
processes associated with the scientific endeavor since the Enlightenment – 
understanding and control – implicated one another in ways not fully appreciated in the 
natural sciences up until that point. What were the attendant risks involved in studying or 
treating human relations as clockwork? What were the implications of the growing 
valorization of efficiency, calculability, and rationality in human relations?  
These were not entirely new concerns – recall J.S. Mill’s attempts at distancing 
ourselves from Bentham’s utilitarian dictum that “push-pin is as good as poetry” – but 
their implications were newly discovered. In a world where technologies of control and 
death were developing alongside increased economic integration and a constriction of 
“distance” between life-worlds (i.e., nations, cultures, peoples), how were we to 
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determine who “we” were and what where our rights and privileges? How could we 
maintain social cohesion and act in ways rational while caught in this systemic 
whirlwind?96 In the world of international politics, the development of the concept of 
national interest proved to be one of the more effective strategies for answering these 
questions, or so it appeared.  
One of the seminal works on the concept of national interest, written by Charles 
Beard and published in 1934, reminds us that if “soldiers are to die for it, and foreign 
policies are to conform to it, what could be more appropriate than to ask: what is national 
interest? An inquiry into the substance of the formula becomes a pressing task of political 
science.”97 Note the desire in this passage, the normative insistence and faith in the 
concept of national interest; “a pressing task” that, if successful, seems to hold the 
promise of salvation and clarity for those seeking meaning in a world of deathly horror 
and confusion. Beard, however, like those who followed him, was never quite able to 
complete this task. Rather than achieving greater clarity on what is the national interest, 
all of the works that I present here end on similar notes; namely, the national interest is 
important, even if we can’t be sure what it is exactly.  
Early American political scientists grappling with the concept – whose methods 
were more in line with the tradition of historiography and less with the behavioral turn 
that was beginning to take place – often turned to the foundation of the American 
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97 Charles Beard, The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: 
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Republic and the great debates occurring at the time.98 The protagonists of this debate, 
Hamilton and Jefferson, each represented differing visions of the nascent global 
superpower and in turn, drastically dissimilar conceptions of the national interest.  
As Michael Joseph Smith has observed, ‘How one defines the national 
interest depends on the values he espouses and the way he ranks them.’ 
Contemporary political scientists, including some realists, largely either 
assume or ignore this question, but based on their experience and their 
reading, the leading thinkers of the American Revolution had a lively 
sense of the different forms republican government – with clearly different 
foreign policy implications – could take.99 
 
Both of these impressive minds wrote political essays that were rich in moralistic 
language and in defense of a particular set of values. For Hamilton and Jefferson, 
“’National interest’…was opposed primarily to ‘sectional interest,’ not necessarily to 
moral principle. Yet, each had a distinct vision of what kind of country – regime? – the 
United States should be, and this affected their assessment of the national interest.”100 
The differences between the two views held by these great American political thinkers 
are described through various metaphors by later scholars: Rome vs. Sparta, 
expansionism vs. isolationism, Machiavelli v. Montesquieu, industry v. agriculture, and 
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so on.101 Throughout history, each side of these apparently opposing terms and 
perspectives had been offered as being coextensive with the national interest. Given this 
contestation, it appears as though policies themselves can tell us very little about what it 
means to secure the national interest. Instead, it seems incumbent upon us to discern 
some underlying value guiding the particular policies, some principle that could be 
recovered from the cacophony of events and decisions. The most sustained effort to rise 
above the mass of historical detail in this way was put forth by the father of modern 
political realism, the German-Jewish refugee, Hans Morgenthau.  
Morgenthau, whose Politics Among Nations famously defined the realist approach 
to international politics as a concern with “interest defined in terms of power,” attempted 
to establish clarity in the realm of international politics, providing a single source from 
which to judge the wisdom of a given foreign policy. States are concerned above all else 
with survival and control over other states which can only be guaranteed by wielding 
sufficient power. Power, which itself is defined as control over others, becomes the vital 
(national) interest of all states. “When we speak of power” Morgenthau tells us, “we 
mean man’s control over the minds and actions of other men. By political power we refer 
to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the 
latter and the people at large.”102  
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Morgenthau, echoing insights by Carl Schmitt, explains that politics is “an 
autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as 
economics…ethics, aesthetics, or religion.”103 These other spheres become political as 
soon as a struggle for power over the minds and actions of other men are observed. From 
this perspective, politics is more closely associated with decisionism than it is with 
morality, more closely related to Weberian rationality than Platonic dialectic.104 But this 
division itself is overdrawn.  
Throughout, Morgenthau’s argument reads more normative than empirical, with 
the focus on ideology (i.e., Idealism) in political science serving as his archrival. 
Morgenthau asks us to imagine ourselves looking over the shoulder of the statesman as 
he writes his dispatches, to place ourselves at a privileged vantage point where the 
statesman’s actions can be observed from without, free of the motives and ideological 
preferences that may cloud the statesman’s own mind. As he puts it, “as disinterested 
observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he…does 
himself.”105 And yet, a few pages later, Morgenthau explains that:  
Realism does not endow its key concept of interest defined as power with 
a meaning that is fixed once and for all…[and] the kind of interest 
determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon 
the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is 
formulated…The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its 
content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and 
                                                 
103 Ibid, 5; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political.  
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cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and 
maintains control of man over man.106  
 
Accepting Morgenthau’s analysis for the time being leaves us with an understanding that 
power is the elusive ends to which statesmen, and in turn states, aspire.107 When it comes 
to means, however, the analysis is left wanting. Morgenthau appears to indicate that the 
means depend heavily on political and cultural context. The mediating role played by 
culture and values that interject themselves between the statesman’s mind and his pen is 
acknowledged before being swiftly marginalized. The disinterested observer is asked to 
view the inscriptions of the statesman’s parchment as originary and decontextualized 
from the process of history and the practice of mediation – the text appears as an 
unmoored and self-sustaining ontological being. However, and despite Morgenthau’s best 
efforts, the meaning of the text cannot exist independent of a context – both in the mind 
of the reader and the mediating world. Values are sewn into the text and continue to 
haunt it; they continue to exert influence on the possible interpretations and implications 
of the political decision as well as the intention behind it.108 In spite of Morgenthau’s 
attempts, power cannot be decontextualized from ideas if it is to retain any meaning 
whatsoever. 
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Morgenthau gives us little by way of isolating a discrete ontological conception of 
power. He explains that power cannot be simplified as material capabilities, nor any other 
single sphere, and could be acquired and maintained through imperialist policies, status 
quo policies, or prestige-seeking policies, all depending on the historical and political 
conditions at a given time. Still, we can understand that whatever the national interest 
might be in practice – whatever state-guiding actions and discursive constructs it includes 
– it will always aim toward acquiring power over others. Most importantly, it should be 
differentiated from motives and ideology, from what leaders claim to aspire toward or 
whatever rhetoric is used to gain public support and lend an air of legitimacy.  
Morgenthau was well-aware that ultimately, the national interest is a site of 
political contestation, not an objective measure that could be dropped into political 
analysis without reflection. He even concedes that perceptions of the national interest, 
and the means used to achieve the national interest, have undergone several phases in 
American history.  
Three types of American foreign policy have emerged: the realistic – 
thinking and acting in terms of power – represented by Alexander 
Hamilton; the ideological – thinking in terms of moral principles but 
acting in terms of power – represented by Thomas Jefferson and John 
Quincy Adams; and the moralistic – thinking and acting in terms of moral 
principles – represented by Woodrow Wilson.109  
 
For Morgenthau, the Monroe doctrine in the Western Hemisphere and policies aiming at 
a balance of power in Europe are the best approximations of America’s national 
interest.110 All other formulations of the national interest – those that would emerge after 
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the initial pure Hamiltonian variant to corrupt the aims of policymakers with ideals or 
moralistic considerations – are unrealistic and dangerous to boot.  
Morgenthau’s Defense of the National Interest indeed reads as a political treatise, 
urging the reader to dispense with moral platitudes and recognize the power political 
nature of international politics. Of course, the effort to establish the primacy of power 
politics and extinguish any remaining doubt is an indication that the national interest has 
never been clear, and this is true just as much after Morgenthau’s work as it was in 
previous centuries. Each of Morgenthau’s historical readings is open to challenge and 
some claims (that popular revolutions are all but over, for example) have proven to be 
misguided. Morgenthau’s attempt to once and for all clear the ideological landscape in 
order to get to the heart of international politics reads as a work that is itself rich in 
ideological suppositions. Rather than giving a reader comfort in the knowledge that the 
national interest has been discerned once and for all, these works demonstrate that the 
definition of national interest is a site of political contestation.  
My first point – that the national interest is the site of politics – is too obvious for 
an analyst to take much pride in pointing it out but also too widely ignored for a field of 
political analysis with pretensions toward representing the world as it really is. “National 
interest” may serve as a stand-in for interests that some could see as counter to, 
competitive with, irreconcilable with, or distinct from the interest of the broad citizenry 
or nation. “National interest,” even when defined as power acquisition, is radically 
indeterminate in both form and content. Stephen Krasner indicates this same tension: 
Both the strength and weakness of Morgenthau’s dictum is that it lacks 
specific content. Power for what is always the puzzling question. The 
clearest answer is: power to protect the core objectives of the state, its 
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territorial and political integrity. When these goals are threatened, the 
theory does give fairly precise explanations and predictions about state 
behavior. 
 
This approach is less potent, however, in dealing with situations in which 
core objectives are not at stake, either because of a country’s position in 
the international system or because there is only a tenuous connection 
between core objectives and a particular policy problem. A logical-
deductive approach to the problem of the national interest is not of much 
use when dealing with a hegemonic or imperial state whose territorial and 
political integrity is completely secure.111 
 
Krasner’s attempt to define the core objectives of the state as territorial and 
political integrity is hardly convincing when one considers the prevalence of coup 
d’états, revolutions, annexations, and disengagements undertaken by those who 
speak for the state. The political and territorial upheavals are always invoked as 
actions concerned with the securing the state “from enemies both foreign and 
domestic.” Moreover, in the case of Israel, the political contestation over what 
exactly is the state’s territory and which values represent its political integrity are 
impossible to ignore, leaving Krasner’s attempt at grounding both “power” and 
the “objectives of the state” (i.e., the national interest) a noble but meaningless 
effort.  
And yet, despite its myriad inflections in differing contexts and its opacity 
as an analytic concept, the concept of the national interest persists. To quote the 
introductory paragraph of Joseph Frankel’s book, National Interest: 
‘National interest’ is a singularly vague concept. It assumes a variety of 
meanings in the various contexts in which it is used and, despite its 
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fundamental importance, these meanings often cannot be reconciled; 
hence no agreement can be reached about its ultimate meaning.112  
 
And once again, this time from Robert Keohane: 
 
When commentators wish to justify policy prescriptions on ethical 
grounds, they smuggle their ethics into the ambiguous and elastic concept 
of “the national interest.”113 
 
The relevant question to ask, then, is how certain sectors conceive of the national interest 
and the political forces and power structures that craft, manipulate, or alter these 
conceptions. Within the American academy, the national interest is often conceived as 
democracy promotion, regional or domestic stability, and security. Rarely is the national 
interest described as the pursuit and practice of hegemony, imperialism, or aggression. 
The privileged position held by the former series is telling but the latter series, harsh as it 
might sound, should not be read as hyperbole. 
American academics who have lived through the Vietnam War, witnessed U.S. 
covert interventions of the 1980s in Central and South America, and are aware of the 
whole series of government sponsored terror and acts of sabotage against secular 
nationalism in the Middle East (which continues to this day), and who nonetheless 
persistently espouse a benevolent version of American foreign policy should be 
commended for their idealism if nothing else. One is hard pressed to find a rosier pair of 
lenses than those donned by U.S. foreign policy analysts when it comes to representing 
the history of U.S. foreign relations. The ability to minimize the chasm between the 
historical record and the ideological pretensions of American policymakers – and to 
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proclaim the later as the true foundation of American foreign policy – perhaps testifies to 
the power of education to discipline the elite class along nationalist lines.114  
Looking back at the literature on national interest is somewhat refreshing. The 
further back you go, the less ideological cover-up and confusion, the more direct the 
analysis. Let us briefly return to Charles Beard’s book, The Idea of National Interest. 
Harold Lasswell, quoted in the preface to Beard’s study, explains, “Often the phrase 
‘national interest’ is used when what is meant is that a certain bank wants the State 
Department to do something.”115 Beard offers a similar view of the “national interest” as 
the most recent form of legitimizing government practice, following earlier models based 
on the divine right of kings or dynastic interest. This modern form appears to have 
emerged at the intersection of capitalism and popular governance (i.e., liberalism), 
though in the interest of clarity, it often concerns itself with those social objects that lend 
themselves to a ‘felicific calculus.’  
Unlike the abstractions and vagaries of the old formulas, national interest seems 
to bear a clear and positive relation to the tangibles which are the major concern 
of the modern world, especially to economic operations that can be cast or 
reflected in particular and general balance sheets.116 
 
A similar, though more nuanced formulation is presented by Stephen Krasner in his 1978 
book, Defending the National Interest. According to Krasner, the national interest can be 
viewed as “the preferences of central decision-makers that are related to enduring general 
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goals.”117 These goals must meet a few basic conditions; “first, they are concerned with 
the general interest of the society (they do not persistently benefit some groups or classes 
and harm others); second, they maintain the same transitive ordering over time.”118 After 
securing the primary goals of territorial and political integrity, the U.S. national interest, 
according to Krasner, is most convincingly demonstrated in policymaking concerned 
with securing raw materials markets. 
[T]he preferences of American central decision-makers, revealed by their 
actual behavior toward foreign raw materials investments, suggests that 
their most important goals have been related to broad foreign policy 
objectives, their next most important to insuring security of supply, and 
their least important to increasing competition and reducing prices.119 
 
There are two important points to note regarding Krasner’s thesis. First, his invocation of 
the terms “broad foreign policy objectives” and “general foreign policy goals”120 reflects 
an ambiguity similar to that of Walt and Mearsheimer’s invocation of “national interest” 
(a point we will get to shortly). Despite his observation that a “logical-deductive 
approach to the problem of the national interest is not of much use when dealing with a 
hegemonic or imperial state whose territorial and political integrity is completely 
secure,”121 Krasner falls back on a logical-deductive gambit, positing the existence of 
some consistent and unproblematic national interest that is reflected in the pursuit of 
general goals, the characteristics of which do not appear to require serious explication.  
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When Krasner does provide details, they tend to contradict the purported broad, 
resilient, or uncontroversial nature ascribed to these goals. The particulars range from 
“preventing a communist regime in Iran”122 to addressing the threat to security of the 
supply of rubber123 and addressing the threat to “the economy in general and naval 
capabilities in particular”124 presented by possible petroleum shortages. That these goals 
are “concerned with the general interest of the society (they do not persistently benefit 
some groups or classes and harm others)” and “maintain the same transitive ordering over 
time” is by no means a given. Krasner, to his credit, admits that his analysis could lend 
support to Marxist, liberal-pluralist, or statist approaches, and while he maintains the 
latter to be most convincing, it is neither logically entailed from his analysis nor is it 
convincingly demonstrated by his selective empirical investigation.  
The second point, and the more critical one for the present purposes, is that 
Krasner identifies the importance of economic considerations to policymakers who are 
said to concern themselves with the national interest. That is to say, while Krasner 
remains an avowed statist, he often makes no distinction between the interest of the state, 
the interests of society, the interest of financial or economic centers, and interests as 
perceived by policymakers. Though Krasner does not develop “enduring general goals” 
as a discrete analytic category, his analysis clearly indicates that the national interest is 
largely comprised of economic concerns determined by elite policymakers.   
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Beard’s conflation of the national interest with the financial and banking sector, 
and the association made to a utilitarian methodology that casts the national interest in 
terms of “particular and general balance sheets,” is arguably a more profane or brute 
variation than that which emerges from Krasner’s more nuanced approach. Both views 
nonetheless fall back on the national interest as defined by policymaking elites who are 
largely concerned with economic and material considerations. As it turns out, the notion 
that national interest serves as stand-in for elite interests is not all that controversial in the 
scholarly literature. 
Whereas most investigations into the national interest determine the concept to be 
a stand-in for elite interests, the interests of uniquely powerful networks (industries 
central to the pursuit of the aims set forth by elite state policy makers), and highly 
contested, Mearsheimer and Walt return to the naïve conceptualization of the national 
interest as indicating the interest of the general public. Of course, the authors do not 
eliminate the presence of powerful and interested networks who work to shape state 
policy; their focus is precisely on these actors (i.e., The Israel Lobby)! Whereas earlier 
analyses of the national interest could not avoid the process by which the national interest 
is defined (pluralism, ideological debate, elite competition), Mearsheimer and Walt 
somehow manage to elide all of this. Using a strategy that would best be described as 
estrangement, Mearsheimer and Walt accept the idea that the actions of the United States 
government do not meet the needs of the general public and instead represent the interests 
of powerful elite networks. However, and in order to preserve the concept of the national 
interest, they estrange these networks, thereby ensuring that the pure concept of the 
national interest can remain uncorrupted.  
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I am making reference here to the Georg Simmel’s concept of the stranger. 
Simmel describes the stranger as “fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a 
group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries. But his position in this group is 
determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that 
he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself.”125 In the 
next section, I demonstrate how this concept of estrangement accurately describes the 
strategy undertaken by Mearsheimer and Walt toward “The Israel Lobby” and how this 
ultimately shields the history of U.S. foreign policy – and the elites affiliated with its 
projection – from serious criticism. Having shown that the national interest is a powerful 
rhetorical tool that lacks conceptual and formal integrity, we can now turn to how the 
term national interest functions in the context of the Israel Lobby thesis. 
 
National Interest and The Lobby 
 
At the heart of Mearsheimer and Walt’s Israel Lobby thesis is their view that “using 
American power to achieve a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians would help 
advance the broader goals of fighting extremism and promoting democracy in the Middle 
East.”126 These broader goals are offered as being consistent with the U.S. national 
interest and are meant to pass without comment. In this section, I discuss the authors’ 
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ambiguity regarding the form and content of the national interest, challenge their 
uncritical reproduction of a largely fictitious history of U.S. foreign policy, and focus on 
several inconsistencies found in the finer points of their argument.   
To begin, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the way the authors’ above 
statement undermines the very methodology they employ and the central argument that 
they make. The authors want to demonstrate, on the one hand, that U.S. policymaking in 
the Middle East is subject to consistent subversion by interested parties (i.e., the Israel 
Lobby). At the very same time, they argue that the U.S. is uniquely capable of bringing a 
more just political order to the Middle East. The reader is expected to concede at the 
outset the legitimacy of U.S. regional hegemony and accept on faith the ability (or desire) 
for the U.S. to implement a more just order.  
The authors provide a number of historical case studies meant to demonstrate U.S. 
foreign policy failure: the premature cessation of U.S. counter-terror cooperation with 
Syria and Iran in the early years of the Bush administration’s War on Terror, U.S. failure 
to limit the mistreatment of Palestinians at the hands of the Government of Israel (GOI) 
after 2001, and U.S. failure to prevent the Second Lebanon War in 2006. In all of the 
above cases, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the U.S. government, for all its power and 
prestige, had been duped and outpaced by a small and loosely-bound network of power, 
the “Israel Lobby.”  
If the authors question the ability for the U.S. to pursue rational policies that 
would secure the national interest, they do not question the benevolent intentions of U.S. 
policymakers. The intended goals of the U.S. government are taken for granted even if 
they do not comport with the historical record. These stated goals – fighting extremism 
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and promoting democracy – function as strong ideological justifications for all manner of 
interventions throughout U.S. history. The openly avowed quasi-imperial desire to 
achieve regional and global hegemony passes without mention.  
To be clear, Mearsheimer and Walt do not expressly condone all interventionist 
foreign policy decisions undertaken by U.S. administrations – the authors had voiced 
strong opposition to the invasion of Iraq and more recently have argued against indirect 
military involvement in Ukraine.127 However, their argument works to perpetuate a myth 
of generic benevolence on the part of U.S. policymakers and as such, keeps intact the 
ideology of American exceptionalism. American foreign policy, for all its faults, 
seemingly has the potential to be guided by benevolent intentions. In light of this, the 
authors’ search for a corrupting force should not be all that surprising. 
Back when the Israel Lobby piece was first published, I found the work to be bold 
in its claims, well-researched, and for the most part convincing. The piece was refreshing 
not only for its unabashed criticism of Israeli and U.S. foreign policy – a point on which 
mainstream American political science remains largely mute – but also for the historical 
context in which it was published. Following the puzzling and illegal U.S. intervention in 
Iraq, the American public and academic community seemed hesitant to push against the 
grain of conventional wisdom. Walt and Mearsheimer wrote a piece that challenged 
American foreign policy orthodoxy, implying that American foreign policy is crafted in 
ways that subvert the democratic will of the people, minimize the oppositional role and 
                                                 
127 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War” Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb 2003): 50-
59. 
  136 
capacity of their elected representatives, and oftentimes produce suboptimal outcomes. 
But as Christopher Hitchens wrote in response of The Israel Lobby essay: 
The essay itself, mostly a very average "realist" and centrist critique of the 
influence of Israel, contains much that is true and a little that is original. 
But what is original is not true and what is true is not original.128 
 
None of the forgoing discussion is intended to take credit away from Walt and 
Mearsheimer for publishing an auspicious piece that helped to open a critically important 
space for dialogue.129 Still, their analysis, convincing as it appears to be, has only taken 
us half of the way toward understanding and addressing the role of U.S.-based networks 
of power in the Israel-Palestine conflict.  
 
The Pro-Israel Position  
 
In both the original essay, the expanded version and in their book version, 
Mearsheimer and Walt’s analysis stands or falls on the concept of “national interest.” 
Curiously enough, the authors forego a sustained discussion on the contours and content 
of the national interest until the concluding section of these works. Delaying a discussion 
of the national interest also allows for the label of “Pro-Israel” to pass without comment. 
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These two issues related to positioning require some attention before moving forward. 
The first – the position of their description of the national interest within the larger text – 
suspends a critical reading of their thesis. The second – the position of the Israel Lobby in 
relation to the U.S. and to Israel – allows the authors to participate in the promotion of an 
ideological trope seemingly without realizing it themselves.  
In an expanded version of their original London Review of Books piece, 
Mearsheimer and Walt write the following: “The U.S. national interest should be the 
primary object of American foreign policy.”130 This normative and under-specified claim 
is followed by: “no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the 
American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing 
Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical”131; “In fact, they are 
not” add the authors in the book version of The Israel Lobby.132 They continue to explain, 
again in the book version, that: 
Specifically, we have to convince readers that the United States provides 
Israel with extraordinary material aid and diplomatic support, the lobby is 
the principal reason for that support, and this uncritical and unconditional 
relationship is not in the American national interest.133 
 
Throughout their piece, the authors scatter implied and at times explicit (though 
underdeveloped and tangential) conceptions of the national interest following what could 
best be described as an adventitious rather than a rigorous method. This strategy, not 
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surprisingly, brings with it all manner of attendant inconsistencies and promotes a 
reading strategy that must sacrifice clarity and suspend disbelief if it hopes to sustain a 
narrative. We are left with a text that appears to derive much of its strength from the 
partial and sporadic invocation of the national interest alongside grand if cliché 
statements on benevolent intentions. Given that Walt and Mearsheimer pose their thesis 
in terms of national interest, why do they relegate the (not so) detailed accounting of the 
national interest to a subsection in the concluding chapter of their book (“What are U.S. 
Interests?”)? 
Returning to the abovementioned description of the national interest that appears 
in the concluding section of their essay, the authors explain that: “using American power 
to achieve a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians would help advance the 
broader goals of fighting extremism and promoting democracy in the Middle East”134 
(emphasis added). On the face of it, Mearsheimer and Walt’s implied and uncritical 
ascription of democracy promotion to U.S. interest in the Middle East is unconvincing at 
best given the history of U.S. policy in that region. The authors themselves acknowledge 
as much.135 Like the article, their book delays an accounting of the U.S. national interest 
until the concluding section. This delay serves a strategic function by deferring an 
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explicit accounting of what turns out to be the weakest – and at the same time the most 
central – element of their argument.  
Another important problem emerges when the authors attempt to position the 
Lobby in relation to both the State of Israel and the U.S. Their efforts meet with a number 
of seemingly unsurpassable contradictions. They complicate their general theoretical 
position when they state, for example, that: 
Pro-Israel forces surely believe that they are promoting policies that serve 
the American as well as the Israeli national interest. We disagree. Most of 
the policies they advocate are not in America's or Israel's interest, and both 
countries would be better off if the United States adopted a different 
approach.136  
 
The positioning of the Israel Lobby in relation to U.S. policymaking circles is telling. The 
authors are careful not to imply that the Lobby is entirely alien to the American public 
and political sphere. Both its membership and the sorts of activities it undertakes are 
presented as native to the tradition of American democracy. Its membership is largely 
comprised of American nationals, many of them serving in their official capacities as 
Representatives and Senators in Congress, others occupying important cabinet positions 
and executive branch offices, and still others sitting on the boards of major corporations 
and think-tanks. The Israel Lobby, despite its name, is an American institution through 
and through. This leads to a tension that the authors attempt to relieve with little success.  
Insofar as “Pro-Israel forces” are characterized as promoting policies that are not 
in Israel’s interest – leaving aside for now how these interests are determined – the “Pro-
Israel” qualifier appears utterly meaningless from an analytical perspective. It appears as 
though the “Pro-Israel forces,” native to America, drive the U.S. government as well as 
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the Government of Israel to pursue policies that harm their respective national interests. 
The Lobby can be described as an “Israel Lobby” only in terms of its interest in the State 
of Israel but without relation to the interests of the State of Israel. This is not merely a 
matter of semantics; it is a rhetorical strategy necessary for the proper functioning of the 
Israel Lobby thesis.  
The Lobby is never exiled, but always estranged from the state; a part apart (if 
you will forgive the wordplay). This estrangement applies as much to its place in U.S. 
statecraft as it does in Israeli statecraft. In order for the Israel Lobby to function properly 
in the analysis – as an antagonistic force – it must remain distinct and separate from Israel 
while at the same time appearing as an appendage of the state.  
The authors decision to describe the Israel Lobby as “Pro-Israel” while arguing 
that the policies it pursues are against the interest of Israel leads to an apparent 
contradiction in terms (i.e., the Pro-Israel Lobby that brings harm to Israel). This is 
doubly problematic when one considers the politically charged environment developed 
around questions of Israeli policy and the resort to labelling critics of GOI policy as 
“anti-Israel.” Fortunately for the authors, the Pro-Israel appellation is hollow. This is 
fortunate because if the term carried its implied solidity, then Mearsheimer and Walt 
would be taking residence in the “anti-Israel” camp. This sort of charge, despite its 
absurdity, was leveled by Zbigniew Brzezinski in a short review of their book. According 
to Brzezinski, “[t]hey are…generally critical of Israel’s policy and, thus, could be labeled 
as being in some respects anti-Israel.”137  
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In using the appellation “Pro-Israel,” however, the authors concede substantial 
ground to those forces in the Lobby that they otherwise aim to weaken; namely, right-
wing religious nationalists who refuse to concede either territory or recognition to the 
Palestinian people. By limiting all possible political debates in the discursive field to the 
pro-Israel/anti-Israel division, the authors participate in the erasure of pluralism and 
politics within and between the relevant societies (Israel, Palestine, U.S.). We are left 
with a rigid construction whose inability to adapt to the frequently changing dynamics of 
the Israel-Palestine conflict – including demographic, cultural, infrastructural, and social 
characteristics – is not all that surprising. The more nefarious effect of this discourse is its 
ability to reinforce identification with sterile divisions that carry with them old modes of 
historical violence.  
Let me develop this point a bit further because it highlights the core assumption 
supporting Mearsheimer and Walt’s thesis: the existence of a representable, identifiable, 
incontestable national interest. Either the Lobby pursues its own peculiar interests, in 
which case we should hesitate to call it the Israel Lobby, or it advocates policies that have 
Israeli interests in mind but nonetheless result in negative and unintended consequences. 
In either case, the Government of Israel and the U.S. government appear to be inept and 
powerless institutions unable to adjust their policies toward their own interests.  
Put in terms of theoretical frameworks, the view that the Lobby pursues its own 
unique set of interests is most consistent with a liberal/pluralist view of politics. The view 
that the state actions account for policies and their attendant results is most consistent 
with a statist perspective. Mearsheimer and Walt, as realists, appear to privilege the latter 
logic. However, if the latter were true, then pursuing the national interest could be done 
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only after first determining which political influences are pure and which are degenerate. 
In other words, political deliberation would be a necessary first step toward ascertaining 
the national interest. This simple observation escapes the authors’ analysis, and for good 
reason, because making it explicit would reveal the contestable nature of the national 
interest. If the national interest is up for debate, then Mearsheimer and Walt’s insistence 
that it is not being met is not likely to be very convincing. Put simply, political process is 
sidelined in order to offer a more manageable puzzle amenable to top-down 
administration using calculative reasoning.138 
The focus on Pro-Israel forces is even more puzzling given Mearsheimer and 
Walt’s self-ascribed realist orientation. Because Pro-Israel forces are represented as 
separate from the state, Mearsheimer and Walt would need to explain how the statist 
conception of national interest (the view that states are discrete, unified entities capable 
of pursuing discrete interests) can be consistent with their pluralist epistemology (the 
focus on sub-state forces determining state policy). If the state interests and policy are 
predominantly determined by non-state actors, then a statist approach to understanding 
foreign policy would appear misplaced.   
 
“Three Main Interests” 
 
The particulars that Walt and Mearsheimer turn to also provide little by way of clarifying 
the tension between (1) the interests of loose networks of power (e.g., the Israel Lobby) 
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and (2) the state conceived of as having a single definable identity from which the 
national interest would emerge naturally and appear incontrovertible. The authors begin 
the second half of the book with the following general claim:  
The United States has three main interests in the Middle East today: 
keeping Persian Gulf oil flowing to world markets, discouraging the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction, and reducing anti-American 
terrorism originating in the region. There are instances where the lobby 
has supported policies that advanced these interests, but many of the 
policies that organizations in the lobby have promoted over time have 
ultimately left the United States worse off.139 
 
  
Consider these “three main interests” in turn. Keeping Persian Gulf oil flowing to 
world markets is by no means an uncontroversial pillar of the U.S. national interest nor a 
clearly articulated goal. As Timothy Mitchell points out in Carbon Democracy, control 
over oil markets has long been a concern for policymakers, but this control entails both 
supply and scarcity. This partly follows a logic of price controls but also serves wider 
political objectives including securing the dominance of the Saudi monarchy against 
regional adversaries, limiting class-based political reforms, and undermining democratic 
movements at home and abroad.140 More importantly, that there exists a real threat to the 
supply of oil for market is refuted by the authors themselves:  
because most oil-exporting governments depend on large revenues to keep 
themselves in power, threatening to cut off the supply is not credible and 
their leverage is thus reduced. Many of these governments also have 
sizable investments in Western economies and would suffer considerable 
losses in the event of a sustained economic downturn. Reducing 
production would drive prices up and make alternative energy sources 
more attractive, and give the United States and other countries a big 
incentive to wean themselves from oil dependence once and for all. 
Because major oil exporters like Saudi Arabia want to keep the industrial 
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powers hooked on oil and gas, they have an obvious disincentive to using 
what little leverage may be at their disposal. As a result, U.S. dependence 
on imported energy supplies has not given these countries much influence 
over U.S. policy.141  
 
So goes the threat from Persian Gulf oil supplies.  
The second main interest proposed by Mearsheimer and Walt is equally puzzling. 
Not only has the U.S. allowed for weapons of mass destruction to spread in the region 
(e.g., providing support for chemical and biological weapons development to Saddam’s 
Iraq, providing cover for Israeli nuclear proliferation) but it has sought policies that make 
the development and acquisition of WMD a reasonable policy goal for states like Iran.142 
The authors are correct to point out that some of these policies have been aided by the so-
called Israel Lobby, but others were more accurately the result of broader geostrategic 
aims by various U.S. administrations. The Nixon administration’s “Twin Pillar policy” 
regarding Iran and Saudi Arabia is a case in point whose effects remain relevant for the 
current politics in the Middle East region.143 Much like the carbon politics referenced in 
the last example, this topic is far too complex to summarize here and is open to many 
challenges. As such, it fails to serve as a commonsense basis from which to derive the 
U.S. national interest.  
The last goal, reducing anti-American terrorism, is similarly complex. There are 
many U.S. policies unrelated to Israel that have been used to justify terrorism against the 
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U.S. While Mearsheimer and Walt are correct to point out that bin Laden mentioned U.S. 
support for Israel as a reason for the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden also mentioned U.S. military 
bases in Saudi Arabia as a principle grievance. Similar to the other examples, the authors 
acknowledge this line of reasoning, even accepting the view that U.S. bases in the Middle 
East provoke violence against American assets.  
A more general point should also be made regarding the use of political rhetoric 
as evidence. The rhetoric used by the likes of bin Laden might not necessarily represent 
the political logic employed by him or similarly gifted if sadistic political strategists (e.g., 
Zawahiri, al-Baghdadi). As Bruce Riedel has pointed out, bin Laden followed a strategy 
that could best be described as one of promoting adversaries – provoking the U.S. in 
order to draw its forces into the region only to trap them in a long and costly quagmire.144 
From the region-wide chaos, a charismatic leader could emerge and serve as a unifying 
force, turning the initial U.S. intervention in the Middle East toward a weakening of U.S. 
assets – a sort of political judo – or so the logic went. Bin Laden did not need U.S.-Israel 
policy to pursue his political agenda, though the policies of the two states can be effective 
recruitment tools. Walt and Mearsheimer acknowledge but quickly marginalize these 
points in order to maintain the assertion that the Israel Lobby is unique in terms of the 
scale of its impact, and that U.S. policy would avoid all manner of negative and 
unintended consequences if not for the Lobby.  
For the authors, a more just solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict would allow 
the U.S. to exercise power in the region more effectively, thereby reducing anti-American 
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sentiment.145 The U.S. military could have its cake and eat it too, so to speak, maintaining 
regional dominance under a new, improved, purified strategy that would limit all manner 
of negative externalities.  
 
Syria 
 
Mearsheimer and Walt, in their attempt to estrange the Israel Lobby, have to convince the 
reader that the Lobby is a force uniquely capable of sabotaging U.S. strategy. In order to 
demonstrate this power, the authors turn to U.S.-Syrian relations. Mearsheimer and Walt 
argue that Israeli policy toward Syria undermined U.S. attempts to normalize its relations 
with the Assad regime and achieve a mutually beneficial strategic cooperation. The Israel 
Lobby, which in this section is comprised almost entirely of members of the hawkish 
neo-conservative wing of the Bush administration, is charged with steering the 
administration toward a more conflictual stance with regards to Syria. Aligning 
themselves with the hawkish policies of Ariel Sharon, and later with the hawkish wing of 
Ehud Olmert’s administration, the Lobby is credited with having successfully 
undermined U.S.-Syria strategic cooperation.  
In December of 2006, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad signaled his interest in 
opening negotiations with Israel concerning the Golan Heights (occupied by Israel since 
1967) without preconditions. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, citing pressure from 
the Bush administration, rebuffed Assad’s overtures. Mearsheimer and Walt dismiss 
Olmert’s claims of American pressure by recourse to three indicators. 
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First, the U.S. ambassador to Israel denied Olmert’s claim. The word of the U.S. 
ambassador is trustworthy by definition.146 Second, the authors claim that “Israel is not in 
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“he does not consider Syria a partner in the diplomatic process so long as it supports 
terrorist organizations and aids Hezbollah. He added that the Syrians have not done 
enough to lift doubts that they are interested in negotiations solely as a means of 
receiving international legitimacy. 
"If the Syrians change the situation," the ambassador said, "the situation will also 
change." 
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Unchanged”, Haaretz, May 25, 2007) appears to indicate in the first paragraph that both U.S. and Israel 
officials were opposed to talks with Syria. The full article is behind a paywall and has not been accessed at 
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A third article cited on this point (Ze’ev Schiff’s “U.S. envoy denies pressure on Israel not to engage in 
talks with Syria”, Haaretz May 21, 2007) is similarly confusing. It begins with the claim that the U.S. had 
reversed its previous objections to negotiating with Assad, followed by Ambassador Jones’ denial that such 
objections were ever made, which is immediately put to doubt with the following: 
 
During a recent visit to Israel, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded 
forcefully when the issue of Assad's call for a resumption of negotiations with Israel was 
raised. 
"It is best that you avoid even exploring this possibility," she said. 
Israel's government interpreted this as a firm American stance preventing Syria from 
taking advantage of talks with Israel to extricate itself from diplomatic isolation before 
fulfilling its obligation to control insurgents from crossing into Iraq, and before meeting 
the demands of the international investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese 
prime minister Rafik Hariri. 
 
The article also offers instructions from the U.S. to Israel regarding which issues have not been approved 
for discussion by the U.S. administration (e.g., U.S. policy, Iran, and the future of Lebanon). 
Ze’ev Schiff, “U.S. envoy denies pressure on Israel not to engage in talks with Syria,” May 21, 2007, 
Haaretz (http://www.haaretz.com/news/u-s-envoy-denies-pressure-on-israel-not-to-engage-in-talks-with-
syria-1.221112).  
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the habit of taking orders from any U.S. leader when its vital interests are at stake.”147 
This statement is curious for at least three reasons.  
First, the authors attribute to Israel a characteristic that their thesis denies to the 
U.S.; namely, pursuit of the national interest (“vital interests”) in spite of outside 
pressures. U.S. policy appears to be easily guided by a loosely assembled though 
powerful interest group, while Israeli policy appears resilient even in the face of pressure 
from the world’s sole remaining superpower. Quite a feat if it were true. The authors 
undermine this claim almost immediately.  
Mearsheimer and Walt explain that Israeli leaders have never viewed negotiation 
with Syria as a top priority, though some abortive attempts to settle their disputes have 
occurred several times in the past (under Rabin, Barak, and Olmert). Syria does not pose 
a serious let alone existential threat to Israel (i.e., it does not put Israel’s “vital 
interests…at stake”), though proxy forces like Hezbollah and Hamas have managed to 
exact a toll, mostly through effective provocation.148 As Mearsheimer and Walt point out, 
Israeli Prime Ministers since Sharon have preferred to maintain an antagonistic 
relationship with Syria rather than return the Golan Heights, a calculation that has wide 
support among the Israeli public. As Mearsheimer and Walt demonstrate, there was an 
affinity between the right-wing elements of the Sharon and Olmert governments, on the 
one hand, and the right-wing elements of the Bush administration on the other. Both 
viewed Syria as a rogue state and militated between opening channels of communication 
when advantageous and withdrawing cooperation when contemporaneous calculations 
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deemed such a policy to be in the national interest. Instances of Israeli intransigence 
regarding the opening of negotiations with Syria, the end of which would be a 
disengagement from parts of the occupied Golan Heights in exchange for a normalization 
of relations, fall short of demonstrating an intentional undermining of U.S. policy by the 
Israeli government, let alone effective manipulation at the hands of the Israel Lobby.  
Finally, the Government of Israel has taken orders from past U.S. administrations, 
even in the face of threats to vital national security, most notably in the restraint shown 
against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the Gulf War. Iraqi missiles bombarding Israeli 
cities were met with no retaliation by Israeli forces. Curiously enough, Mearsheimer and 
Walt reference Israel as a strategic liability during the Gulf War because its participation 
in the war would “jeopardiz[e] the fragile coalition against Iraq.”149 Their assertion is odd 
because in that conflict, the U.S. managed to restrain the IDF. In other words, the U.S. 
was successful in controlling the actions of its ally. Netanyahu’s continued restraint in 
bombing Iranian nuclear sites is a more recent example (in this case, domestic politics 
plays a decisive role, with Israel’s top military leaders vocally opposed to an attack on 
Iran). Israel appears to have bowed to U.S. pressure even when its perceived vital 
interests were at stake.  
Could it be the case that Olmert acceded to U.S. pressure, avoiding negotiations 
with Syria that were otherwise viewed as an auxiliary rather than primary concern? It is 
plausible and it would be unsurprising if true. More importantly, where does the Lobby 
fit into this calculation? According to Mearsheimer and Walt, the Lobby successfully 
prevented the U.S. cooperation with Syria by preventing Israel-Syria reconciliation. Was 
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Olmert bowing to pressures by the Israel Lobby or is Olmert part of the Israel Lobby? 
The authors blur the distinction, writing that “Israeli policy toward 
Damascus…determines U.S. policy toward Syria.”150 Was Olmert part of the Israel 
Lobby? Was he acting on behalf of the Lobby when he offered the Palestinians shared 
custody over the holy sites in Jerusalem, as was revealed by the Palestine Papers leak?151  
These tenuous connections between particular policies, the interests of the Lobby, 
and the politics of particular Israeli and U.S. administrations recur throughout The Israel 
Lobby. The inconsistencies presented by Mearsheimer and Walt are often difficult to 
reconcile. Olmert plays the role of a spoiler at one moment and the role of flexible 
statesman the next. After describing Olmert’s snub toward Assad, the authors explain that 
he approved of the progress being made in covert Track-II negotiations from September 
2004 to July 2006 by Israeli and Syrian interlocutors. Olmert ultimately rejected attempts 
at bringing the negotiations to an official level, and while the politics regarding that 
decision are by no means clear, the event itself should give pause to accepting 
Mearsheimer and Walt’s characterization. The authors also rightly point out dissension 
within Olmert’s own cabinet, as well as the shifting attitudes and opinions regarding 
Syria from otherwise bullheaded politicians like Netanyahu.  
In a similar vein, Walt and Mearsheimer explain that when it came to U.S. policy 
regarding Israel and Syria, “[t]he Bush administration’s bottom line is difficult to discern, 
due to the continuing tug-of-war among policy makers over how best to deal with 
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Damascus and a recognition of competing interests.”152 This being the case, one has to 
wonder why the authors put forward their argument in the first place. What, after all, was 
the U.S. national interest given the “continuing tug-of-war among policy makers”? Each 
of these cases has its own complex history and political logic, and deserves a more 
serious analysis than what I present here. My present task is merely to show that many of 
the claims that Walt and Mearsheimer present as straightforward and uncontroversial are 
anything but.    
Mearsheimer and Walt bring their point home on the topic of Syria by focusing on 
the War on Terror. Put simply, “if there were no lobby, there would have been no Syria 
Accountability Act, and U.S. policy toward Damascus would have been more in line with 
the U.S. national interest.”153 In the fight against the al-Qaeda network, the Bush 
administration valued Syrian intelligence cooperation and hoped to secure a policy of 
non-interference in Iraq by the Syrian regime. Against these efforts stood a piece of 
congressional legislation entitled The Syria Accountability Act – first introduced in the 
Spring of 2002 before the U.S. invasion of Iraq – which called on Syria to withdraw from 
Lebanon, end its support for terrorism, and give up its WMD or face sanctions. It was 
initially rejected by the Bush administration who at the time were still trying to market 
their plans for an invasion of Iraq. After the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, Bush 
resisted calls for regime change in Syria and passage of the Syria Accountability Act 
despite vociferous advocacy by the more hawkish insiders and administration officials 
(e.g., John Bolton, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliot Abrams).  
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After several failed attempts, the Syria Accountability Act was passed by 
Congress and signed to law by Bush in December of 2003, over a year and a half after it 
was first drafted. Interestingly, Walt and Mearsheimer admit that Bush dragged his feet 
and never did really implemented the law.154 Instead, administration officials kept 
pressure on Syria using little more than harsh rhetoric; hardly a victory for those seeking 
regime change, or as Mearsheimer and Walt call them, “The Israel Lobby.” The current 
situation in Syria and the Obama administration’s policy goals regarding Assad – whether 
the Assad regime will be toppled at the behest of the U.S. – is deeply contested and too 
complex an issue to enter into here. In either case, Mearsheimer and Walt’s analysis 
regarding Syria, Israel, and the U.S. is hardly convincing. 
 
The Petrodollar-Weapondollar Connection155 
 
In the next chapter, I address the military, security, and hi-tech networks as they relate to 
the politics of recognition. Here, I will briefly outline the importance of the military and 
hi-tech industries in order to establish how and why they are too easily dismissed as 
explanatory variables in Mearsheimer and Walt’s analysis. These industries are not only a 
source of economic prosperity for the two states, but also point to the ideological 
affinities between the Israel Lobby thesis, American exceptionalism, and Jewish 
nationalism. With regards to the interests of the security and defense industries, some 
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basic facts are worth repeating. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), the U.S. annual military budget surpasses that of the next 10 largest 
military combined ($682 billion).156 Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. military aid and 
a close collaborator on new defense-related technologies (e.g., Iron Dome, David’s Sling, 
the F-35 fighter jet).  
Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollack demonstrate rather convincingly that 
military and hi-tech industries have much to gain from a close relationship with the State 
of Israel. Indeed, the conflict has proven to be one of the most secure investments, with 
R&D programs working at a fast pace and with demand skyrocketing at every new 
outburst of violence. Foreign aid and military industry cooperation with Israel is best 
viewed as an investment, not as support for a fledgling client, as it is often characterized 
in both the media and in scholarship. Intelligence cooperation with Israel bears a similar 
characteristic of preferential treatment of a kind not extended to any other U.S. ally, not 
because U.S. networks of power fear for Israel’s existential situation, but rather because 
the payoffs happen to be more relevant and secure.  
Networks of power emanating from the U.S. do not subsidize the Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian lands, as Mearsheimer and Walt claim; they invest in it. Drone 
technology, surveillance (hardware, software, and training), and all manner of national 
security related technologies undergo real world field testing in Israel, oftentimes 
foreshadowing the use of these technologies by the U.S. military and the domestic 
security establishment. Moreover, support for Israel along these lines is consistent with 
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Mearsheimer and Walt’s preferred U.S. strategy in the Middle East – offshore balancing 
and client-state relation management. Walt and Mearsheimer make the odd claim that 
“we should not forget, [Israel] still managed to defeat its various adversaries, and with 
little assistance from the United States,”157 a claim that might have held true before 1967, 
but not since, with the U.S. becoming the primary weapon’s supplier for Israel and 
replacing France as the primary supplier of jetfighters. The now-routine bombardment of 
the Gaza Strip by the Israeli military is consistently met with three responses from the 
U.S. – affirmation of Israel’s right to security and an obligatory if restrained 
condemnation of the use of excessive force followed by resupply to the Israeli military.  
One last point to consider. The other major recipients of U.S. military aid in the 
region – Saudi Arabia and Egypt – were driven to enhance their military capabilities in 
the face of Israeli military dominance. Echoes of the Nixon administration’s Twin Pillar 
Policy with regards to Iran and Saudi Arabia can be seen in U.S. military aid to both 
Egypt and Israel following the 1973 War. The “special relationship” not only guarantees 
an ally with military superiority in the Middle East (a strategic asset) but also offers a 
stable market for hi-cost military-industrial projects. 
 
Democratic Realism and Neo-Conservativism 
 
After this excurses, you the reader might be wondering what, exactly, is the U.S. national 
interest? If national interest is not one given thing, then we need to return to the claim 
made at the outset of this chapter; namely, that the national interest is little more than an 
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ideological stand-in for a given political project by an interest(ed) group who cannot 
properly be described as the “national.” Focusing on political preferences, we can 
conceive of many private groups – what were once called factions – vying for power in 
order to craft policy.  
Walt and Mearsheimer appear to have fallen into a trap of sorts: ensnared as they 
are in the self-proclaimed position of realists, they end up missing the (idealist) woods 
for the (realist) trees. Try as they might, the authors are unable to construct a version of 
the national interest that is anything but contingent and value-laden. They are unable to 
present the national interest as an objective measure without sneaking in a certain set of 
values and an identity. These values are rarely explicit with most invocations of the 
national interest passing over an otherwise glaring void at the center of the thesis. The 
center – the national interest – is as fortified as it is hollow. By covering over the point de 
capiton, the authors leave the hollow center of their thesis just out of sight, just far 
enough to produce an authoritative aura to a thesis that stands on the edge of a void. 
By claiming that the U.S. national interest is being damaged, the authors seem to 
already have in mind the interests of certain groups held together by a shared identity. At 
its most general level, the authors assign a national identity to a broad collection of 
individuals and interests; they write of Israel, the U.S., and to a lesser extent the 
Palestinians as fully formed entelechies. These very categories, however, are deeply 
contested sites of political deliberation regarding what values they wish to represent and 
the ends to which they should aspire. Mearsheimer and Walt do not escape the impulse to 
offer their own preferred ends.   
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There are those who maintain that Israel should never have been created, 
or who want to see Israel transformed from a Jewish state into a binational 
democracy. We do not.158 
 
What Walt and Mearsheimer mean when they describe Israel as a Jewish state is not 
clear. What is clear is that Jewish is privileged over binational democracy, which would 
otherwise be a troubling position for anyone who advocates democratic pluralism, even 
more so for a realist concerned with state power above all else. Does something about the 
State of Israel logically entail that its national interest be identified with the appellation 
“Jewish”? This of course depends on the range that one allows for the national interest.  
One could imagine that the State of Israel would greatly increase its strength if it 
properly utilized the powers of all of its citizens, developing loyalty based on civic virtue 
and a common national (Israeli) identity. For some reason, conceiving of Israel as a state 
of its citizens appears anathema, but the logic is not worked out in any detail, especially 
not in The Israel Lobby. The point is to make these assumptions clear, to draw attention 
to them so that we can then begin the work of theorizing the relevant politics from a more 
distanced, though never entirely objective, point of view.  
How is the national interest used as an ideological stand-in within popular 
political analysis of which Mearsheimer and Walt are prominent participants? A telling 
example can be found in the publication cited several times by the authors, the 
fortuitously titled journal, The National Interest. The journal is published by The Center 
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The authors appear to have deviated from this position in recent years though my criticisms still apply. I am 
currently working on a postscript to this chapter which does not appear in this version. The postscript 
outlines the apparent change toward acknowledging the one-state reality and the view expressed in writing 
by Mearsheimer that Israel/Palestine will undergo a process of integration and apartheid, only then to be 
followed by a binational state.  
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for the National Interest and was founded by Irving Kristol, noted Trotskyite-turned-neo-
conservative, in 1985. While it is true that Walt and Mearsheimer include neo-
conservatives in their operationalization of the “Israel Lobby”, most notably Charles 
Krauthammer, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle, they seem to have overlooked the 
ideological shell game between The National Interest, its affiliated institution The Center 
for the National Interest (started by Richard Milhous Nixon and currently listing Henry 
Kissinger as Honorary Chairman), and the term “national interest.”159  
Here you have a journal and a center, emerging at the tail-end of the Cold War 
and potentiating the popularity of neo-conservative hawks like Charles Krauthammer and 
Daniel Pipes, which attempts to define the U.S. national interest on any given issue. 
Emerging from the Reagan years, ideals like democracy promotion and neo-liberal 
reform were ubiquitous, as were concepts of balance of power and hard-lined policies 
toward the Soviet Union and its allies. These echoed earlier efforts by the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom, an anti-Communist intellectual conglomeration funded by the CIA in 
the 1950s.  
Irving Kristol, then publisher for the literary magazine Encounter, was one of the 
more prominent recipients of covert CIA funding during this era.160 Towing an anti-
Communist line, these publications were largely mute in criticizing U.S. foreign policy, 
                                                 
159 It’s also worthy to note that the Chairman of the Center for National Interest, General Charles G. Boyd, 
was the President and CEO of Business Executives for National Security (BENS) and also serves on the 
board of In-Q-Tel, the C.I.A.’s venture capital firm. Incidentally, the chairman for In-Q-Tel is current 
Arizona State University President Michael Crow, further highlighting the location of politics at the 
intersection of national security, national education (the academy), neo-liberalism and technological 
innovation.  
 
160 Joel Whitney, “Exclusive: The Paris Review, the Cold War and the CIA,” Salon May 27, 2012. 
Available at: (http://www.salon.com/2012/05/27/exclusive_the_paris_review_the_cold_war_and_the_cia/) 
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though American society was openly criticized.161 Kristol’s The National Interest is also 
notable for having published Francis Fukuyama’s essay, “The End of History?” which 
empowered both neo-liberal and neo-conservative fundamentals rooted in American 
exceptionalism. Fukuyama later walked back some of the conclusions he reached in that 
essay (history being unforgiving), and as the War in Iraq showed signs of a massive 
strategic blunder, largely rejected the neo-conservative logic that he helped to perpetuate. 
And that is exactly when the politics of The National Interest started to get 
interesting. As the short-sightedness of the Iraq War became glaringly apparent, 
Fukuyama challenged the interventionist approach of his colleague and fellow neo-
conservative at the journal, Charles Krauthammer.162 Alleging that Krauthammer and 
fellow high-level Bush administration officials were betraying neo-conservative values of 
democracy promotion for a more hawkish and amoral foreign policy, Fukuyama ignited 
an internal debate.  
The debate consequently resulted in the resignation of 10 of the 16 board 
members of the journal. Krauthammer, for his part, pondered in an editorial whether 
Fukuyama’s criticism revealed an anti-Semitic core in his thought and derided 
Fukuyama’s suggestion of applying “soft power” in response to the September 11 
attacks.163 Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington were among the dissidents who split, with 
                                                 
161 Democratic movements at the time implied socialist tendencies that had to be reduced if the neo-liberal 
world order was to succeed. The Crisis of Democracy document co-authored by Samuel Huntington and 
published by the Trilateral Commission (Zbigniew Brzezinski being a prominent affiliate) gives a clear 
picture of the emerging neo-liberal ideology that promoted “Western” management of the global economy 
alongside justification for all manner of foreign intervention. 
 
162 Francis Fukuyama, “The Neo-Conservative Moment,” The National Interest (Summer 2004). Available 
at: (http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-neoconservative-moment-811). 
163 Charles Krauthammer, “Fukuyama’s Fantasy,” Washington Post March 28, 2006. Available at: 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/27/AR2006032701298.html); Charles 
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the former starting a rival publication, The American Interest.164 It turns out that the more 
influential segments of editorial board at The National Interest could not come to an 
agreement on what neo-conservativism entailed, and more importantly, which “national 
interest” would be the focus of the publication. The irony should be clear.   
What is significant about this and similar publications is their location at the 
nexus of the academy and the government, between science and politics, in the very place 
that our point de capiton, the national interest, is subject to attempts at establishing form 
and content. It is also worth noting that the debate surrounding The National Interest was 
never one that doubted the project of American hegemony. While the means and even the 
purpose of American global hegemony may differ, the appropriateness of the project is 
unquestionable. Similarly, Mearsheimer and Walt never pose the question as to the right 
of U.S. global hegemony.  
In their conclusion, the authors advocate a U.S. policy of offshore balancing, a 
strategy which guarantees a permanent and expanding role for the U.S. military and its 
related industries in the region and beyond. If national interest is meant to signal 
something beyond mere tactics at any given point in time, if national interest is to be 
some discrete discernable thing that can guide policy, as Mearsheimer and Walt imply, 
then we are still left with few clues as to what it might be. With such a high degree of 
uncertainty, the call to minimize the strength of the so-called Israel Lobby in order to 
                                                 
Krauthammer, “Krauthammer on Fukuyama,” New York Times: Letters April 16, 2006. Available at: 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/books/review/16mail.html). 
 
164 David Glenn, “Quarrels Cause Resignations at ‘The National Interest’ and Give Rise to Plans for a Rival 
Journal,” Chronicle of Higher Education, April 15, 2005. Available at: 
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Trends; Battle Splits Conservative Magazine,” New York Times, March 13, 2005. Available at: 
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restore the U.S. national interest cannot be taken seriously. At times, the Lobby pursues 
objectives that would align with Mearsheimer and Walt’s conception of the national 
interest, and at other times, the opposite is true.  
 
American Exceptionalism and Jewish Nationalism 
 
Earlier in this chapter I had indicated that national interest, lacking consistent form or 
content, nonetheless functions as a rhetorical device that lends productive capacities to 
otherwise sterile claims. The purpose I had set forth was to describe how national interest 
functions at the hands of different actors and what that might teach us about underlying 
ideological assumptions that are implicitly at play in their analyses. Applying this aim to 
Walt and Mearsheimer’s Israel Lobby thesis, a clear picture begins to emerge.  
The concept of national interest functions as a bulwark for a vision of American 
exceptionalism, the purpose of which is to legitimate regional and global management at 
the hands of “a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively works to 
move U.S. foreign policy,” though maybe not those identified by the authors. In The 
Israel Lobby, Walt and Mearsheimer only take their analysis half-way, focusing on one 
particularly exciting network at the expense of other equally interesting, complex and 
arguably more powerful and effective networks. There is no monolithic, unified coalition 
of political actors steering policy, but rather a loose coalition based on some fundamental 
presuppositions buried in seemingly innocuous discursive networks. The economic and 
military superiority ascribed to the United States, and the actions that are prescribed in 
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the name of securing the national interest – securing it as if by right – emerges from 
networks of interested individuals and organizations within the United States whose 
power is derived from a discourse that implies, and on occasion explicitly declares, the 
right to intervene in the affairs of other national, regional, or global networks.  
To reiterate, the process of defending some privileged conception of the national 
interest is natural, and while many philosophical, ethical, and normative implications 
emerge from my critique – ones which I cannot fully develop here – it is important to 
clarify that the tendency to convoke a national interest is not inherently malicious. 
Instead, the critical point is to draw our attention to the way discursive privileges operate 
so that we can avoid the most arrogant tendencies of social science and embrace the 
radical freedom offered by the scientific method, a method that urges us to investigate 
our deeply held assumptions. The assumption that there is a national interest that is 
pursued by policymakers does not withstand the most basic load-bearing test, and so, any 
enunciation of the national interest needs to be clear as to the bounds of the nation, the 
type of interest, and inevitably, the political contestation over these very questions.  
Much of Mearsheimer and Walt’s evidence points toward the complex 
entanglements that the U.S. found itself in due to efforts by the Lobby or the Government 
of Israel. The Lebanon War in 2006, for example, weakened the Siniora government in 
Beirut – a regime which the Bush administration had up until then successfully 
empowered – and “solidified the informal alliance” between Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah. 
This, in turn, “complicat[ed] U.S. efforts to forge a regional consensus on Iraq and 
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Iran.”165 The reader must assume that these efforts are otherwise reasonable, rational, 
practical and have a high likelihood of success. What policy could be more propitious 
than one aimed at forging a regional alliance in the Middle East, or anywhere else for that 
matter?  
When the U.S. lost the war in Vietnam, blame was cast at the media, at the 
surrounding countries sucked into the vortex and “complicating U.S. efforts,” at the 
Russians and the Chinese, and at the American public that failed to show resolve. If not 
for these subversive elements, the U.S. would have won the war. Following the dictates 
of American exceptionalism, credit is taken when a policy is deemed successful; 
exculpation and estrangement is performed when a policy is deemed a failure. Any U.S. 
policy failure must be attributed to some aberration, sometimes under the label of an 
administration, and sometimes under more particular and complex networks. This works 
to shield the state, as a concept and as a network, from any criticism. It works to 
strengthen the notion, never well founded in all of history, that the state is the 
culmination of a community of interests. It is Rousseau (though he was too idealistic), it 
is Machiavelli (though he was too honest), it is Hobbes (though he was too bullish).  
The same unity that Mearsheimer and Walt convoke when describing the U.S. 
national interest (unity in the State though not in civil society) is the unity – in an 
inverted form – that the authors deny to Israel-Palestine (unity in civil society though not 
in the State). Put another way, Mearsheimer and Walt’s dismissal of a bi-national state – 
one that would more accurately reflect the body politic in the State of Israel and de facto 
exists at this moment – denies not only a possible unity of the two polities (Israel and the 
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Occupied Territories) under a pluralist democratic state, but also threatens to constrain 
Palestinian-Arab-Israelis in the public sphere and government within the Green Line.  
It is little wonder that as the Government of Israel continues its separation policy, 
the treatment of Palestinians becomes more brutal, and society itself becomes coarser. 
Domestically, there are signs of a growing integration of Palestinian-Arab-Israelis and 
efforts by the Government to reduce anti-Arab racism in Israel (e.g., Or Commission, 
current President Reuven Rivlin’s anti-racism campaign). Israeli society still has 
considerable work to do regarding the tortured history with the Palestinians and the 
groundswell of racial prejudice that continues to exercise considerable force in the 
conflict, both within and outside of the Green Line. It should go without saying that 
Palestinian society too will need to overcome bitter resentments that eliminate the most 
productive paths toward reconciliation.  
In short, at the level of society, strategies toward recognition should be explored 
and developed rather than closed off. Not the recognition of state-making and legal 
coercions, but a recognition at the level of social encounter, beginning with the so-called 
elite institutions, primary among them the academy. In the context of a discourse of 
national security and terrorism, these considerations are effectively banned. The 
likelihood that these strategies are pursued is no higher than any other presently predicted 
paths and there is reasonable pessimism regarding their plausibility. That said, this idea 
should not be mistaken for utopianism or naïve optimism. The case of post-apartheid 
South Africa, if it is to be invoked at all, should be invoked in the name of truth and 
reconciliation (a process of recognition), however partial and on-going that process may 
be.  
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Israel is a polity with an identity problem. The problem is not an inability to 
balance the various identities, but rather, an inability to slough off their most divisive 
inscriptions in law and in the public mind. Recent efforts by the Netanyahu 
administration to inscribe a hegemonic identity to the state in the domestic realm (i.e., the 
Jewish nationalism bill whose proposal dismantled the current government) and in the 
international realm (i.e., the demand for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish State 
whose proposal dismantled the most recent peace efforts) appear in-line with 
Mearsheimer and Walt’s thinking on the conflict. But the success of such an approach is 
by no means guaranteed and its ethical implications should give us pause.  
Recall that in South Africa, apartheid did not end with two new culturally 
homogenous states; it ended with a single state that continues to work toward eliminating 
old barriers rooted in identity. It is similarly telling how soon we forget the American 
Civil War. In that conflict, the U.S. reconstituted itself along new, more inclusive lines, 
largely by (partially) eliminating the inscription of divisive identity in law. We have yet 
to remove these inscriptions from our minds and from our various institutions (witness 
the “Ferguson” unrest). Whether the Israel-Palestine conflict – rooted in religious, ethnic, 
and historical cleavages – is able to overcome barriers to (re)cognition is an open 
question and its success depends in part on gathering allies at the level of policymaking 
elites and civil society. 
Taxonomies of identity developed for the purpose of control and management are 
inherently unstable in the long term. Changes in political, social, economic, and personal 
relations within and among states are the most stunning and consistent features of modern 
political history. The changes are always met with legal-statist counterforces – sometimes 
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in the form of barriers, bullets and bombs – but their prevalence is difficult to ignore. In 
many cases, changes to social structures are preceded by shifting attitudes regarding the 
logic of hierarchical structures based on identity (and often, shifting attitudes regarding 
the necessity of identities as well). It is a wonder, then, why efforts at establishing 
difference for the sake of management and control continue to pervade our political 
landscape. The statist perspective, based as it is on establishing difference, is never quite 
able to defend the criteria on which to determine difference and identity. The 
“commonsense” rejection of the bi-national approach by Mearsheimer and Walt is a clear 
example of an uncritical reproduction of difference and all its attendant violence. 
The greatest risk to a society is the potential for identities to calcify such that a 
new forms of (re)cognition – the process by which subjects negotiate shared 
understanding – require more force, and often times, violence. Without addressing the 
uncritical reproduction of identity, the conflict between the warring factions will likely 
continue, either within the same borders (Israel proper), in neighboring states (Israel and 
Palestine), or in a greater Israel. We are back to first philosophy and the responsibility to 
open broader avenues of (re)cognition for the purpose of eliminating what Levinas 
termed “ontological violence.” 
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PART THREE: THE MILITARY-SECURITY NETWORK 
Chapter Five: War Machine, National Identity, and Recognition 
 
Without agreement on the formal structure or substantive content of the national 
interest, any attempts at securing recognition between supposed national groups will 
result in not a little failure, whether at the margins or through the marginalization of 
particular interests. In the context of Israel, the manifold identities and their geographic 
overlap further point to the significant problems in the Jewish State recognition 
discourse. By what force might the relevant political identities in the conflict (i.e., Jewish, 
Palestinian) and the subsequent hierarchy of rights in the state be determined? 
Gilles Deleuze and Guattari’s essay “Treatise on Nomadology – The War 
Machine” provides a useful vantage point from which to view the relationship between 
the concepts of identity, violence, and the state. The piece broke with the classic 
articulations of the state as either (1) a unitary actor identified by its monopoly on 
violence or (2) an institution that binds and represents a sovereign communal identity and 
works to form a “milieu of interiority.”166 Rather than take the notions of “interiority” 
and sovereignty as self-evident characteristic of the state, Deleuze and Guattari trouble 
the very notion of interior/exterior with the introduction of the peripatetic force of the 
“war machine.” By introducing the concept of the war machine as a go-between or “in-
between,” Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate the way in which the two poles of the state – 
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sovereign power and identity – are entangled in a perpetual relationship with a circuit of 
violence. Their insights allow me to address how this circuit of violence – the war 
machine – troubles those attempts to define or have Israel recognized as a Jewish State. 
By decentering the force that helps determine the relevant political identities in the 
conflict (i.e., Jewish, Palestinian) and the subsequent hierarchy of rights, we can begin to 
understand the misapprehension that allows the recognition discourse to appear rational, 
plausible, and central to resolving the conflict.  
At stake is the mythic conception of a sovereign national identity that would have 
to hold in order for the discussion on recognition to maintain conceptual, political, and 
ethical rigor.167 As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, academic productions on the 
national interest provide little in the way of securing a non-contradictory and stable 
conception of the national identity and interest.  
As Deleuze and Guattari describe it, the State is a type of force or logic that has as 
its project the establishment and consecration of sovereignty. Sovereignty here should be 
read as broadly construed, including everything from the inscription and division in 
territory, the definition and consecration of identity, the creation and annunciation of 
sovereign language, the direction and practices of the Sciences, and the reception and 
translation of the sovereign word of God. However, as the world is not given to us ready-
made, fully prepared and properly divided, the State is burdened with a project that it 
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might not be able to carry out to final completion. In order to create a sovereign space, 
not a little ground clearing has to take place. As such, the State’s work toward striating 
space relies on forces that create new, smooth, open space for the state to re-territorialize. 
These forces are an opposing tendency to that of the State but are at the same time 
necessary for the State project. Without these forces (i.e., the War Machine), nation-
building and state-making would be rendered mute and ineffective.  
Resembling Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida’s investigations into the 
“Force of Law,” Deleuze and Guattari argue that “the war machine in itself…seems to be 
irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law.”168 
And yet, the war machine proves to be both a project and retainer of the state – a project 
insofar as it has the quality of “in-the-making-ness” and projects outward; a retainer 
insofar as it helps to bind, enclose, capture, package and keep in reserve services 
rendered to the state. The war machine is necessary for the state to form its sovereign 
claims. 
The war machine should not be confused with the military. Understanding the war 
machine as tethered to but differentiated from both state and military is useful because it 
allows us to more carefully observe how these networks function. More exactly, it allows 
us to observe the practices of legitimation that are taken at every step along the 
production line of the modern State. Both state and military are institutions whose 
ostensible purpose is securing the national interest; their very legitimacy as institutions 
hangs on this project. Typically, the military is thought to take orders from the state for 
the purpose of securing the national interest defined by the state. As we saw in the last 
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chapter, political scientists can say plenty on what the national interest might mean but 
nothing they say appears decisive, especially once we realize the minute practices and 
detailed chains of relation that go into producing the national interest. Any declarative, 
constative statement either from State or the Academy following the form “the national 
interest is X” quickly leads to any number of squabbles with competing conceptions 
offered by other agents. And yet, the term is functional.  
The national interest helps to secure the preferences of some networks or affinity 
groups over that of others. It establishes hierarchies of interests and rights and attempts to 
consecrate these structures through a performance that would lend legitimacy to these 
conceptions. The war machine – whether appropriated by the military or the state – does 
not have the protection of the national interest or of the people (civil society) as its 
motivating principle. Its tendency is toward de-territorialization and itineracy; its 
structure – insofar as speaking of structure is meaningful in this context – is 
rhizomatic.169 And yet, the practices of the war machine rally or else leave in their wake 
effects which condition or construct discourses of the “national interest” and identity 
from which a privileged metanarrative emerges.  
The “national interest” that emerges does so through the play of power over 
discourses which works to accentuate certain features, ideas, or connection while 
marginalizing or neglecting others. The play of power can be traced, in part, through 
concentrated centers of political power and discursive nodes, understanding all the while 
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that these traces are inherently as unstable as the centers and nodes themselves.170 
Tracing the operations of power through these networks can nonetheless bring into relief 
underlying ideological and political positionings that condition the structure and the 
subsequent ethical justifications that follow from it.  We have already addressed two of 
these networks – the State Department/diplomatic network and the academic/intellectual 
network. Now, we turn to the military/security network. We will begin to realize that the 
military network itself is no longer, and in many ways never was, strictly a property – and 
here I mean both property-as-ownership and property-as-characteristic – of the State.  
 
The State of the War Machine 
 
The State of Israel, like many national movements who have achieved broad recognition 
of their de jure and de facto statehood, owes its existence in large part to pre-state armed 
bands who coordinated strategies and enacted tactics of violence against their intended 
targets. These armed bands did not yet have the legitimacy of the state form; they could 
hardly be said to have established a metaphorical social contract let alone a codified set 
of institutional rules in the form of basic/common laws or a constitution. Refusing to 
legitimate contemporary social and political institutions, they actively worked to subvert 
the status quo and establish a new institutionalized order. The Haganah, Palmach, the 
Irgun, and Lehi were all nomad war machines, denying the legitimacy and status of the 
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existing political topography, recognizing neither the British Mandate power nor the 
traditional clans and elite Arab networks within which they operated. They operated 
covertly, outside of the law, and without regard to the previously consecrated territorial 
claims and their attendant powers. The Yishuv, alongside the traditional Arab political 
networks, were establishing their own spaces between those spaces constructed by the 
British. As Benny Morris described it: 
As they developed, Jews and Arabs bred their own social, economic, and political 
structures, with British officialdom becoming increasingly irrelevant to the 
internal dynamics of each community – a process that helped lead eventually to 
the withdrawal of the British and the partition of the country between Jews and 
Arabs.171 
 
These forces had two primary tasks to complete before they could claim to hold 
legitimated sovereignty in its state form.  
The first task facing the nomad bands was demonstrating their power to sanction 
human actions in their territorial holdings. The Arab riots of 1929 revealed the inability 
of British forces to adequately protect Jews in the Yishuv and precipitated a restructuring 
of the Jewish defense organizations; first the Haganah and later Irgun.172 These forces 
remained largely decentralized and refused to be integrated into the British Mandate 
forces in the style of earlier “Jewish battalions” within the British Army during the First 
World War. Whether operating as local defense units or later as terrorist organizations 
that cut through enemy lines, these groups were vying for the privilege to establish their 
preferred social, political, and territorial space. As Weber would describe it, they had to 
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hold a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within their given territory. 
Whether against the local Arab population (at times with tacit British approval), or later, 
against British interests themselves, these Jewish paramilitaries sought to regulate 
peoples within a territory.173  
The second primary task of these paramilitary forces was to create some unifying 
identity that would legitimate the control – by force or by law, though the distinction is 
never quite clear – over the land by these people over attempts to control the land by 
some other people. In short, they would have to establish a nation. Almost without 
exception, national belongings must point to some origin in order to legitimate sovereign 
right. Whether we look to Plato’s myth of the metals, Rousseau’s Civic religion, or 
Hobbes’ Leviathan, some real and unifying identity is sought in order to bind members of 
a community to one another and to differentiate them from those on the other side. Even 
though these notions of a nation of peoples are often described in terms of calculated 
necessity – necessary for the proper functioning of a coordinated community of 
individuals – rather than as observable and self-evident fact, they nonetheless take on a 
real dimension insofar as members of a community adopt them into their beliefs and 
practices. As Nadav Shelef explains, nationalism is “sticky,” and “while scholars should 
recognize the constructed character of any particular nationalism, they should still treat 
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nationalism ‘as if’ it was primordial.”174 Whether through archeology, anthropology, 
genealogy, history, or theology, and often through combination of one or more of these 
epistemological communities, some root or grounding is sought.  
At stake is the legitimacy that would allow the State to justify its being to others. 
Recall that the discourse on recognition in its liberal register depends upon some stable 
identity. As I argue in the introductory chapter of the dissertation, this stable identity is 
not ontologically grounded but can nonetheless carve out and defend a space through 
performative acts. While we can point to national or ethnic groups through their 
superficial markings either as phenotypical characteristics or as cultural productions that 
include styles of architecture, dress, language, and so on, we cannot demonstrate their 
onto-theological beingness or universal grounding. It is for this reason that national 
symbols, identities, and performances undergo noticeable changes over time. In the case 
of Israel, we could once again point to Shelef’s observation that three strands of the 
Jewish national movement – the Labor Zionist, the Religious Zionist, and the Revisionist 
Zionist – all underwent important changes in their territorial claims regarding what 
constituted the Land or State of Israel as well as their views on Jewishness and its ability 
to legitimate a particular kind of state.   
While Weber provides us with Ideal Types of legitimacy, it is clear that these are 
intended for their functional possibilities in furthering theory and not as representations 
of some true state of reality or state of affairs. After all, the history of politics is marked 
by some very basic similarities (large scale violent conflict, disparities and hierarchies of 
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rights, and so on) but more instructively by major and persistent shifts in political logic. 
New iterations and concepts emerge and previously unthought paradigms develop before 
shifting or melting away. In short, the inclusion of legitimate in Weber’s definition of 
sovereignty introduces a complicated ideational element into a definition that is most 
often championed for its simplicity: the sovereign is that which can kill and get away 
with it.  
 
“Facts on the Ground”  
 
The first primary task of an armed band looking to establish legitimacy in its state form is 
to do it through practice, or to borrow the phrase used in Israeli diplomacy, to create 
“facts on the ground.” The war machine – whether in its institutional manifestation as 
military or state, or in its discursive operation – is the force that breaks down existing 
structures. The Jewish paramilitaries had to break existing sovereign structures (e.g., the 
British Mandate, Palestinian Arab networks, traditional European-Jewish culture) in 
order to build anew. They proved their ability to create certain facts on the ground by 
monopolizing violence in a given territory and they worked toward creating an identity 
that might unify and ground a privileged national community. 
The identity, however, could never become whole unto itself. The presence of the 
Palestinian other could not be reconciled with the Jewish attempts at reterritorialization. 
While these pre-State bands and their successor IDF could attempt to forcibly remove the 
internal others, or at times eradicate them, they could never complete the task without 
undermining their own legitimacy. They could never quite get away with it. Whether in a 
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transfer policy or in the re-naming of towns, villages, or archeological sites, the actions 
that seek to create homogenous and pure demarcated space are always faced with 
counterforces. In addition to the obvious “Palestinian Question”175 there remained 
disagreements over who is properly Jewish and the rights, duties and behaviors that are 
entailed in holding that identity. The Irgun, Haganah, and Lehi and the different Zionist 
Socialist and Revisionist Zionist factions had substantial disagreements over the character 
of the people and the state. Could the war machine ever be brought under full submission 
to the state and fulfil the task of creating smooth space which could then be filled anew 
with a sovereign identity?  
Looking at present conditions provides ample justification for skepticism. The 
stage still has not been cleared of extras and the actors cannot seem to agree on which 
performance they should enact. Before giving up hope on the war machine’s capabilities, 
we should turn our attention to its idealization, raising the question of whether there is or 
is not hope for a successful production of the Jewish nation-state. In order to make this 
task manageable, I will first focus on the movement of the war machine through the 
military institution in the first two decades following Israel’s declaration of statehood. 
After this prelude, I will provide a brief intermezzo of sorts – this time focusing on the 
shifting political economy of the State of Israel – before returning to the contemporary 
movement of the war machine through the military/security networks.  
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The Jewish State, the War Machine, and the Civitas 
 
As mentioned above, the paramilitary forces in the pre-State period took to breaking 
down the existing political structures within the British Mandate of Palestine. Before 
1947, these forces could not properly ground their legitimacy in a state institution, even if 
they did have influence and connections with the state-like political bodies of the Zionist 
movement (i.e., the Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency, the Haganah, Keren Yesod, 
and the Histadrut).176 Similarly, when it came to military practice, their actions were not 
primarily aimed at protecting and maintaining borders, hunkering down or holding the 
line – actions commonly associated with a state defense force (i.e., military). Instead, 
their practices were ones of expansion, covert maneuvering, cutting paths and opening 
space, operating on an offensive strategy. Their behavior was that of a war machine, 
concerned not with the “perpetuation or conservation of organs of power”177 but rather 
with “becoming” by using “speed and secrecy,” “flows and currents that only secondarily 
allow themselves to be appropriated by the State.”178  
These early roots of a nomad-like war machine would later be weaved into the 
IDF but were easily discernable in the pre-state bands organized as Hashomer, Palmach, 
Lehi, and Irgun. These were distinct organizations (though some close affiliations existed 
between them) with their own unique ideologies and visions for the future of the Jewish 
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people and for their State-in-the-making. With each new land grab, new possibilities of 
the nation emerged along with new paths of legitimation. At times, the various pre-State 
and early state forces competed with one another, collaborating with the British Mandate 
against their fellow Zionists. As Morris explains, during the Second World War: 
The Haganah declared an “open season” (referred to in Zionist historiography as 
the “Saison,” meaning hunting season) against IZL, and Haganah intelligence and 
Palmah [sic] teams tracked down IZL members, confiscated their weapons, 
interrogated and beat them, and occasionally handed them over to the British 
police.179  
 
At the same time, these groups found ways of achieving and creating legitimation for 
new conceptions of the Jewish nation that would soon have its very own State.180 We 
cannot speak of a proper national interest that determined those practices meant to secure 
it at this time. Instead, the content of the national interest was constructed through the 
very process of securitizing strategies and practices. 
As we move into the early state period, the relationship between the military and 
the State takes on a different character than that of the armed bands of the pre-State 
period. With defense and border maintenance now appearing as a central task, the need 
for a single centralized military institution capable of monopolizing violence and 
displaying command and control capabilities became apparent. The process of integrating 
the military bands into a single force was undertaken with not a little political rancor. One 
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event even became the stuff of legends in Israeli history – the decision by Ben-Gurion to 
attack the Altalena. The ship, belonging to the Irgun (IZL) paramilitary forces, carried a 
stockpile of weapons intended for distribution to its fighters and refused to surrender their 
cargo to the Haganah. On Ben-Gurion’s orders, the newly minted IDF fired artillery 
shells at the vessel, sinking it just off the coast of southern Tel Aviv. The rebellion had 
been subdued, and the IDF became an integrated state military.181 Today, you can find a 
plaque commemorating (or else mourning) the event on the tayelet (boardwalk) in Tel 
Aviv, not far from the IZL (Irgun) museum dedicated to the Revisionist Zionist military 
forces of the pre-State period.  
With the creation of a state military, the war machine – properly understood as a 
force shuttling between violence/law and identity – maintained much of its prior function 
and freedom. Expansion, circumvention, boundary-breaking and the opening of space 
were its driving tendency. Whether in seizing new territory (often in contravention of 
orders from the political or military establishment) or in claiming new social space as part 
and parcel of the national military project, the war machine expanded its scope and 
explored new sites.  
This force or tendency is easily discernable when one explores a series of 
important events that are well-known to Israeli historians and the general public, even if 
their centrality to Israeli politics are marginalized or suppressed in the standard historical 
narrative. Soon after the creation of the state military, secret units and covert operations 
were established. These forces (Mossad – The Institute for Intelligence and Special 
Operations, Shin Bet – The General Security Services, Unit 101, Sayeret Matkal – 
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General Staff Reconnaissance) would later capture the imagination of people around the 
world and would become the pride of many Israelis. All would become involved in 
practices that broke with conventions and at times, with the law.  
We can take as an example the now-disbanded “Unit 101.” David Ben-Gurion, 
who in the 1950s was the de facto commander-in-chief, defense minister, head of state, 
and founding father of the State of Israel, helped to kick-start the career of a man who 
would become one of Israel’s more notable (and infamous) leaders. Along with 
Mordechai Makleff and Moshe Dayan, the three created Unit 101 – a covert outfit that 
would plan and execute cross-border retaliatory raids into Jordanian territory, attacking 
suspected Palestinian irregular forces, Arab Legion fighters, and not a few civilians.182 As 
is the case with covert forces, the existence of Unit 101 was initially denied by the Israeli 
government. It found itself exposed to international scrutiny after an operation in the 
village of Qibya – dubbed the Qibya massacre – left some 40 unarmed villagers dead.  
Hand-picked by Ben-Gurion to head Unit 101 was a young soldier known for his 
brash personality and messianic-like dedication to Israel’s armed forces. The soldier, 
Ariel “Arik” Scheinerman, would throughout his career find himself at the center of 
disciplinary sanctions for insubordination, conduct that contravened international law, 
and actions that at times bordered on war crimes. He would acquire nicknames like 
“Father of the Settlements” and “the Butcher of Beirut” as well as more distinguished 
titles like “Prime Minister of the State of Israel.” He was most widely known by his 
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Hebraized name, Ariel “Arik” Sharon.183 We will return to some of his more 
consequential actions shortly. 
It is important to emphasize here that Sharon was not exceptional in breaking with 
the chain of command and establishing new facts on the ground that would have 
significant ramifications. As I argue in this chapter, the war machine tendency to resist 
the State (including “its own”) and establish new realities through “speed and secrecy” is 
preserved (though not contained) within the military and state institutions. The war 
machine is a tendency, not an assemblage, even if it is most easily apprehended in the 
form of roving armed bands who slice through frontlines and blast through barricades or 
as a state military, as the case may be.  
Moreover, we would be mistaken if we restricted our analysis of the war machine 
to strictly military units or the military in general. While most of this chapter isolates the 
military-security networks for analysis, the war machine does not submit to 
categorization imposed from above.184 Take for example Gush Emunim and the settler 
movement that has only expanded and extended its power in recent years. Following the 
capture of the West Bank in 1967, the settlement movement emerged as a force neither 
sanctioned nor controlled by the state.185 Whether in staking out hilltops to turn into 
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future settlements, or undertaking so-called “price-tag” attacks against Palestinian 
civilians, or in the duplicitous “temporary visit” to Hebron that would later achieve the 
status of a government-approved settlement, the settler movement and the radical hill-top 
youth are a war machine par excellence. Breaking with state rules, then establishing new 
facts on the ground that are subsequently ratified by the state, these forces at once 
develop a new conception of the state (i.e., a new territorialization) while at the same 
time opening the state to a number of attacks from without and within.186  
After the June 1967 War, when Israel captured, held, and then occupied East 
Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank, the compass of military actions was drastically 
extended. The state more than doubled in size and the responsibilities of the IDF grew 
accordingly. It is no wonder, then, that a whole literature on Israel’s civil-military 
relations began to develop in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Concerned with the apparent 
boundary-less operations of the IDF and the hazy line between military and state, many 
began to wonder whether Israel could maintain its democratic attributes alongside its 
newly acquired territories. Much of the early works by scholars like Amos Perlmutter, 
Moshe Lissak, and Baruch Kimmerling, and later works by Uri Ben-Eliezer, Yehuda 
Ben-Meir, Oren Barak, and Gabriel Sheffer focus on both the institutional and 
sociological characteristics of Israel’s unique form of militarism.187 Debates over whether 
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Israel is a “nation-at-arms,” a “garrison state,” or a “praetorian state” are important and 
interesting, but here I focus instead on what I view as a consistent oversight among these 
works.  
The literature on Israel’s military-civil relations demonstrates the military’s 
tendency for breaking the state – its territory or borders in particular as well as its policy 
– while at the same time helping to ground the state’s legitimacy. With the exception of 
Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer188 and Rafael Ben-Eliezer, however, the recognition of 
the co-constitutive nature of the state, military, and civil sectors does not lead to further 
theorizing. How, for example, does the military construct the concept of “national 
interest” that it is ostensibly tasked with protecting? If the military has a dominant role in 
constructing the “national interest,” then how can the state maintain sovereignty over its 
defining features – the ability to make the definitive decisions on violence and identity? 
And if the state cannot claim to hold this monopoly, then how does it legitimize its 
relation to the civil society, to the body politic, to the people who are thought to belong – 
in a deeply rooted way – to the state? It is critical to remember in all of this that the 
question is not whether the state becomes “praetorian,” a “nation-in-arms,” a “military 
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with a state,” or a junta. Instead, the very separability of the state, the military, and civil 
society – and the way these three sectors relate – is called into question.  
Curiously enough, most writers in the genre of Israel civil-military relations 
acknowledge the fact that oftentimes, major changes occurred not by the planning of 
political elites who then used the military to enact their policies, nor even by the military 
high command enacting strategies that are then carried out by subordinates. In several 
crucial instances, the military operated less as an arm of the state or as a single body and 
more as a wild force whose actions caught the leadership by surprise. A list, by no means 
exhaustive, and truncated in the interest of space and the reader’s patience, might include: 
• Ben-Gurion’s underhanded machinations during the short-lived Sharett 
administration.  
• The creation of Unit 101 with its cross-border incursions and targeting of 
civilians.  
• The disastrous Lavon affair in the early state period.  
• Ariel Sharon’s decision to charge through the Suez and occupy the Sinai during 
the June 67 War against the orders of his superiors.  
• The same Ariel Sharon’s decision to draw the Egyptian military into a firefight in 
the Sinai during the October 1973 war.  
• Dayan and Rabin’s decision to take the West Bank during that same war without 
the approval of Prime Minister Eshkol.  
• Ariel Sharon’s manipulation of Menachem Begin in 1982, when his proposed 
limited incursion into Lebanon became in practice a charge through to Beirut.  
• The Dotan affair.189  
All of these events proceeded outside of the normal chain of command and without 
approval of either higher command or the political leadership of the state.190 They left in 
their wake some of the more consequential outcomes that have come to define Israel’s 
                                                 
189 Maman et al, Military, State and Society in Israel, 386-387; Tyler, Fortress Israel. 
 
190 Sheffer and Barak, Israel’s Security Networks, 90-93. 
  189 
politics; the occupation of the territories, the bitter rivalries with Israel’s neighbors in the 
region, and the dominance of military affairs in public and political life. 
The history of Israel demonstrates how the trajectory of the war machine – 
working through the State and through the military – worked to create the conditions 
rallied for the performance of the national interest. Against the view that the national 
interest is a direct reflection of the interests of the people, civil society, or state, the war 
machine demonstrates the national interest as at best tangential related to the raison 
d’état. Delinking the state from policy also works to challenge social contract theories 
that would draw a direct connection between the sovereign action of the state and civil 
society for whose interest these actions are undertaken. Not only were the most decisive 
actions in Israel not subordinate to the State, they also were not reflecting civil society at 
large, amplifying the conflict and strengthening the more radical elements of both Israeli 
and Palestinian society.  
In addition to the Palestinians exclusion from the national project of the State of 
Israel, the Jewish communities themselves could not agree on what the national interest 
would entail. As the war machine began to extend its purview into emerging political-
economic models that began to guide state policymaking in the 1980s, it precipitated a 
further detachment. The operations of the war machine in the early state period 
demonstrate the dubious connection between state sovereignty and the military institution 
as well as the taken-for-granted unity and chain of command ascribed to the military. The 
current epoch of neo-liberal governance takes the relation one step further, revealing how 
the “war machine” exceeds the military and state to such a degree as to make its 
legitimation claims – the military protection of the people – difficult to accept.  
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Interruptio: “The Life of the Nomad is the Intermezzo” 
 
Before there was a market in Israel, there was an economy subsidized by foreign aid, 
fundraising, and international loans.191 The dominant early state-like institutions in 
charge of the economy and production in the Yishuv – the Jewish National Fund (JNF) 
and the Histadrut – consciously created an economy based in an ideology of ethno-
national socialism.192 Using this model, the Yishuv could guarantee labor for new Jewish 
emigres, slowly increasing the absorption capacity of the state by creating new 
settlements and townships, side-stepping any need to integrate with the Palestinian others 
who had already established their own social, political, and economic networks under 
Ottoman and then British rule.  
Following the occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, the state re-
oriented its economic model in line with new realities. Israel as an occupying power had 
a new responsibility; namely, to govern the Palestinians who since 1948 were under 
Egyptian and Jordanian rule in Gaza and the West Bank, respectively. The complex 
history of Israel’s governance of the territories is too dense to recount here, but in 
general, the doubling of both territory and population following 1967 potentiated a new 
economic model that included integration of the Palestinian population. Israel chose to 
integrate the labor markets of Israel Proper and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in at 
least three ways: 
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First, by creating a common market between Israel and its newly acquired 
territories, where Israel alone would set price controls, tariffs, a permit regime 
that would dictate labor conditions and movement as well as land-use and 
building provisions, licensing, etc. Some of these decision-making powers and 
procedures were determined unilaterally by the Government of Israel as Military 
Orders (MO) executed through the Defense Ministry’s Coordinator of 
Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). Others, especially in later 
years, were a result of negotiations with the PLO, especially the Paris Protocol of 
1994.  
 
Second, by extending a common currency into the Occupied Territories (the 
Shekel - NIS) that would allow Israel to tie itself to a larger consumer base. This 
worked to increase circulation of the shekel and strengthen the currency.193 This 
also proved valuable once the PLO and later the PA gained international 
recognition. Following recognition, the PA would begin to receive foreign aid 
and, as the now outsourced occupation194 appeared to be the new status quo, NGO 
funding. Both would necessarily run through the Central Bank of Israel, which 
would result in additional economic benefits as well as Israeli control over 
Palestinian resources.195  
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Third, by creating a common labor force. The notion of a common labor force, 
however, needs to be amended: as an economy that was still driven by an 
ideology rooted in ethno-nationalism, part of the labor force (i.e., the Palestinians) 
contributed to the common projects, paid payroll taxes, and were subject to social 
security withdrawals from their paychecks all while receiving none of the 
traditional rights granted to workers. Pensions, access to social services, and 
labour bargaining power were reserved for the Israeli workers only. 
 
By the time we enter the 1990s, we witness another shift, brought about by the 
wave of one million Former Soviet Union (FSU) Jews into Israel as well as a new 
security situation following the First Intifada (1987) and continuing into the Oslo years. 
The dominant economic arrangements in the state were now neither ethno-national 
socialist nor market-oriented in character, but increasingly neo-liberal.196 With these new 
economic arrangements came new governing practices that altered the relationship 
between the military/security network, the state, and its people. Not only were the state 
and its people increasingly alienated from the military/security networks, but the 
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Palestinians under occupation figured as a new kind of subject best described by Judith 
Butler as “precarious life.”197 
The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, once an important part of Israel’s 
market and labor force, now largely related to the state in one of two ways:  
(1) As a captive market of consumers.198  
(2) As a captive population of threatening individuals who could (and must) be 
punished collectively at the will of the State. 
The State of Israel’s relation to the Palestinian subjects was not dissimilar from its 
relation to the Occupied Territories. Much in the same way that the actions of the State of 
Israel valued the land but not the people who inhabited it, they valued (though less so) the 
subjects in the OPT but not the Palestinian identity they inhabited. They recognized them 
as something other than a subject deserving of “equal standing.” 
Against the practice of recognition there now stood two substantial barriers. The 
Palestinians could now be excluded by economic detachment from the previously 
integrated Greater Israel and could be viewed as dividuals – abstract subjects defined by 
their potential threat as “terrorists,” “enemy,” or worse. The abstraction was achieved 
through transformations instantiated by a force not enclosed within the State; by the war 
machine.  
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The Wake of the War Machine 
 
Early in their essay on the War Machine, Deleuze and Guattari pivot from speaking of the 
relation between the State and the War Machine in terms of functionality, roles, poles, 
and striation of physical space to the relation between the State and the War Machine in 
terms of thought, the sciences, and imaginary space. Introducing the concept of noology, 
the authors develop a critique of that sovereign voice, language, image or identity 
contained and crafted by the State in order for it to (per)form an interior.199 Deleuze and 
Guattari introduce an opposition between the royal sciences and the nomadic or minor 
sciences200 as well as a sharp criticism of philosophers and great thinkers – including 
Kant and Hegel but excepting Artaud, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Kleist – whose ideas 
develop in such a way as to be mere functionaries of the state.  
Their criticism is an apt one. Kant’s Perpetual Peace, for example, maintains a 
statist project, despite important challenges that he made to State power (e.g., Contest of 
the Faculties, “Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?”).201 Hegel’s thought, 
from the Right-Hegelian tradition all the way into the Fukayamist resurgence, has also 
been appropriated (appropriately or inappropriately) for Statist purposes. In any case, 
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these thinkers sustained the notion that the State is a natural and naturalized category 
necessary for the proper functioning of collectives and societies. Against them stood 
those who “destroy images,” the “private thinkers” who reject the state projection of 
Cogitatio universalis.202 These thinkers share the qualities attributed to the War Machine.  
The War Machine has a strange relationship to thought, the state, and the military, 
especially regarding questions of identity that would help create an interior for State 
thought, language, and sovereignty. The War Machine contests the very categories 
imposed by The State, whether these categories are ones of bureaucratic or functional 
necessity, or more problematically, social and political necessity. The State, for example, 
must present some notion of citizen who is protected from the other by the sheer force 
and violence exercised by the sovereign state. However, the war machine, whose 
tendency is toward breaking the State form, cannot lend respect to the categories imposed 
by the state. For the war machine, the target is the dividual entity who is defined simply 
and only in terms of its relation to the war machine as a target, as an element that will be 
eliminated, or as one point among others along its itinerant path.   
When we turn to studying the science of the war machine, we notice this 
dividuation of characters. The military/security network develops its weapons not against 
the Palestinians as a cultural identity. The Palestinians could just as easily be the cartel 
functionaries operating in Brazil’s favelas, or Iraqi insurgents operating in Baghdad, 
paramilitary forces challenging the Phillipino army, or neo-Marxist guerillas in the 
mountains of Peru. In the projects and calculations of the war machine, it makes no 
difference what identity is ascribed to the enemy or held by the State. And this, it turns 
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out, is one reason why an entire literature on state-military and civil-military relations 
emerged following the Second World War, after once-General and then-President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower made his dire warning: “we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. 
The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist.” Deleuze 
and Guattari echo this insight in their own unique way: 
It is true that this new nomadism accompanies a worldwide war machine whose 
organization exceeds the State apparatuses and passes into energy, military-
industrial, and multinational complexes.203 
 
We have then two senses in which the State attempts to appropriate the war machine. 
First, by directing its flow and channeling its energies toward its particular projects that 
involve striation of space. Second, by attempting to thread the war machine into a 
national identity produced by the State; a national identity that would allow military 
practices to be described as “national service” or “national duty,” (i.e., as legitimate 
actions guided by the logic of security). The war machine, however, moves in the smooth 
spaces between the stakes planted by the state, flows through channels that traverse the 
state model and escape its capture.  
This presents a problem for the State insofar as it seeks to ground the war 
machine in an identity when the tendency of the war machine is toward dividuation – the 
creation of data points that need not be subsumed to the categories performed by the 
state. And yet, with the dividuation of subjects that the war machine leaves in its wake, 
the state is left in the cumbersome position of having to define difference in ways no 
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longer deemed legitimate in modern statecraft.204 As Michel Foucault explains in his 
lectures on bio-politics, the liberal State depends upon national distinction whose logical 
consequence would be a racism that would run into conflict with liberalism’s 
enlightenment principles of universal rights. The State must disavow difference while at 
the same time creating and grounding its legitimacy in the language and categories of 
identity/difference. Between its impulse for creating a distinction of self/other, 
domestic/foreign, Jewish/Palestinian and its desire to fit within the Liberal (i.e., Kantian) 
model of a democratic state205, the State of Israel is left with the task of packaging the 
effects left in the wake of the war machine in such a way as to allow the performance of a 
Jewish Democratic State to continue uninterrupted, despite its inherent theoretical 
contradiction and practical infelicity.  
The war machine, however, is not some invisible or submerged force living in a 
“shadow world.”206 Its movement through institutions is easy to identify once one 
correctly apprehends the war machine as a tendency that operates through many 
institutions – state, military, economic, and social. What this means in practical terms is 
that the war machine is observed in the practices that break the ideal of these institutions.  
Why, for example, is the military not simply the institutional manifestation of the 
war machine? To answer this question, we need to view the military as an ideal. Central 
to the idea of the military is the connection it claims to have to the people, however 
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tangential. Like conceptions of the state in the liberal and social contract registers, the 
connections between these institutions and the abstract “people” are more theoretical than 
they are practical. The connections are empirically dubious but nonetheless central to the 
performance of the State or Military as institutions rooted in the will of the people.207  
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Chapter Six: Global War Machine 
 
In the first part of this section, attention was drawn to the military/security networks that 
pre-dated the state and worked to clear space in service of the state-to-be. These same 
forces were also shown to have undermined the newly imposed territorial and operational 
boundaries established by the state in several critically important instances. This 
tendency, identified with the “war machine,” helps reveal the ways in which the military 
is not strictly a property of the state. With Israel’s transition from a socialist to a neo-
liberal economic model beginning in the late 1970s, the position of the military in 
relation to the state and its people was made doubly problematic. Now, the military not 
only had a dubious relation to the state regarding chain of command, but more 
problematically, it began to extend its purview beyond the territory of the state. The 
design, funding, construction, and distribution of military/security equipment took on an 
increasingly transnational character.208 The military/securities industries would prove to 
be highly lucrative on the global market, but its operations were increasingly directed by 
private interests. In light of this, the military/securities industries sought ways to maintain 
some tentative connection to the state and its people.  
If the operations of the military/security network traverse state boundaries and 
undermines state control, it also insists that it is not a rogue power. The military/security 
network must appeal to the notion that it serves “the people” and provides for their 
security. It cannot avoid entering into questions of identity. No longer viewed as merely a 
technical arm of the state, the military/security networks participate in the production of 
                                                 
208 Jeff Halper, War Against the People.  
  200 
identities, performing is such ways that would grant legitimacy to the actions of certain 
peoples against others. And yet, in the dialectical, peripatetic movement characteristic of 
the war machine, the military/security networks also rely upon dividualization of subjects 
that can serve as the objective inputs of their security calculation, giving the technology 
flexibility for application across a wide range of interstate and instrastate contexts.  
 
The Political Economy of Ethno-national Identity and Security 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, Israel’s economy began to undergo a shift from its traditional 
socialist or planned economy to a neo-liberal model.209 These changes occurred 
concurrently with drastic changes in the social and political culture of the state. In a 
sense, the writing was already on the wall in the economic crises of the late-1960s into 
the early-1970s, not only within Israel, but globally.210 Social movements and political 
upheavals in 1968 (in the U.S., France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, elsewhere) soon 
reverberated in Israel, with groups like the Black Panthers organizing for better treatment 
and greater representation of the Mizrahi Jews, and an increasing number of labour 
strikes challenging the central role of the State. Following the October 1973 War, civil 
society groups began to proliferate in Israel, including the rightwing settler Gush Emunim 
(Bloc of the Faithful) and the leftwing peace group Shalom Achshav (Peace Now). The 
diversity of viewpoints that were organizing outside the traditional state/party structure 
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revealed the splintering character of Israeli society and various competing conceptions of 
Israel’s national identity and interest.  
As the dominant cultural hegemony in Israel began to splinter and crack, 
economic changes further exacerbated the growing rift between the people and the state. 
Poor economic management from the 1970s into the 1980s led to high levels of inflation, 
a negative balance of payments, growing foreign debt, increasing levels of 
unemployment, and a series of budget cuts that damaged Israelis confidence in the state. 
The economic downturns revealed limits to the support that the state could offer its 
citizens. In the global political scene, this was the era that witnessed the growing neo-
liberal hegemony marked by the governments of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. 
After decades of Cold War with the Soviet Union, political leaders and private interests 
in Western Europe and the U.S. found growing salience of the rhetoric against “Big 
Government” or the “Nanny State.” As socialist policies suffered due to the resentment 
directed toward Communist regimes, privatization of previously government-owned 
industries began to trend.  
In the literature on Israel, the Mahapakh (“reversal”) of 1977 is often cited as the 
pivotal historical moment when the role of government in Israel underwent irreversible 
change. After the 1977 parliamentary elections, the Socialist hegemony that dominated 
the pre- and early-State period was smashed and the economically liberal and politically 
conservative Likud party took power. Central government control slowly receded as 
private capital began to shape the economic, social, and political landscape. The results 
were felt across the spectrum from urban centers to the periphery, in kibbutzim, 
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moshavim, and ultimately in the military. With the exception of national healthcare, 
Israel’s turn toward globalization, liberalization, and privatization was undeniable.  
The first phases of neo-liberal reform were rather unsuccessful and occurred 
during what could be described as an economic disaster in Israel. From 1977-1985, the 
selling off of Government Enterprises (including telecommunications, public works, 
chemical processing, military, and transportation companies) did not meet the high 
expectations of off-setting fiscal imbalances and generating much-needed revenue.211 
However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, government divestment from industry – 
itself only partial insofar as the government maintained a controlling or substantial share 
in the previously government-owned enterprises – started to see encouraging dividends. 
The economic growth, however, could not be attributed entirely to the new neo-liberal 
model. 
Israel’s rehabilitated economy grew in part due to large-scale migration from the 
Former Soviet Union (about 1 million over a few short years) that helped to boost 
consumption and brought in a highly skilled work force.212 In addition to providing 
economic stimulus, the influx of new migrants boosted political capital for Jewish 
nationalism, with the changing demographic/ethnic/cultural make-up of the state 
providing a buffer against the Arab “demographic” threat and leftwing reconciliationists. 
The recent dominance of the Israeli right and the growing status of Avigdor Lieberman’s 
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Yisrael Beiteinu political party in particular is strongly supported in good part by these 
recently naturalized citizens and 1st generation FSUs.  
Further complicating the story was the ability to not only expand settlements like 
Ariel – one of Israel’s largest, well-subsidized and predominantly Russian-speaking 
settlements – but also the parallel movement beginning in the early 1990s away from 
Palestinian labor which would soon amount to a full-scale separation policy between 
Israel proper and the territories it controlled beyond the Green Line. This separation, as I 
mention in Part One of this dissertation, has serious implications on the ability to reach 
recognition not only between OT Palestinians and Israelis, but between OT Palestinians 
and Israeli Arabs, and finally, between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs. But let me bracket 
this digression for now. We will return to this point in the concluding chapter of this 
dissertation.  
Government divestment of its formerly state-managed companies meant not only 
a new, liberal model for Israel’s economy, but more importantly for our present 
discussion, an increasingly global orientation. As Ben-Porat points out, “while in the past 
the Israeli economy was influenced by geopolitics and the conflict, its globalization 
means that it is now also influenced by international developments.”213  Given Israel’s 
reputation for military/security dominance and skill, it should be no surprise that 
international developments in the areas of military/security would begin to reflect an 
important push-pull relationship between Israeli economic and political projects, on the 
one hand, and the interests of global capital and global politics on the other. The War on 
Terror helped create an ever-growing demand for military/securities technologies and 
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knowledges over which Israeli companies had a distinct advantage, especially in UAVs 
(drones), electronic warfare, urban and counterterror technologies, and surveillance. As 
the military/security companies made sure to note in their advertisements and sales 
pitches, they could offer “battlefield-tested” devices to interested customers.  
 
Privatization in the Military Industries 
 
The military industries had been – up until the late 60s – owned and operated by the State 
and this remained true for the most part into the 1980s. However, beginning in the 60s, 
certain functions once dominated by the state/military (especially in R&D) began to show 
success in the private sector. Elron Electronic Industries, a large technology holding 
company, formed in 1962 and created the defense-based microchip company Elbit 
Systems by 1966. The 1960s also saw the rise of one of Israel’s first billionaires, Shaul 
Eisenberg, who began to amass his fortune as Israel’s top arms dealer (import and 
export).  His success could be attributed in part to the “Eisenberg Law,” a special 
amendment instituted in 1969 that exempted him alone from paying taxes for 30 years.214 
Eisenberg will soon reappear in this story.  
Privatization of the military industries was not only dragged along by the general 
trend within the state economy, but also, and critically, the deteriorating security situation 
and consequent development of new military and securities technologies. Information 
systems, air defense systems, border control technologies, and drone technology were all 
part of a military-tech boom. Elisra Ltd., a military electronics firm specializing in 
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missile guidance technology, signals intelligence, and communications, is a prime 
example. Founded in 1967, Elisra underwent a number of corporate acquisitions between 
private firms while Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) controlled 30% of the company 
through its subsidiary, Elsa. In 2011, IAI sold its remaining shares to Elbit Systems, the 
private firm that previously controlled 70% of Elisra.215   
Elbit Systems, which describes itself as a “world leader in improving lethality and 
survivability” in its marketing documents, is one of Israel’s top five military/security 
companies.216 Their technologies can be found in everything from F-16 fighter jets that 
are updated with sophisticated integrated imaging and communications technology to 
border security fences, UAV software, armored vehicles, and other high-end military 
technology. As Elbit points out in their marketing material, their products are “battle-
proven,” the unique designs “based on years of battlefield experience in full scale and 
low intensity conflicts,” and “based on innovative R&D performed in close cooperation 
with the Israel Air Force.”  
Direct mentions to Israel are limited in company documents available through 
their website, and while the company’s relation to the State of Israel is well-understood 
by prospective customers, there is little overt imagery of the IDF or direct connections 
made to the State of Israel. Indeed, many of the clients represent government who are 
otherwise critical of Israeli military offenses and tactics against the Palestinians. The 
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Palestinians of course, the subjects on which these products are “battle-tested,” are 
decidedly absent from tradeshow and marketing documents. Elbit, like other weapons 
companies (i.e., Lockhead Martin, Boeing, Raytheon) want their clients to feel confident 
in the effectiveness of the technology but not to bother with the particular political 
contexts from which these technologies are developed, derived, tested, and used. When 
Elbit markets its products to prospective customers from Brazil, Singapore, Chile, the 
Phillipines, and elsewhere, they often have the support of top Israeli military chiefs.217 As 
the documentary The Lab demonstrates, arms trade shows are packed with former IDF 
Staff, indicating a revolving door between military service and private sector 
employment.218 One particularly salient example is that of former Defense Minister 
turned Minister of Industry, Trade and Labour Binyamin “Fuad” Ben-Eliezer. Ben-
Eliezer makes clear the importance of Israel’s military clout in these tradeshows: 
Yotam Feldman (dir. The Lab): Why is there such a demand for Israeli weapons 
when there are many states that make weapons? 
Binyamin Ben-Eliezer: Oh, it’s very simple. It’s because we are talking about a 
state whose technology is basically among the best in the world, but not only that, 
people like to buy things that have been tested. When Israel sells weapons or 
equipment, they’ve been tested and tried out. We can say: ‘We’ve used this for 10 
years.., 15 years.., 5 years…’ so the demand is tremendous. 
Feldman: And does this experience bring economic growth [to Israel]? 
Ben-Eliezer: This brings many billions of dollars to the State of Israel. 
 
Another one of the Big 5 military/security companies developed in Israel is Rafael 
Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. Initially an arm of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, Rafael 
transitioned to a government-owned limited company in 2002, leaving behind years of 
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operating at a loss to become a highly profitable company. Rafael produces a myriad of 
land, sea, air, and space-based military and securities technologies, including weapons 
systems, anti-missile systems (i.e., the Iron Dome), C4I (Command /Control 
/Communication /Computer /Intelligence), Electronic Warfare (EW), and armor.  Rafael, 
in addition to Israel Military Industries (IMI), also produce cluster bombs whose use are 
otherwise proscribed by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, to which Israel is not a 
signatory.219  
According to Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Israel’s Ministry of Finance is 
pushing for further privatization of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) as well as Rafael, 
following the model pursued in the piecemeal privatization of the Israel Military 
Industries small arms division Magen, its Aircraft Systems Division (to an Elbit 
subsidiary), and Israel Shipyard that had proved highly profitable.220 According to the 
report, “[The Ministry of] Finance is hopeful that offering 25%-49% of each [Rafael and 
IAI] would deliver $4-5.4 billion in a few years.” Currently, Rafael sales amount to about 
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$2 billion per year with some 70 percent of sales comprised of exported products (i.e., not 
for the domestic market or the immediate “national security” of Israel). 
IMI, the other target of privatization, is slated to privatize all but its heavy jet 
propulsion systems and a few classified programs that will be managed by the Ministry of 
Defense under a new company called Tomer.221 IMI is Israel’s oldest arms company, pre-
dating the creation of the state (1933), and while it has run at a loss for several decades, 
negotiations and actions toward privatization have been ongoing since at least 2011.222 At 
the time of this writing, the Government Corporations Authority has recommended that 
the privatization of IMI proceed despite their being only one bidder; Elbit Systems. The 
current Minister of Finance Moshe Kahlon intimated that he will not approve the deal 
unless healthy competition can be ensured, preferring a government monopoly to a 
private monopoly.223  
With IMI being sold to Elbit, practically all of Israel’s top 5 military/security 
industry companies (with the exception of IAI for now) will be owned privately, with the 
exception of a few R&D labs which the government will maintain as proprietary 
holdings. As former Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz explained in 2005, “At the end of 
the process, everything in the industry will be in private hands except the national 
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infrastructures and national laboratories, which will always remain government-
controlled."224 If Elbit acquires practically all of IMI, this concentration of 
military/security technologies in private companies is rather stunning, though it reflects in 
many ways the U.S. Military-Industrial Complex dominated by Lockheed Martin, 
Boeing, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman, themselves the results of 
a long chain of acquisitions representing a concentration of the industry over the last 
several decades. Altogether, these top Israeli firms constitute over $7 billion in sales per 
year at last estimate, and their market share appears to be expanding.225 The rate of 
growth in the last decade is stunning. Between 2005 and 2012, Israel weapons sales shot 
up from $3.5 billion to around $7.5 billion per year before receding back to around $5.6 
billion in 2014, likely due to cuts in domestic military spending and a difficult 
international market.226  
The expanding market for these technologies and their growing independence 
from forms of organization that are thought to provide some measure of checks and 
balances or democratic input (i.e., the State, the Military, Civil Society) reveals two 
points that we should pause and consider carefully. First, if the military/security networks 
are no longer a property of the State nor of the People, then they pose a potential threat to 
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those institutions and their democratic appurtenances. This is especially troubling when 
the economic incentives outpace the political and social controls that would work to 
channel and guide these networks. Second, as Jeff Halper’s War Against the People 
convincingly demonstrates, these networks portend a future of global surveillance and 
control aimed at disciplining and ensnaring every individual.  
We should nonetheless be careful not to misapprehend the tendency of the war 
machine as necessarily and in all cases a dangerous development. Indeed, the tendency is 
not likely to be eliminated but that does not preempt the growing need for awareness of 
the tendency. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the view of politics as 
centered in hegemonic sovereign institutions is one means of controlling political 
possibilities. Instead, we may expand the scope of politics toward the view of 
establishing some measure of democratic controls over those networks within which 
political ideologies are sanctified and concretized. At the very least, the tendency 
displayed through the war machine demands attention at the level of political analysis. 
Only when we apprehend the work done by and through networks can we begin to 
theorize the ethical implications of our modern politics and begin the project of opening 
spaces for the free exercise of recognitive practices. 
 
Whither the War Machine 
 
How do the military/securities industries maintain their tentative connection to the state 
as they transitioned from a state-run model to a transnational privatized network? Recall 
that the state is generally thought to have two primary functions: the sovereign decision 
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on violence (sovereign power/law) and the capture of individuals into a national 
collective, identity, and interest. The war machine, as mentioned earlier, could be viewed 
as a tendency that runs between these two poles of the state. The war machine is 
necessary for the state to exercise sovereign violence, even if at times it works to 
undermine the states attempt to completely capture and enclose this force within its 
physical and juridical ambit. The war machine is also necessary for the national identity 
insofar as it is tasked with defending the national interest, even if at times it works to 
undermine the states attempt to completely capture and enclose a unified and stable 
national interest.  
In order to serve both functions – violence and identity – the war machine needs 
to speak in two voices. One voice is that of security, emphasizing existential crises and 
the ability to limit or eliminate them. The other voice is that of common cause, 
emphasizing that all this violence is justified because it protects “us,” “the people,” or 
“the nation.” In the turn toward privatization, both tasks were still central to the 
military/security network, and these attempts to fulfil both roles despite the structural 
break from the state can be demonstrated through two anecdotes.  
 
Good as Gold 
 
In military and security affairs, necessity is often thought to dictate action. Chain of 
command and bureaucracy are created in order to streamline decision-making, ensure 
accountability, and help organize otherwise complex systems of action. From this point 
of view, the military-security networks often appear to be purely technocratic in their 
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operations. Leave ideology and politics to the politicians, the military is there to get 
things done. However, as the first half of this chapter demonstrates, the military-security 
institutions often go off-course and determine on their own which actions might be 
necessary.  
These instances are once again legitimated by claims of necessity but a closer 
look reveals that not a little ideology is gathered in order to establish these claims as 
common sense extensions of an otherwise technocratic institution. While the war 
machine appears at times to break out of its established boundaries, it nonetheless tethers 
itself to an ideology grounded in the notion of the nation, peoples, or the State. In cases 
where a monetary benefit appears to guide the direction of development, the agents of the 
war machine must nonetheless rally a particular ideology and identity in order to proceed 
from a position of presumptive necessity.  
The story of Brigadier General Danny Gold is a case in point. Gold was in charge 
of the Research and Development Unit at the Research and Development Directorate 
(RDD) in the Ministry of Defense, the unit responsible for guiding R&D efforts toward 
new weapons systems for the IDF.227 In August of 2005, Gold began to allocate his units 
funds toward developing a missile defense system without going through the typical 
chain of command (i.e., without the knowledge of the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, 
or the IDF). Along with discretely appropriating funds for the purpose of developing this 
project, Gold utilized his connections with Rafael Ltd., who approached the government 
of Singapore in order to secure additional funds and share the cost of developing the 
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system. For its participation in the project, the government of Singapore could secure the 
purchase of the new system.  
It was not until after the fallout of the Second Lebanon War in August of 2006 
that Defense Minister Amir Peretz began to officially instantiate the project, with the 
RDD instructing Rafael to begin the project, which consequently received the approval of 
Prime Minister Olmert. The program then underwent a series of delays and reboots, with 
the IDF chief of staff delaying further developments in June 2007 only to have the new 
Minister of Defense Ehud Barak approve them one month later. It gathered additional 
support when U.S. President Barack Obama allocated some $205 million to the 
project.228 Shefer and Barak, citing reporting by Yossi Melman, argue that the system 
appeared to be directed less toward addressing a particular security concern and more 
toward creating a profitable project for Rafael, who were previously sidelined in the 
development of the Arrow missile system directed by IAI.229 In addition to U.S. funds, 
the project is reported to have sought additional funding and received interest from India, 
South Korea and other states. 
In 2009, State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss’ submitted a report on the 
development of Iron Dome, singling out Gold for breaking the chain of command. The 
report was summarized in an editorial in Haaretz thusly: 
…in fact, the entire inception of Iron Dome was done in sin, because one cog in 
the Administration for the Development of Weapons and Technological 
Infrastructure, Brig. Gen. Dr. Danny Gold, took it upon himself to assume the 
responsibilities of the IDF chief of staff, the defense minister and the government 
of the State of Israel, before the project was approved in the proper channels. In 
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other words, desk job Gold decided on his own with complete disregard for the 
IDF chief of staff, the defense minister and the entire government.230 
When asked in an interview about the comments of the comptroller and other critics, 
Gold stated:  
I am completely not angry. It only made the process more challenging and more 
interesting. People worked on the development like mad men, truly day and night, 
and the comptrollers and critics, like the pair of old guys in the Muppet Show, sat 
on the sidelines and criticized. It never really bothered us. 
 
One has a sense that Gold was not exactly “completely not angry” and was indeed rather 
annoyed by the need to follow some basic guidelines imposed by the institution. In 
another interview, Gold explained his actions this way: “I just canceled all the 
unnecessary bureaucracy… I left only the most crucial bureaucracy needed for 
success.”231 Similarly, Yossi Drucker, a project manager at Rafael responsible for 
developing Iron Dome, explained that “I cannot say that the [State Comptroller] report is 
wrong… But if you want to achieve something in a very short time…you have sometimes 
to bypass the bureaucracy.”232 Drucker, in an interview with U.S. televangelist Pat 
Robertson, also intimated that the Iron Dome project was never intended to protect Israeli 
towns but was instead pursued for purely financial reasons; the system was developed as 
an item explicitly targeted toward the export market.233  
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For his deviation from the chain of command, Brigadier General Gold was not 
reprimanded but instead received high praise. Following the State Comptroller’s searing 
report, Uzi Rubin, head of the Israeli Missile Defense Organization explained that: 
In the Austro-Hungarian Empire before the First World War there was a special 
award for officers who violated a command and thereby saved the state. It would 
be appropriate to give such an award to Brigadier General (res.) Danny Gold, who 
was severely criticized by the state comptroller for starting the Iron Dome project 
without waiting for long months until all the bureaucratic steps were completed 
(Haaretz April 17, 2011). 234  
 
Gold went on to receive an Israel Defense Prize in 2012 for his development of Iron 
Dome.  
Oddly enough, his acknowledgement led another Israel Defense Prize winner, Dr. 
Moti Shefer, to charge that Iron Dome was in fact a bluff and that the claims regarding its 
success rate were wildly overblown. According to Shefer, the system was part of a 
conspiracy between the defense industries and the Prime Minister; the first receiving 
substantial foreign investment and an expanding international market for the new 
technology, the latter achieving the added benefit of being able to demonstrate that 
negotiation with the Palestinians was neither necessary nor desirable.235 Shefer’s 
allegations received additional support when Theodore Postol, a physicist at MIT, and 
Richard Lloyd, a weapons expert, echoed the charges of exaggerated claims regarding 
success rate after reviewing amateur videos of Iron Dome in action. Both claim that the 
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success rate is closer to 5 percent against the 86 percent reported by the IDF.236 Absent 
some revelatory leak or whistleblowing act, we are not likely to receive the necessary 
detailed information that might confirm these allegations, as the IDF withholds most data 
confidentially as a matter of national security.  
The Iron Dome system continued to receive development and production grants 
from the Obama administration in 2014 worth $225 million and a Senate report estimates 
$1 billion provided by the U.S. between 2011 and 2014 for Iron Dome.237 The 
government of Canada has purchased Iron Dome technology and there are reports that 
Singapore, several Gulf States, and South Korea have for a long time now expressed 
interest in purchasing the technology as well.238  
Danny Gold developed Iron Dome outside, arguably against, the chain of 
command. The development of Iron Dome troubles the notion of sovereign state action, 
especially in the sphere most often associated with the monopoly of state power; over the 
technologies of violence. That the singular notion of state sovereign action is troubled 
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should come as no surprise. This example, however, provides a clear demonstration that 
need not rely on esoteric theory or philosophical exegesis. Gold, a man of the state, broke 
with the state, guided by the ostensible desire to protect the homeland as quickly and as 
effectively as possible. As he explains: 
Alongside the unique contribution to saving human lives and the fact that it only 
intercepts projectiles headed for a defined protected area, it also gives the political 
and defense establishments the freedom to plan tactical and strategic maneuvers. 
It gives the IDF breathing room in its offensives, as the civilians are protected by 
a safety net. It is much easier when there aren't any casualties on the homefront. 
The system also saves the cost of economic damage both by preventing physical 
destruction and by preventing the economy from being paralyzed. For Israel, this 
is the first line of defense against the main threat we face — the missile threat.239   
 
Iron Dome proved to be a political and economic success for Israel. Apprehending “the 
missile threat” as “the main threat we face,” it worked to create space for the continuation 
of the status quo, or viewed in the negative, helped give delay to any meaningful political 
concessions or debates regarding the status of the territory and identity of the State of 
Israel. All in all, Iron Dome proved to be good as Gold.  
 
“That’s Right, I am a Gaucho Judío” 
 
The second anecdote involves two men who did not hold significant positions in the state 
military institutions but whose dealing would nevertheless shape Israel’s military/security 
network. One of the more successful companies to emerge from Israel’s transition toward 
privatization of military and securities industries was International Security and Defense 
Systems (ISDS), a security consultancy firm. Its founder and president is Leo Gleser, 
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self-described as a “Jewish Cowboy” and known as “Colonel Gleser” among his Latin 
American clients. Gleser, an Argentine-Jew, migrated to Israel in the late 1960s and 
quickly developed a good reputation in the security establishment. After serving in an 
elite IDF unit, he was reportedly offered a position in Israel’s intelligence service, the 
Mossad, which he turned down for a security position at El Al airlines.240 Gleser got his 
start in business with the help of Shaul Eisenberg. Eisenberg, you will recall, was one of 
Israel’s first billionaire oligarchs.  
At age 17, Eisenberg fled Nazi Germany before settling in China and then Japan. 
According to legend, Eisenberg’s first small fortune was earned while on a freighter to 
China, where he bought cigarettes at five cents a pack from the ship canteen and sold 
them to Chinese refugees at a dollar a pack. After the war, he began to amass a fortune in 
the import-export business (e.g., steel for Japanese reconstruction) before moving to 
Israel in 1968 and founding Israel Corp. – the state’s largest holding company – with the 
aid of the government. With his growing wealth, Eisenberg found his way into elite 
policymaking circles, donating to the major political parties and using his influence to 
pass the aforementioned “Eisenberg Law.”241 Eisenberg’s experience in the import/export 
business alongside his political connections and world travel proved valuable to his new 
venture as an arms dealer in the 1980s. He served clients from developing nations in 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia, selling Israeli arms as well as purchasing equipment on 
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behalf of the state. According to Bichler and Nitzan, Eisenberg’s reach extended far and 
deep: 
In 1981, for example, Defence Minister Ariel Sharon was planning an African 
trip, with plenty of journalists, whose purpose was to open up new markets for 
Israeli armament. Eisenberg politely offered to fly Sharon, discretely and without 
the press, in his private jet. The minister of course refused. He had his own 
friends, such as arms dealers Markus Katz and Ya’akov Nimrodi, to cater to. But 
as the trip progressed, Sharon realised [sic] he was outmanoeuvred [sic]. On every 
landing he was greeted by an Eisenberg representative, already holding the 
exclusive right to import Israeli weapons.242 
 
Much of Eisenberg’s story reads like a Hollywood screenplay full of drama and intrigue, 
strange connections, bizarre events, stunning achievements and equally devastating 
failures.  
One of the more bizarre incidents in Eisenberg’s life was his falling out with 
former business partner Michael Albin. Following the 1983 Israeli stock market collapse, 
Eisenberg had losses amounting to some $40 million while his partner Albin made some 
$15 million in profit. As Bichler and Nitzan recount the story, “Eisenberg unleashed his 
political power – this time against his own partner. Scandal ensued, and Albin, who 
found himself in police custody, eventually jumped (or was pushed) to his death from the 
station window.”243  
All this happened several years after Eisenberg gave Leo Gleser his first 
introduction into the world of international security consulting. In 1979, Glesser was 
approached by Victor Cohen and Zvi Aharoni, two security experts who sought Gleser’s 
help on behalf of Eisenberg. One of Eisenberg’s business connections was the wealthy 
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Granados family of Guatemala. Eisenberg and the Granados were developing plans for a 
hydroelectric station project in Guatemala worth an estimated $1 billion. In the midst of 
their business dealings, Jorge Raul Garcia Granados, a child in the Granados family, was 
kidnapped by Ejercito Guerillo de los Pobres (General Army of the Poor), a Maoist rebel 
group. The family sought help from an American security firm in addition to reaching out 
to their Israeli connections. Cohen and Aharoni successfully recruited Gleser, who took 
leave from El-Al and travelled to Guatemala. Forming an investigative body and reaching 
out to the kidnappers, Gleser was eventually successful in securing the release of Jorge 
Raul Garcia Granados by paying a modest ransom of $4.5 million.  
According to Gleser,  
From the Jorge Raul affair I learned how this world works. I understood that 
people want to be sold dreams. After all, what was my part in the episode? I 
helped a family in distress. People in distress want to grasp at hope. I came and 
gave them the hope, the dream. Sometimes you can wake up from a dream into a 
nightmare. In life there is either a beautiful dream or a nightmare, there is nothing 
in between. Luckily for me, the dream came true with a happy ending. Since then 
I have sold dreams.244 [my emphasis] 
 
The documentary The Lab further demonstrates Gleser’s skills as a dream weaver. Gleser 
is well-known in the military-security network for the large backyard bar-b-ques that he 
hosts, bringing foreign dignitaries, military leaders, heads of industry, and Israeli 
politicians to enjoy a social mixer in his idyllic moshav property. The documentary gives 
an intimate view of these happenings: a sprawling yard shaded by eucalyptus trees, 
scattered with lawn chairs and picnic tables, children and grandchildren running around 
the yard, all alongside generals, foreign dignitaries, and heads of industry. The event 
exudes the prototypical Israeli picnic that would be familiar to most residents and 
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experienced visitors. Part of ISDS’s success can be attributed to Glaser’s jovial 
personality; he can be seen running from one special guest to another, making 
introductions with a wide grin and punctuating the conversations with quips and jokes.  
The company boasts an admirable list of clients, including governments (e.g., 
Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, India, Italy, Peru, Singapore, Spain, the United States), 
large public events (e.g., the Olympics, the World Cup), corporations, companies, and 
financial institutions (e.g., Petrobras, Telmex, Banco de Mexico, Singapore Airlines, 
Coca-Cola, and many others). They house headquarters in Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, 
Lima, Buenos Aires, Princeton, Tegucigalpa, and Panama City in addition to their offices 
in Nir Zvi, Israel. The company website includes a photo gallery of Gleser rubbing 
elbows with several Israeli heads of state (Olmert, Netanyahu, Peres), the Spanish King 
and Queen, two Brazilian presidents (de Silva and Rousseff), India’s Minister of Defense, 
a New York Mayor Giuliani, former CIA director James Woolsey, and former Homeland 
Security chiefs Michael Chertoff and Tom Ridge, as well as a photo of Mr. Glaser with 
football great, Pele.  
ISDS is the picture of a transnational military/security corporation. Gleser’s 
company holds training sessions, with participants from all corners of the globe. The 
group in one training session filmed by Yotam Feldman is an eclectic and motley crew, 
most donning fatigues of their given military or police agency, some in more traditional 
garb. Gleser lives in a world between borders, between languages, without concern for 
the particular historical or political contexts of his clients. In interviews, he emphasizes 
that ISDS always operates within the law and refuses to deal with abusive regimes.  
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Despite this, ISDS is beginning to see some push back. In 2015, the government 
of Brazil was reported to have distanced itself from the reported $2.2 billion contract that 
ISDS had with the Organizing Committee for the 2016 Games in Rio. According to 
statements by officials in the Ministry of Justice, the Government of Brazil has not 
granted any government contract to ISDS and that any withstanding deal with the 
Olympic Committee “won’t result in compromises by the Brazilian government.”  The 
statement came as a result of a letter penned by Brazilian labor unions and activist 
groups, citing ISDS connections to Israel as well as to Latin American death squads and 
military regimes.  
As the executive director of Central Única dos Trabalhadore (CUT) – Brazil’s 
largest trade union – Julio Turra explained:  
We are glad with the information the government distances itself from ISDS. It 
would be illegal and shameful to hire a company that develops its technologies in 
complicity with Israeli crimes and that accumulates complaints about its 
participation in Central American dictatorships.”245 
 
The response was viewed as a significant victory for the BDS movement. Still, there is 
not a little hypocrisy, as the government of Brazil has for a long time had connections 
with ISDS and the Israeli military/security industries. In 2015, Israel and its affiliated 
companies were the 5th largest arms importer to Brazil.246 Gleser, on behalf of ISDS and 
Israeli manufacturers, provides training and pitches small arms and security vehicles to 
Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE) – the Brazilian Special Police Forces 
                                                 
245 Palestinian BDS National Committee, “2016 Olympics: After BDS pressure, Brazilian government 
denies relations with Israeli company IDSD,” BDS Movement, May 7, 2015, Accessed March 8 2016, 
http://bdsmovement.net/2015/israeli-company-loses-2016-rio-olympics-security-contract-it-had-claimed-
to-have-been-awarded-13120#sthash.RmlwD2zN.dpuf 
 
246 SIPRI, “Trend Indicator Values (TIV) or arms exports to Brazil, 2015,” Generated through: 
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php 
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in Rio de Janiero responsible for killing and capturing narcotraffickers in the densely 
populated favelas.  
For Gleser, a balancing act between identity and the war machine is necessary. 
ISDS seeks to benefit from Israeli policies and the development of highly profitable 
antecedent technologies of control while at the same time disavowing itself as an absolute 
stand-in representative of the State. Like Gold, who was balancing between the war 
machine and Law, Gleser has to disavow attempts by the state to tie down his actions, 
avoiding the stakes of the State. This does not mean Gleser, as an embodiment of his 
company ISDS, is any less implicated in the networks of violence generated and 
legitimated by the State. Gleser needs the state no less than it needs him, even if their 
constructions of perceived threat are quite different in structure (form) and context 
(content).  
Gleser and ISDS are highly concerned about generalized threats that could 
emerge from anywhere and spread everywhere; data points to be targeted and eliminated, 
movements to be redirected, crowds to be dispersed, surges or blocs of bodies to be 
pacified. In one especially telling scene, Gleser describes to the filmmaker his vision of 
the future: 
Gleser: The world is heading for very hard times.  
Feldman: Where?  
Gleser: Apocalypse. Yes. Look, what happened on September 11th was the 
American apocalypse. Nineteen men with a limited budget brought the U.S. to its 
knees and made them bite the dirt with their teeth… The defense solutions 
continue to come only from Israel by Israeli companies.247   
 
                                                 
247 Feldman, The Lab 
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Gleser is the anthropomorphic embodiment of the war machine described by Deleuze and 
Guattari, an itinerant commander without an army. As a functionary of the 
military/security apparatus, Gleser reflects at one and the same time a largely uninhibited 
range of movement, beyond the capture of the State, and an absolute reliance on the 
identity that the State grants its projects and subjects, an identity secured for their and its 
protection. His romantic self-description as a Gaucho Judío – a Jewish Cowboy – is 
fitting. Not tied to a State, ambling across the continents, having no superiors, yet 
motivated by a sense of belonging, Gleser must project that identity which would help 
legitimate his itineracy.  
 
Military Public Relations and Identity 
 
Since the 1990s, the IDF has not only become increasingly privatized, but has also started 
to move a greater distance away from the lives of many Israelis. As fewer and fewer 
Israelis serve in the IDF – the numbers are now less than half of eligible Israelis248 – the 
ability to engender social cohesion around the common experiences of military service 
has diminished. Added to this are the scandals that undermine the public faith and trust in 
the military institutions and leadership. This might explain, in part, why the IDF has 
engineered a growing public relations presence on social media.   
Since Operation Cast Lead in late 2008-early 2009, the government of Israel has 
become increasingly aware of its public image on the internet. After the backlash against 
what was seen by many as an overwhelmingly disproportionate use of force in Gaza that 
                                                 
248 Maman et al. 
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resulted in the death of some 1400 Palestinians, the IDF began to increase its presence on 
various social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter). Facebook, the most popular 
social media outlet, proved to be an especially important branding tool for IDF. Facebook 
posts are largely aimed at countering criticism hurled against the Forces and the State of 
Israel, as well as crafting an ideal image of an admirable military force. Rallying public 
relations techniques, the IDF Facebook page features human interest stories on current 
soldiers as well as infographics, news updates, greetings and memes. 
The IDF social media effort is telling for at least two reasons. First, it 
demonstrates the IDF’s need to strengthen civil/public support in Israel, but more 
importantly, to a foreign Western audience. For a State military, the IDF appears to be 
uniquely concerned with its public image. Many of the Twitter posts highlight the IDF 
role in emergency aid following catastrophic events in places like the Philippines or 
Haiti. Another common feature is the focus on women soldiers in the IDF and the 
military’s openness toward gender and sexual orientation. These run alongside updates on 
seized weapons caches in the West Bank, the routing of Hamas operations, the state-of-
the-art equipment used or developed by the IDF, and news alerts on stabbings, shootings, 
or other violent activities in and around Israel, Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.  
Those elements not directly related to defense and security – the ostensible sole 
purpose of a State military – should not be misread as exaggerations or pretense. The IDF 
is rather unique in its liberal policies toward sexual orientation and gender, which is not 
to say that the institution is free of cases of sexual assault and rape. The IDF is also 
unique, given the size of the force, in the level of support it lends to international aid 
efforts. These qualities should be encouraged and given their due. The reason I highlight 
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these practices is not to disavow these praiseworthy characteristics, but instead to ask why 
they are necessary for a military and how they work to legitimate the institution. This 
chapter provides some direction toward answering those questions even if it does not 
provide a definitive answer. More will be said on this in the concluding chapter of this 
study.  
The second reason that the IDF social media presence is telling is that it reflects 
the increasingly religious, ethno-national character of the IDF mission. A look at the 
memes posted on the Facebook page gives a distinct sense that Israel is the Jewish State 
and the IDF is the military of the Jewish people. This meaning is conveyed by the use of 
holiday greetings and religious imagery. For example, on Fridays, the IDF often posts an 
image – usually a heroic scene of soldiers engaged in their duties – with the message 
“Shabbat Shalom.” More often than not, the image is accompanied by a Star of David 
with sword and olive branch – the logo of the IDF. Some of the images are not-so-subtle 
in their intention. One image in particular shows an IDF soldier draped in a prayer shawl 
and donning a kippah, pressed close to the Western Wall, head hung low in prayer, with 
rifle slung low at his hip. The increased prevalence of the kippah donned by active duty 
soldiers has also been noted by many who served in the IDF during the 60s and 70s. 
Statistics back up these observations. As Jones and Murphy point out:  
The religious-nationalists make up some 10 percent of the Israeli populace, they 
now provide 40 percent of the IDF officer corps and tends to do their military 
service in front-line combat units. Moreover, some 30 percent of front-line troops 
now wear knitted skullcap or kippah, a visable mark of affinity with religious-
nationalism.249 
 
                                                 
249 Clive Jones and Emma C. Murphy, Israel: Challenges to Identity, Democracy and The State (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 54.  
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One also increasingly sees Israeli soldiers performing the ritual of wearing tefillin for 
prayer while riding on the public train system.  
This is not to say that the IDF was ever anything but an ethno-national military 
force, but as nationalist aspirations have become increasingly tied to human rights, and as 
multiculturalism has increasingly become a defining characteristic of the modern liberal 
state, the IDF’s ability to garner legitimacy appears weakened. In light of that difficulty, 
the IDF has chosen to emphasize its ethno-national affinities, believing that this – rather 
than legitimacy based on security for all citizens of the State – could provide the grounds 
for its legitimacy. At the same time, the IDF appeals to liberal enlightened ideals of 
human rights, gender equality, and ethnic diversity (i.e., images of Ethiopian, Mizrahi, 
Bedouin, and Druze soldiers but not Palestinian or Arab-Israelis).  
The PR images disseminated by the IDF are not likely to raise eyebrows, either 
among Israeli Jews or a foreign audience who are used to thinking of the State of Israel as 
the Jewish State. Michael Brecher’s seminal study on Israeli military-civil relations, for 
example, includes the following line: “For Israel’s high policy elite, as for the entire 
society, there is a primordial and pre-eminent aspect of the political culture – its 
Jewishness; this pervades thought, feeling, belief and behavior in the political realm.”250 
Brecher’s assertion that Jewishness pervades the political culture of the entire society is 
as unsurprising as it is a mischaracterization of the social and political make-up of the 
state.  
Placed in the context of Israel’s actual demographic make-up, the images are less 
than a clear reflection of the reality and diversity of Israeli life, culture, and people, 
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especially as it relates to the Arab minority. None of the images on the IDF site give 
mention of Muslim holidays, toward which some 20 percent of the Israeli citizenry share 
affinity or observance. Christian holidays, on the other hand, are occasionally given 
mention – Easter and Christmas. The exclusion of Muslim holidays and imagery, whether 
intentional or not, reflects the ethno-national affinities of the Israeli State and Military. 
When one considers the fact that Christians make up an estimated 2 percent of the Israeli 
citizenry, their inclusion alongside the Muslim exclusion begins to take on some 
relevance.251  
These images, we should remember, are posted on the IDF Facebook page, 
written in English, and largely targeting a foreign audience. The message is clear: Israel 
is a Jewish State, Liberal and inclusive, but weary of any affiliation, celebration, or 
commemoration of its Palestinian Arab citizenry. In this context, how might the State 
hope to achieve peaceable recognition between the Jewish and Muslim communities?  
 
Conclusion 
 
The above discussion gives an image of a globe blanketed-over by a tapestry of the 
military/security industry, a transnational war machine without any particular national 
loyalty that is nonetheless appropriated by state power and tasked with its political 
projects. The image of the war machine that takes the entirely of the globe as its space of 
movement elicits the nervous conclusion that against the people and the state stands an 
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independent force that threatens to subordinate their needs in preference to its own 
freedom of movement. Toward the end of their essay, Deleuze and Guattari describe the 
war machine this way: 
The war machine reforms a smooth space that now claims to control, to surround the 
entire earth. Total war itself is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still. 
The war machine has taken charge of the aim, worldwide order, and the States are 
now no more than objects or means adapted to that machine. This is the point at 
which Clausewitz’s formula is effectively reversed; to be entitled to say that politics 
is the continuation of war by other means, it is not enough to invert the order of the 
words as if they could be spoken in either direction; it is necessary to follow the real 
movement at the conclusion of which the States, having appropriated the war 
machine, and having adapted to their aims, reimport a war machine that takes charge 
of the aim, appropriates the States, and assumes increasingly wider political 
functions.252 
 
This essay has noticeably and explicitly addressed only two tendencies of the war 
machine; its appropriation by forces of state and its naked disregard for life and other 
established values. In the conclusion of the dissertation, I will now turn to a speculative 
theory that may illuminate another tendency of the war machine, the one that 
postmodernists were so attracted to: the deterritorializing of physical and discursive space 
for the creation of new avenues toward freedom. A politics of (re)cognition that would 
point toward an ethics of epistemology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
252 Deleuze and Guattari, 421. 
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CONCLUSION: A RECOGNITIVE ETHICS OF EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
There is no privileged position from which to view the production of the state in 
its entirety.253 We can see the state from the window of a shack in a slum surrounding the 
central bus station, from a high-rise apartment overlooking the city, from maps on the 
desk of a cartographer, from tables in the central bureau of statistics, from the diplomatic 
archives of a foreign embassy, from the market just before sundown on Shabbat, from a 
mosque minaret edging the coast, or from a church pew on Christmas eve. None of these 
vantage points is any better than the other. None of these positions is uniquely privileged 
outside of a web of meaning in which they might be placed or the ends toward which 
their positions would be rallied. This is not to say that each of them is devoid of value. 
Quite the opposite is true. Each position is rich in meaning and offers another thread to 
the tapestry of social life. In addition to lending meaning, each of these vantage points 
works to undermine any final, stable judgment on what makes up the state and society, 
how they might be described, from where they derive their value, how they might inspire 
loyalty or dissidence, and how they may be enclosed now and forever. 
 In this project, I bring a decentering ethic to the concept of recognition. At heart, 
this was a study on the other that always disturbs our attempts achieving a final and 
stable being and at the same time demands of us an admission of ethical responsibility in 
facing its gaze. For a study that would be placed in the field of International Relations, it 
might seem as though centering the inquiry on the subject of the other reads too abstract 
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and detached. International Relations is a field defined by the focus on relation between 
States – objects that are all too familiar even if we cannot say for sure what they are and 
what their presence entails for any of the major areas of human inquiry into social 
relations (justice, economy, politics, aesthetics, language). With its focus on States, 
mainstream international relations has appeared largely unconcerned by the 
phenomenality, social ontology, and epistemic paths that allow us to know the State as a 
thing.  
The discipline of international relations relies upon a crucial distinction, a 
bifurcation of the social world –  at times leading to a physical boundary –  that would 
mark the space between “us” and “them,” collective-self and collective-other, the people 
(our people), the nation (our nation), the state (our state). This bifurcation is employed by 
and achieved through recourse to identity and difference. In the field of post-modern 
social theory, the problematic of history as it relates to identity and difference is a guiding 
theme, thanks in part to Hegel.254 In fact, one could go further back in history to Thomas 
More.255 With a little work, one could reach even farther back to Plato and his dialogues 
The Sophist, Timeaus, and The Republic in particular.256  
These thinkers and others realized the uncomfortable tension: our waning 
confidence in our ontological viewpoint toward the world on the one hand, and our 
assuredness as to the political positions we occupy, defend, and disseminate – or in which 
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we are ensnared, entrusted, and disciplined – in our social relations and being. If we are 
to understand our political scene, we would be required at the least and impelled upon at 
most to understand how this bifurcation is achieved, to what ends, with what 
repercussions, and in light of which other possible options or degrees of freedom. We 
would be required to begin an inquiry into the recognitive ethics of epistemology – that 
field which works to bridge the gap between our phenomenality and our ontological 
gambits: the very seat of structural violence.  
A Recognitive Ethics of Epistemology 
 
The current ethics of epistemology is heavily indebted to its positivist roots. Knowledge 
is typically seen as value-neutral among its peddlers, practitioners, and developers. 
Packaged products that emerge after a long chain of verediction are thought to represent 
the world as it is: nothing but the facts. However, as I demonstrate throughout this 
project, choices that are made along the way in the face of incomplete information. 
Despite this, knowledge claims are too often coated in a veneer of confidence that begins 
to crack when placed under the least amount of pressure.  
A recognitive ethics of epistemology would begin with a dedication to 
interpreting, forecasting, and preventing forms of violence that would emerge from a 
privileged discourse. This would be an ethical responsibility placed primarily on those 
whose writing, speaking, and activity are likely to have substantial impact on how their 
thoughts, ideas, and activities proliferate and affect changes in social thought, structure, 
relations, and the like. Their ability to affect significant change may emerge from their 
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individual genius, but more often than not, their work is disseminated via networks of 
knowledge that have the distinction and power to amplify their effects.  
In this project, I focus on three areas of discourse that I packaged and labelled as 
discursive networks or networks of knowledge/power. These were the State, the 
Academy, and the Military-Security networks. These might also have been labelled as 
“Governing/Ordering,” “Analytical/Creative,” and “Killing/Securing” networks – though 
these, perhaps exempting the first, lack precision and appear “clunky” in the 
contemporary vernacular.257 Other networks exist and a similar focus could be placed on 
their knowledge production and the creative forces they rally to affect change in social 
relations. These might include the Aesthetics (Music, Visual Art, Film, Poetry and 
Words), Technologies (Energy, Information, Travel, Communication), and Spatial Orders 
(Architecture, Design, Civil Engineering), among others. The networks selected here 
were best suited to the current project and my own area of knowledge and interest. The 
selection, however, was not arbitrary. The networks chosen were those which may be 
implicated in forms of violence that are more destructive to ethical recognitive practice 
than others.  
These networks have a regretfully heroic ability to influence the killing of 
corporeal and cognitive bodies. Part of this ability is ceded to them, either because their 
powers of persuasion as to the legitimacy of their actions, or the magnitude of the force 
they are able to rally toward given ends. Whether ideationally or materially, these 
networks often take as their role an act of clearing or else agglomerating bodies and 
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ideas. What they place in the center of reason and what they relegate to the margins is 
always a choice between competing values guided by certain modes of interpretation. In 
this act – we may call it a sovereign act though it is not – are a succession of ethical 
decisions. As systems become more complex, the nodes of ethical choice – sites of 
recognition – proliferate. Unless ethical thought is allowed to keep apace with these 
mushrooming nodes of decision making, the decisions made carry an increased risk of 
enabling unjust actions toward others and toward the self. Unless ethical thought is 
brought into epistemological chains or networks, the iterative practice of (re)cognition 
risks falling toward the stifling politics of recognition.  
What would a recognitive ethics of epistemology look like in practice? First, it 
would include in its analysis an engagement with possible futures emerging from the 
given knowledge being produced. Second, it would contain explicit notes regarding the 
gambles being made along the way of producing this knowledge and why one path was 
chosen over another. Third, it would work toward ensuring that the likelihood of the 
worst predicted outcomes would be minimized as much as possible. Put another way, it 
would not only be reflexive in its thought, but actively so, working to reduce its worst 
excesses. The recognitive ethics of epistemology would also include responsibility on the 
part of those who pass along this knowledge, to hold the knowledge to account and 
explicitly announce its failure to aspire to an ethic that would lean toward the reduction 
of the unjust killing of bodies and ideas.  
The exact contours of a recognitive ethics of epistemology are yet to be worked 
out. Here, I am merely motioning toward them, suggesting their importance and 
applicability, and enlisting myself with the intention to ferret out their movement and 
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structure. None of the above is to say that those involved in knowledge production do not 
admit of some inevitable errors that have been made along the way. The scientific 
method could be read as one which builds in its practitioner a healthy level of skepticism, 
(self)doubt, and humility toward its discoveries and findings. Paradigms shift, new 
discoveries overturn old ones, the value of knowledge can quickly degrade from 
officially sanctioned praise to junk- or pseudo-science. However, while an individual 
might admit to some caution and weariness, networks of knowledge/power may have 
reason not to. The degree to which the two – the individual and the network – are 
separated is too dense a topic to explore here but both a qualitative and quantitative 
difference exists between these categories.  
Institutions and networks can often escape scrutiny not only because they often 
pass unnoticed, but also because they legitimate their power on the basis of group 
identity. Like the War Machine, institutions that structure power and structures that 
institute power shuttle between violence and identity. The ways they do this are never 
value neutral and always reflect one choice among many. Our responsibility should be to 
consider these choices carefully, introducing a recognitive ethics of epistemology into the 
scientific method and other methods of inquiry, including and especially scholarly 
productions.  
 
Ethics of recognition 
 
My focus on recognition is an exercise in an ethics of epistemology. Recognition works 
to ground, stabilize, and legitimate certain institutions. Too often, how this functions and 
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to what ends – with what repercussions and to what exclusions – is passed over as 
nitpicking or trifling. Recognition, with its origins in the Liberal tradition, collected over 
the centuries all manner of justifications as well as elusions. My goal here has been to 
expose some of these overlooked conceptual and political gambits with the hopes of 
addressing the violence that passes either unnoticed or unrecognized. 
The Israel-Palestine conflict, in the eyes of many, can only be solved by a hard 
division. “Separate but equal” best characterizes the approaches to the conflict from the 
view of State, the Academy, and the Military (though not the War Machine). From this 
view, a proverbial Judgment of Solomon will have to take place, except that this time, the 
sword would be allowed to do its work. Then it would finally put Us Here and Them 
There: everything in its right place. The individuals and communities, as we have been 
told before, must suffer and only have a future as righteous victims. If this is true now, 
has it always been? If this is true now, must it be now and forever?  
The ethics of recognition would not only recognize contingency and change, but 
also renounce control and domination of others that had been achieved until now through 
a bifurcation based on identity (as if identity were a stable and rooted thing). The goal is 
to remove from politics in the public sphere – or on grand scales (i.e., states, the 
international system) – an imposed hierarchy of rights and enter instead into relations 
from which exchanges are decided openly, deliberately and democratically. This does not 
mean politics and differentiation of roles will not exist in smaller scales or even that the 
desire toward sovereignty will be entirely removed. Acknowledging and understanding 
the way this desire operates to construct a certain kind of social world might help to avoid 
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some of the more aggressive and persistent relations of domination that are given 
momentum by the presumed and ascribed legitimacy of their project, demand, or calling.  
An ethics of recognition requires humility and openness. As Levinas said when 
speaking of “dis-inter-estedness”: 
When I talk of ethics as “dis-inter-estedness,” I do not mean that it is indifference; 
I simply mean that it is a form of vigilant passivity to the call of the other, which 
precedes our interest in being, our inter-est, as a being-in-the-world attached to 
property and appropriating what is other than itself to itself.258 
 
It is my hope that the peoples residing in the land between the Jordan River and the 
Mediterranean Sea might still find the space to open to the face of the other.  
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